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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

JUSTICE IN EVALUATION: PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY EVALUATION

by

STEPHEN WILLIAM YULE BATH

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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(SIGNED) Stephen Bath

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

#57 - 3115 - 119 St.

Edmonton, Alberta

Canada, T6J 5N5

DATED January 28, 1988

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled JUSTICE IN EVALUATION: PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY EVALUATION submitted by STEPHEN WILLIAM YULE BATH in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

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Supervisor

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External Examiner

Date.....January 18, 1988.....

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Marilyn and Liam, for it could not have been written without their insuperable encouragement.

Abstract

The thesis question — What are just rôles for participants and evaluators of Participatory Case Study Evaluation (PCSE), and how do these effect the validity of the case study report? — derives from the ethical problems of control discussed in the literature on Democratic Case Study Evaluation of the Centre for Applied Research in Education (CARE), University of East Anglia. Going beyond the CARE ethic, a principle of justice-as-control was introduced when evaluating a university, graduate programme. Contrary to the CARE justificatory principle of the public's right to know, PCSE asserts a pre-emptive participant right to privacy (anonymity and confidentiality). Also, the PCSE ethic was initially given to effect participant validation of the report. Recipients of the report, in turn, were understood to generalise through vicarious experience or empathetic understanding.

However, a hermeneutic turn was experienced which led to an understanding of a positive distanciation between spoken dialogue and written discourse. This was to question whether the reader is in conversation with the lived-participation of the study, or whether validation is dependent upon the reader's pre-understandings combining with the objective sense of the text. Do participants stand behind the text, or does the world of the text transcend their lived-experience?

The dissertation thesis concerns this relationship between participatory ethics and written reporting. Participant validation is disavowed and a distinction is made between the participatory, ethical experience and the validating, comprehension of the report. While PCSE empowers participants, the positive distanciation effected by writing mediates reader appropriation. Participation and validation are discreet phenomena.

Co-research in educational evaluations is not unusual. Participation which countenances principles of confidentiality, anonymity, and justice is unique. Coming to understand such ethical choices to allow access and to release understandings is the added dimension of this study concerning justice in evaluation. The dissertation suggests just, critical and distinct rôles for participants, evaluators and recipients of participatory case study evaluation.

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Chapter I

SITUATING THE EVALUATION STUDY

A. Planning a Study within a Study

This doctoral dissertation concerns a separate study within a study. As preliminary research to this dissertation I conducted an evaluation of a university department's graduate studies and research programme. This was submitted to the University President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews. This dissertation takes up questions concerning justice and validation which were experienced in the context of the participatory case study evaluation. At one level (methodological) the question researched became: How may we develop principles and procedures which provide more justice with respect to participant rights to decide on access to and release of evaluation knowledge? This is to come to understand how and when evaluative actions may empower participants. At the second level (epistemological), the dissertation questions whether we may consider the more just rôles of participants as influencing the validity of the reporting—to consider participants as final arbiters of the case. A third level (philosophical) of the dissertation questions the previous epistemological assumptions by introducing an understanding that the experience of the spoken dialogue of the evaluation is fundamentally different from the experience of the written case study report. Hence, this third level of inquiry becomes: What happens to questions of ethics and validity when spoken dialogue becomes written discourse? Finally, at the fourth level (ontological), the dissertation questions participatory case study evaluation by considering the relationship between lived-participation and written-contextualisation. The hermeneutic task is thus to comprehend just rôles for participants and evaluators once we accept a positive distanciation between the invention of the study and the imagination of the case.

The thesis of this dissertation is that principles of justice in participatory case study evaluation ostensively empower participants in relation to those they know and to those with whom they work. Yet, the ethical conduct of the case study does not contribute to the empathetic understanding of the reader—it does not enhance directly the validity of the case.

This is to say that the sense of the report is dissociated from the ostensive reference of participants, just as the appropriation of the meaning of the case study report by the reader does not rely on empathy with participants. When we accept a distanciation between dialogical participation and written reporting, the ethical questions of participation and the epistemological questions of validation are ontologically distinct.

The experience of this disjunction is a paradigm case for the critical moment in all understanding—implicit in the worlds of action and of reading. That is, a positive understanding of the dissociation involved in participatory case study evaluation is applicative to all critical understanding. And this consciousness of an inescapable hermeneutic—situatedness shifts the interpretation of justice from the problem of subjectivity to the problem of differing worlds of experience.

One way to understand case study evaluation is as a contract in the sense that "the principles of justice are the principles of willing cooperation among equals" (Rawls, 1971, p. 384). I take up this understanding as problematic and as that which underpins much of the democratic case study evaluation approach which grew out of the research on evaluation conducted by the Centre for Applied Research in Education in the University of East Anglia (CARE), England. My previous magistral dissertation provides a conceptual analysis of this CARE development and situates the research in relation to contemporary evaluation traditions (Bath, 1983). The CARE work, especially that conducted for the Ford Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project (SAFARI), reveals problems with the SAFARI ethic for evaluation. These ethical principles and procedures of democratic case study were developed to answer the issues of access to and release of evaluation information. The problems encountered centred on two inimical justifications: the participant's right to privacy and the public's right to know. Critics and advocates of the CARE work suggest that more control must be extended to participants: "[I]t is precisely the control criterion which underpins the procedural principles and marks SAFARI as a study which aspires to shift control of the research from the researcher to the participants" (Simons, 1977a, p. 41). The CARE group felt that the control aspirations were critical to establish a shift that would empower the

participants. Yet, CARE democratic case study will be shown to have resulted in an ethical shift which radically calls into question the efficacy of such democratic principles. Critics have suggested that principles of justice are missing.

B. The Coming into View of the Dissertation Question

Participatory case study evaluation began as an attempted inclusion of these missing principles of justice. Such principles were to be revealed as the understandings realised when participants confirmed access and release. To mitigate the problems of the CARE group, I accepted that the principles of confidentiality and anonymity were pre-emptive of the public's right to know. The inquiry began as the invention of an approach which offered a principle of justice as the principle of control—controls to safe-guard the rights of participants to privacy. Each was given the right and opportunity to release or withhold understandings shared in the interviews—the case record. Otherwise these remained confidential. Each was given the opportunity to edit his or her statements as these appeared in the first draft of the report—the case report. They were asked to maintain anonymity by reconstructing those understandings which could reveal their identities. Each was given the opportunity to edit the transcriptions of our conversations about the ethics of the study which are used in this dissertation—the justice case record. Most had an opportunity to read this dissertation and respond to questions of anonymity.[1] In itself, participant feedback on evaluations is not unusual. Doing so by addressing how participants considered issues of confidentiality and anonymity is unique. Coming to understand these considerations is the added dimension to the evaluation and of this dissertation.

A hermeneutic turn occurred in the study with the textualisation of spoken dialogue. Participants usually understood and decided on release of the case record and the case report within the context of imagined future conversations. Participants most often stated as a reason to release that they "would stand up in public and defend beliefs," therefore, they could clear these understandings into the public realm. The case study report, itself, raised

[1]See Appendix Seven: "Dissertation Letter to Participants, September 21, 1987."

questions about taken-for-granted notions of dialogue as speaking and listening.[2] This understanding of conversation as the arena for praxis is more fully debated in this dissertation. But it was disturbing events of the study which compelled me to take up the issues of language. In addressing the turn of the study, I re-turned to the experiences of dissociation between the dialogue of participation and the discourse of the text.

In this re-searching, I accepted a prejudice against empathetic understanding. As readers (as well as conversational participants), we cannot step out of our historical, biographical nor linguistic ways of being in the world. To believe that we can appropriate another's point of view is a figurative and misleading understanding. Appropriation is quite the contrary to vicariousness and empathy. Our consciousness is historically rooted, and as we interpret, historical consciousness inexorably effects our understanding. That is, we cannot transcend or project ourselves out of this effective, historical consciousness, as an act of empathy assumes. This is not a problem of subjectivity for which we attempt bracketing or objectivity. The author's intentions, the original readers' perspectives and the text's creative milieu are lost to the reader, ontologically.

The phenomenological, hermeneutic bias of my interpretation thus establishes one distinctive praxis of participation and another praxis of reading. The participatory case study evaluation ethic is a focus for the inquiry concerning participation. The phenomenological, hermeneutic understanding of the world of the report is the focus of the dissertation concerning validation. There is no pristine immediacy or vicarious experience of the lived-experience of participation via the reading of the report. The task of the recipients of participatory case study evaluation reporting is to unfold, in front of the text, the world opened up by the sense of the writing as this sense fuses with the readers' own references—references determined largely by each interpreter's unique effective, historical consciousness. On the other hand, the concerns of participation are to safeguard confidentiality and anonymity even while realising that such control is daunted by the non-ostensive, referential power of the text. The ethic of participation does enhance

[2]See Appendix Eight, Chapter Two: "Praxiology" —pp. 219-221.

empowerment of participants in the realm of ostensively referenced ethical considerations.

In short, the hermeneutic turn of the study led to inquiry that establishes the problem of comprehension within a linguistically rooted distanciation between spoken and written evaluative communication. As a consequence, while the principles and procedures of the evaluation approach provide reinforcement of the rights of participants, this empowerment cannot be written into the text as a determination of validity. On the other hand, an understanding that ethical participation is consubstantial with internal validation was an initial premise of justice-as-confirmation. But this assumption is no longer asserted. To the contrary, the ethics of the case are not essentially related to the reasonableness of the report. But these principles and procedures do empower the participants with respect to shared horizons with "privileged addressees" —who may immediately identify participants.

Despite the assertion that the ethics of the participatory case study evaluation have limited bearing on the validity of the report, the principles and procedures provide rôles more just than the CARE approach. Furthermore, the understanding that the justification of belief in the report is a dialectic between the prejudices of the reader and the sense of the text is applicative to all forms of research, not just participatory case study evaluation. Justifications for belief are accessible to the reader only from her or his epistemological pre-understandings as these are drawn out by the sense of the text. Understanding is situated in the experience of the reader before the text; it is not a consciousness behind the text—it is not a matter of empathy with the situated or encapsulated lived-experience there-in. Inquiry regarding the beliefs in justification posited when reading the case must involve the reader's historicity and the text's objective sense. That is, while the sense of the text to be appropriated is limited, it is not to be understood vicariously as authorial intention, participant experience nor the original reader's perspective.

To come to these understandings, I first discuss the study within the study. That is, the remainder of this chapter describes how justice as an ethical problem for case study evaluation was suggested by my previous conceptual analysis of the CARE group's research. Furthermore, the curricular work of Ted Aoki and Walter Werner provided influences on the

planning of the participatory case study evaluation and this dissertation.

Chapter Two describes the experience of including the principle of justice-as-control during the evaluation. The aspirations, assumptions and approach to inventing the study led to an understanding of justice-as-confirmation. Participants are portrayed as I had initially understood their rôles as final arbiters of the case.

Chapter Three returns to reflect critically on the assumptions of the portrayal in Chapter Two of the experience of implementation. A hermeneutic turn to the study is introduced which leads to an understanding of a positive distanciation between spoken dialogue and written discourse—between speaking/hearing and writing/reading. Furthermore, the linguistic turn raises questions about an understanding of interpretation within a dialogical model of conversation. These are questions about actual future forums we may consider when deciding on ethical questions of release.

Chapter Four builds upon the uniqueness of the worlds of participation and of text. The integrity of lived-participation with the read-validation of the report is called into question. There is a disavowal of the previous notion of participant validation.

Finally, Chapter Five suggests alternative understandings of confidentiality, anonymity, validity and justice. With the questioning of the assumption that validity is affected by the dialectic between the invention of the study and the imagination of the case, critical moments in evaluation become two-fold. Ethical issues of participation must be taken up separately from epistemological questions regarding the praxis of the reader. These distinct discussions suggest alternative gestures for the participants and evaluators of the study and the readers of the case.

The appendices of this dissertation contain the documents of the participatory case study evaluation and the case study report, *per se* (Appendix Eight).

The participatory case study evaluation approach does provide a viable amelioration to the ethical problems confronted by the CARE group. Participants have more control over the issues of confidentiality and anonymity. Furthermore, this dissertation raises important questions about the methodological assumptions of situational-interpretive research. These

questions do not detract from this educational research orientation. The same interrogation can be made of traditional, empirical-analytic approaches or ideological critique. The dissertation points to further inquiry concerning the understanding of action as text as well as to the application of the ethical principles and procedures to other forms of educational inquiry. There is also a suggested rehabilitation of the critical moment in curricular criticism and evaluation. There is a call to put judgement back into evaluation—to provide explicit, distinct and critical rôles for participants, evaluators and decision makers.

C. Centre for Applied Research in Education (CARE): Democratic Case Study-as-Planned

The case study evaluations of the Humanities Curriculum Project by the Centre for Applied Research in Education have seemingly routine objectives. An evaluation team member described these as follows:

> In carrying out the evaluation we had several purposes in mind:
>
> 1) to ascertain the effects of the project, document the circumstances in which they occur, and present this information in a form which will help educational decision-makers to evaluate the likely consequences of adopting the programme;
>
> 2) to describe the present situation and operations of the schools and local education systems we study so that decision-makers can understand more fully what it is they are trying to change;
>
> 3) to describe the work of the project team in terms which will help the sponsors and planners of such ventures to weigh the value of this form of investment, and to determine more precisely the framework of support, guidance and control which is appropriate;
>
> 4) to make a contribution to evaluation theory by articulating our problems clearly, recording our experiences and, perhaps most importantly, by publicizing our errors;
>
> 5) to contribute to the understanding of the problem of curriculum innovation generally. (Simons and Humble, 1978 p. 182)

The distinctiveness of the CARE evaluations was the adoption of a democratic approach. A

socio-political stance was taken from which CARE evaluators sought to work out principles and procedures that could safeguard fair treatment of evaluation participants. The "democratic style of research," as described by Simons, "demands in the first place that many are consulted and have a right to have their views represented; and secondly, that data which are to become public and how, [are] to be negotiated with them" (1977, p. 40).

In "Case Study and the Social Philosophy of Educational Research," Rob Walker and Barry MacDonald discussed the political nature of the relationship between the researcher and the researched (1975). The re-orientation to both information gathering and release discussed by these CARE authors was a necessary response to the Centre's alternative view and approach to research. Collection of data and release of information to decision-makers were both subject to political conditions and restraints:

> We have presented a view of case-study research in education which has its primary focus on the political nature of relationships between the researcher and his subjects, sponsors, audiences and related groups. We have emphasised such questions as who has control over, or access to data, and under what conditions and constraints should the researcher seek and present his findings. Our recommendations are derived from a particular socio/philosophical stance. (p. 11)

The political circumstances of the case study impinged on the seeking and presenting of findings. And a central concern was one of control.[3]

The CARE group writers have acknowledged that much of their particular emphasis or view of case-study research was a necessary response given the nature of the Humanities Curriculum Project. That is, the HCP curricular approach pre-determined much of the evaluation approach. The deliberate abandonment by the HCP of behavioural objectives left the evaluators without ends-means evaluation criteria. The die had been cast (or more correctly not cast) before MacDonald became the director of evaluation. The overall director of CARE at the time was Lawrence Stenhouse. He suggested the task facing MacDonald:

---

[3]The seminal article for the democratic case study approach is MacDonald's "Evaluation and the Control of Education," [1974]/(1976). See Simons and Humble (1978).

> To abandon the support of behavioural objectives is to take on the task of finding some other means of translating aim into practice. We attempted to analyze the implications of our aim by deriving from it specification of use of materials and a teaching strategy consistent with the pursuit of the aim. In other words we concentrated on logical consistency between classroom process and aim, rather than between predetermined terminal behaviour and aim. (1973, p. 163)

The teaching strategy to which Stenhouse alluded was a "radical shift in power relationships" (MacDonald and Walker, 1973, p. 12). Dissonance was introduced at the student, teacher and institutional level. The impact of such disturbance represented "the potential for institutional growth and change" (MacDonald, 1978b, p. 33). The evaluation task became the experiencing and reporting of the HCP implementation. And given the impelling aim of the HCP, the foci of evaluation became the transformations of schooling in response to this introduced disturbance.

The Humanities Curriculum Project began with joint funding from the Nuffield Foundation and the Schools Council (Stenhouse 1968, 1973). In 1970, after three years, the funding was extended solely by the Council for an additional two years. The original remit of the Project was a response to the intended raising of the school leaving age to 16 in 1970/71. The extension was granted when this initiative was postponed by the British government until 1972/73. The Raising of the School Leaving Age (ROSLA) initiative had been mapped out in the Education Act of 1944, and it "marked a further stage along the road...leading to secondary education for all" (Schools Council Working Paper No. 2, 1965). In October, 1964, the Schools Council had decided at its first meeting to give high priority to a programme of activity in preparation for the raising of the school leaving age. This activity resulted in the Working Paper No. 11: Society and the Young School Leaver, A Humanities Programme in Preparation for the Raising of the School Leaving Age (1967). In the Spring of 1969 the Council convened in Scarborough. The HCP was extensively discussed in the several working groups at this conference. Lawrence Stenhouse, the appointed director, cautioned at the final plenary session "that the Project was likely to fail in dissemination for want of adequate

provision for training and support" (Rudduck, 1976, p. 13). The Project went ahead.

The initial co-sponsoring body of the HCP was the Nuffield Foundation. In 1972 the Foundation sponsored a conference to explore non-traditional modes of evaluation. The conference was held at Churchill College in Cambridge and was convened by Barry MacDonald and Malcolm Parlett. At this time, MacDonald was the director of the HCP Evaluation Unit. Parlett was involved with David Hamilton in another Nuffield project: The Nuffield Resources for Learning Project. Out of this latter research came the plenary article for the first Cambridge conference: "Evaluation as Illumination: a New Approach to the Study of Innovatory Programmes" (Hamilton & Parlett, 1976b). The mutual concerns of MacDonald, Parlett and Hamilton set out the aim of the colloquium: "guidelines for the future development in non-traditional modes of evaluation" (MacDonald and Parlett, 1973). Subsequently, these authors and others published Beyond the Numbers Game: A Reader in Educational Evaluation (1977).

In December of 1975, a second Cambridge conference was convened by Barry MacDonald and Rob Walker. In line with the adoption of the method of case study by the two researchers, the conference was entitled: "Methods of Case Study in Educational Research and Evaluation." A principal aim of the conference was to dispel the mystique of method criticism that was prevalent against the earlier illuminative alternative to traditional evaluation. Illuminative evaluators were accused of relying on enigmatic interpersonal skills as a method. Partially due to some in-house advocates, the fledgling alternative was acquiring an assumed methodological and epistemological stance which claimed that the methods for forming judgements and interpretations about educational phenomena were inexplicable—they relied on "intuition" (Simons, 1980, p. 6).

The conference fell short of its goal to provide a handbook of principles, procedures and methods of case study in education. The actual book arising from the conference was: Towards a Science of the Singular: Essays about Case Study in Educational Research and Education, edited by a CARE member, Helen Simons (1980). Simons brought together the collective thinking of those authors concerned with the theory and practice of case study. The

editor was explicit, however, that this was not a state of the art account.

The researchers who attended the conferences continued to contribute to an emerging ethic of case study and were distinguishable by their association with the Centre for Applied Research in Education. CARE was established in 1970 with the relocation of the Humanities Curriculum Project to the University of East Anglia. The HCP had been centred in Phillipa Fawcett College of Education from 1967. MacDonald was initially the Schools Study Officer, then the director of the Evaluation Unit. The overall director of CARE and HCP was Lawrence Stenhouse.

At the same time as the first conference, and subsequent to the moving of CARE to East Anglia, MacDonald submitted a proposal from the Centre to the Ford Foundation for a Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project (Ford SAFARI). When this proposal was accepted, MacDonald enlisted the participation of the majority of the conference members. They were to study "'medium term' effects of several recently concluded projects in the curriculum of British secondary schools" (MacDonald, 1974). Initially, MacDonald proposed the use of historical reconstruction and analysis as an approach.

When SAFARI received the go-ahead, MacDonald as director appointed Rob Walker as the Senior Research Associate. Walker came to CARE from the Nuffield Secondary Science Programme when the funding was terminated in 1972. He became the sole full-time member of SAFARI. Walker and MacDonald "took the best part of a year to arrive at a resolution to work with what [they] called case study methods" (Walker, 1981, p. 199).

MacDonald and Walker had proposed, as recounted in "Case Study and the Social Philosophy of Educational Research" (1975b), to examine the "pedigree" of the case study as a research method and wrote (1975b) some three years after the beginning of SAFARI that a method had not been successfully reached. This acknowledgment came seven years after the start of the HCP:

> As we imagine it and describe it, educational case study has as yet no practitioners. We have attempted to describe a kind of research we feel ourselves working towards rather than one we have successfully accomplished. (p. 11)

Even after the HCP and SAFARI summary publications, successful practice of case study as educational research was still only an aspiration.[4] In a more recent article, "Three Good Reasons for not Doing Case Studies in Curriculum Research," Rob Walker still maintained that "We are experimenting with a method we do not fully understand" (1983, p. 164). The failure (MacDonald, 1978b) of the case study method may be directly attributable to the problems with the SAFARI ethic. This ethic grew out of earlier experiences with the democratic evaluation of the HCP.

MacDonald provided the plenary article for the CARE group's approach to evaluation and which eventuated the development of the SAFARI ethic. MacDonald outlined democratic evaluation in "Evaluation and the Control of Education" (1974). While the paper was first published in 1974 for the SAFARI Papers One,[5] the SAFARI Project (and the democratic approach) grew out of the earlier case study experience of the HCP. This type of case study dealt with by the HCP Evaluation Unit led to SAFARI's primary goal: developing a case study method of educational inquiry (Humble, 1971; Humble & Simons, 1978; MacDonald, 1971, 1976, 1975, 1978; Rudduck, 1973; Stenhouse, 1978; Verma, 1980).

MacDonald maintained that the resolution of socio-political issues—unavoidable within an evaluation —required a commitment by the case study worker to a political stance. The evaluator was embroiled in the action which was neither of her or his choosing nor control. A stance had to be taken towards decision makers who were to be served. MacDonald outlined three stances—democratic, bureaucratic and autocratic—in "Evaluation and the Control of Education" (1974). The bureaucratic evaluator was the "hired hack":

> Bureaucratic evaluation is an unconditional service to those government agencies which have major control over the allocation of educational resources. The evaluator accepts the values of those who hold office and offers information which will help them to accomplish their policy objectives. He acts as a management consultant, and his criterion of success is client satisfaction. His techniques of study must be credible to

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[4] See: Elliott, 1977; Humble and Simons, 1978; Jenkins, 1980; Kemmis, 1980; Lawn and Barton, 1981; MacDonald, 1978b; Simons, 1980 and Verma, 1980.
[5] Later published in Tawney, 1976.

> the policy-makers and not lay them open to public criticism. He has no independence, no control over the use that is made of his information, and no court of appeal. The report is owned by the bureaucracy and lodged in its files. The concepts of bureaucratic evaluation are 'service,' 'utility,' and 'efficiency.' Its justificatory concept is 'the reality of power.' (p. 17)

A second stance that could be taken was the autocratic. The autocratic evaluator was the "evaluator king":

> Autocratic evaluation is a conditional service to those government agencies which have major control over the allocation of educational resources. It offers external validation of policy in exchange for compliance with its recommendations. Its values are derived from the evaluator's perception of the constitutional and moral obligations of the bureaucracy. He focuses upon issues of educational merit, and acts as expert adviser. His techniques of study must yield scientific proofs, because his power base is the academic research community. His contractual agreements guarantee non-interference by the client, and he retains the ownership of the study. His report is lodged in the files of the bureaucracy, but is also published in academic journals. If his recommendations are rejected, policy is not validated. His court of appeal is the research community, and high levels in the bureaucracy. The concepts of the autocratic evaluator are 'principle' and 'objectivity.' His justificatory concept is 'the responsibility of office.' (p. 17)

In place of these two rôles , MacDonald offered the democratic evaluator. This was the stance that he acknowledged as his own:

> Democratic evaluation is an information service to the whole community about the characteristics of an educational programme. Sponsorship of the evaluation study does not in itself confer a special claim upon this service. The democratic evaluator recognizes value pluralism and seeks to represent a range of interests in his issue formulation. The basic value is an informed citizenry, and the evaluator acts as a broker in exchanges of information between groups who want knowledge of each

other. His techniques of data-gathering and presentation must be accessible to non-specialist audiences. His main activity is the collection of definitions of, and reactions to, the programme. He offers confidentiality to informants and **gives them control** over his use of the information they provide. The report is non-recommendatory, and the evaluator has no concept of information misuse. He engages in periodic negotiation of his relationships with sponsors and programme participants. The criterion of success is the range of audiences served. The report aspires to 'best seller' status. The concepts of democratic evaluation are 'confidentiality,' 'negotiation,' and 'accessibility.' The justificatory concept is 'the right to know.' (p. 18) [Emphasis added.]

MacDonald's reference to the bureaucratic evaluator as a 'hired hack' was pejorative. He had the greatest disdain, however, for the autocratic evaluator. MacDonald rejected the notion that the independent evaluator could proffer a value-free study. Furthermore, the alleged court of appeal for validation afforded by the academic community was suspect.

> It seemed to me that the act of evaluation is not value-free. The research community might be notionally construed as custodian of the scientific detachment of its members, and guarantor of the validity of their conclusions, in fact, the community has shown few signs of any desire to extend that jurisdiction. When research is closely related to ideology, as is the case with educational research, history suggests that we lock up the silver. (1976, p. 134)

MacDonald felt that the honorific afforded custodians of scientific detachment was actually surreptitious despotism. An evaluator could not stand outside the political process. Any affirmation to the contrary was simply a contrivance that may have had as an aim aiding and abetting certain decision makers. He maintained that educational research is ideological as it concerns the distribution of power and the social use of knowledge. His discussion of the autocratic, bureaucratic and democratic evaluators concluded with the assertion that the promulgations of those who believe in scientific detachment had been exposed as hallucinations. Evaluation and educational research cannot escape being viewed as political

activities.

There is an irony in MacDonald's assertions concerning the inescapable politics of educational research. The HCP centred upon classroom process rather than behavioural objectives. The most controversial characteristic of the HCP aim was the "concept of 'neutrality'"—the rôle of the teacher as a neutral chairperson (Humble and Simons, 1978, p. 77). This rôle "involves passivity towards some aspects of an issue for the sake of exerting positive 'influence' and 'guidance' with respect to other aspects" (Elliott, 1975b, p. 51). The teacher allowed the students to explore "controversial issues" by "the deliberate withholding of certain kinds of 'influence' or 'guidance'...'deliberate refraining from.' ..is what is meant by **procedural neutrality**" (Elliott). Evidence was drawn from HCP Packs: "initial collections of materials in such areas as War and Society, Education, The Family, Relations between the Sexes, People and Work, Poverty Law and Order and Living in Cities" (MacDonald, 1973, p. 18). The teacher "merely" followed student directions and stimulated conversations with the introduction of neutral "evidence." "Evidence as the word is used by the Project has a judicial or historical, rather than a scientific, connotation....'evidence' is not to imply that it carries authority but merely that it is relevant to the matter under discussion" (HCP Introduction, 1970, p. 13).[4]

Despite the rhetoric, this teaching strategy with its epistemological assertions concerning knowledge neutrality was decidedly political—a conclusion implied by MacDonald above, but made explicit elsewhere. The irony developed into an essential tension and was introduced to the HCP by Lawrence Stenhouse. In a "statement of aspiration" he revealed that the assumptions underlying the HCP approach differed from the original intentions of the Schools Council. The latter sought "to probe how far ordinary pupils can in fact be taken" (*vis-à-vis* a humanities curriculum) (Working paper No. 2 , para. 61, p. 14). MacDonald pointed to both the HCP value-ladenness and Stenhouse's dissent with the Council. The director had greater aspirations than the Council:

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[4]Shall we heed MacDonald, here, and check the silver!

"In broad terms the objective will be to provide for the minority of pupils, something of the quality and range of liberal education hitherto reserved for the minority of more academically-minded pupils, and to do this in terms which are intellectually sound while at the same time interesting and relevant to the pupil's needs."

This rather low key statement of aspiration may well have passed unnoticed among the welter of familiar practicalities and procedures outlined in the circular, but it constituted Stenhouse's first public expression of dissent from the assumptions of... Society and the Young School Leaver.[7] (MacDonald, 1978b, p. 43)

Stenhouse and his Project Team were to be swept up in a charismatic movement that built up unrealistic expectations for teachers: "they had been captured by the excitement, only to realize subsequently that they had not fully understood the implications of putting the project into practice" (Simons and Humble, 1978). The implications of implementing a "liberal and potentially liberating ideal" (ibid.) were puissant. While Stenhouse expressed a rumination that the curriculum may have been "suited only to an **elite** school," teachers were attempting what they considered a genuine alternative for potential drop-outs: "Many of the teachers who joined the 'crusade' found themselves imprisoned in a gap between the project's implicit model of the school and the realities of the institutional milieux in which they were located" (MacDonald and Walker, 1976, p. 81). The Project set up a rôle conflict for the teachers which imprisoned them in a gap between an inwrought ideal of educational activity and the everyday innerworkings of the schools. This was a conflict of political ideals.

Experiences of the implementation of the curricular innovation placed people in a "state of **cognitive dissonance**" (MacDonald, 1978, p. 29). Some went to the extent of giving up teaching. Verma wrote in the second HCP evaluation volume that "A major cause of this dissonance was the change in roles....that the teacher must relinquish his traditionally dominant position" (The Impact of Innovation, 1981, p. 26). Instead of an instant panacea for classroom ills the teachers found themselves making the project work.

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[7]Schools Council, 1967.

The implicit view of schooling of the HCP further led to institutional dissonance. CARE writers described how an innovation could split staff and isolate schools from local authorities. MacDonald listed over twenty separate institutional dissonances which accompanied the introduction of the HCP (1978b, p. 34). These involved administrators, staff, parents, students and the general public—"dissonance at all levels of impact" (MacDonald and Walker, 1976, p. 80). The ultimate effect was "one of division and suspicion at a number of levels in the system, anarchy at the periphery as seen from the centre; malign conspiracy at the centre as seen from the periphery" (ibid.).

Criticism as a sword has a double edge, and Stenhouse revealed the innerworkings of the HCP where he suggested that teachers working within an academic institution could be blind to the "profound theoretical roots which lie beneath it" (1978, p. 31). That which brings about up-rooting also must, in its own way of being, have radical force. The HCP dissonance was experienced at times as "a point where re-synthesis becomes difficult if not impossible" (Walker and MacDonald, 1975b, p. 24). The HCP stance was profoundly political and decidedly non-neutral. MacDonald's dwelling with these experiences of dissonance became his evaluation orientation:

> I may summarise that it appears that HCP activates the school by introducing dissonance at different levels —value dissonance at the institutional level particularly with regard to the authoritarian/participatory ethos of the school—cognitive dissonance at the teacher level and particularly a degree of role confusion—affective dissonance at the pupil level where many pupils have their settled expectations of the teacher/pupil/knowledge relationship confounded. In the end the lasting impact on institution, teachers and pupil depends on how in particular cases these dissonances are resolved, whether by moving on to new practices, skills and attitudes or reverting to old ones. (MacDonald, 1978b, p. 35)

MacDonald wrote that not all of the dissonances were purposely "activated." He also sought out "bad communication from the central [CARE] team, or perhaps effective communication of confused thinking" (1978b, p. 26). After explaining the Project to

MacDonald, a new staff member, Stenhouse left on vacation. MacDonald did not understand the explanation and could not be helped by his surroundings:

> There seems to be no common platform—everyone has a different notion of what the Project stands for. No wonder Stenhouse insists that all public statements go through him. (1987b, p. 286)

MacDonald tested his concerns with a questionnaire. Of the twenty-five statements he gave to the nine staff there was disagreement on every one. MacDonald asked himself "So what has the Project been saying to those teachers out there" (p. 286)? On a revised questionnaire which reduced ambiguity, he received agreement on six of sixteen items. MacDonald reported that in one school the teachers "think they can do what they like. And they don't like what they think Stenhouse said" (p. 287).

As suggested, the Democratic Case Study approach was very much a logic-in-use. The evaluators sought to portray the successful or unsuccessful resolve of the strident ambivalences that was the experience of innovation. The Project continued to have curricular impact and was widely used in Great Britain and internationally. But what most concerns us now is the evaluation approach used to report on this dynamic project. Dwelling with the innovation of a curriculum which excited profound up-rooting and radical dissonance invigorated an evaluation approach which explicitly took up a political stance. The democratic case study evaluation posture could, itself, look forward to the experience of much dissonance.

D. Care Access and Release of Information

CARE workers and close associates were critical of the ethical principles developed during the democratic case studies. The on-going HCP evaluations and the later CARE project evaluations were subsumed under the Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project which was sponsored by the Ford Foundation. This became known as the Ford SAFARI Project. The developing evaluation principles and procedures became known as the SAFARI ethic.

Elliott (1974, 1977), Jenkins (1977) and Simons (1977a, 1977b, 1980b) all had fundamental criticisms of the SAFARI ethic. Simons stated the basic critique which centred on the principle of the right to know:[1]

> The democratic principle of equality of access on the face of it marries uneasily with the principle of equality of risk. One cannot assume that it would be in the best interests of all groups to give knowledge of themselves to other groups. (1977a, p. 43)

Simons argued that, if in a pluralistic society the interests of varied groups are tolerated and protected in principle, then arbitrary release of information in the public interest may be merely release in the interests of different groups. She argued a premise which rebukes what Hanna Arendt called the "liberal hypothesis of a natural 'harmony of interests'."[2]

In "Democratic Evaluation as Social Criticism" (1977) Elliott addressed the same concern:

> Since the 'citizenry' exist in a state of value pluralism the aim of the democratic evaluator is to represent the 'interests' of a range of social groups in his evaluation study. In other words, MacDonald appears to assume that individuals in a pluralistic society have the right to know *as* members of particular 'interest' groups rather than as members of the general public. (p. 191)

Elliott argued, as did Simons, that one cannot assume that all groups should have knowledge of all others.

> I want to assert that this assumption is false (later I shall argue that it is cynical and destructive). If it is correct then every group in a democracy is obliged to foster the interests of every other group by providing them with information about their own activities....There is an obvious paradox here since it may not be [in a group's]...interest to inform [another group] who may use the information to harm them. (p. 192)

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[1] See MacDonald's description of the key justificatory concept of the democratic evaluator on pp. 13-14.

[2] The assumption rebuked is that which forms the foundation of "'Classical' economics"—ironically described as the "communistic fiction" (Arendt, "The Public and Private Realm," in The Human Condition, 1958, p. 44).

Given the "obvious paradox," Elliott refuted MacDonald's entire concept of democracy.

> MacDonald's view of democratic society is wrong. As a member of a particular interest group, democracy requires me **to tolerate** but not to actively promote interests which differ from my own. If democracy as such does not require everyone to actively promote the interests of every social group, it does not ascribe to everyone as members of particular groups the right to know....The decision to release information about one group's activities to members of other interest groups can never be justified democratically on the ground that people have an automatic right to know as members of particular interest groups. (p. 192)

In place of the automatic right to know, Elliott offered the principle of justice. He began with the premise "that since all groups desire to pursue their interests, it is in everyone's interest to desire freedom from interference" (p. 193). Hence, all groups should work towards "fair distribution of social and economic advantage" (p. 194). This line of thinking then defined the public interest as those "principles which everyone would accept in a situation where they are free from bias" (p. 195). Confidentiality becomes conditional: "if their activities [i.e., those of interest groups] clearly infringe the principles of justice, then they are obliged to tell the truth about their activities to members of the public who now warrant the right to know" (p. 198).

Elliott stated that where he defined the "principle of 'equal liberty,' and the principle of 'fair distribution' of social and economic advantage [as] the **principle of justice**" (p. 194), he "followed" John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971). The two preliminary principles were given to constitute a conception of the public interest and to provide a set of procedures for handling 'pluralism.' Therewith, the right to know is determined. The right to privacy then becomes the domain for "matters which these two principles do not render matters of public concern" (Elliott, p. 194). A brief discussion of Rawlsian justice will help to clarify Elliott's answer to MacDonald's paradox.

Elliott's situation free from bias is that domain where we act as members of the general public and it is the original position defined by Rawls. The affect of people making

judgements in this time-less-space is "mutual disinterestedness subject to a veil of ignorance [which] leads to the two principles of justice" (Rawls, 1971, p. 187). To arrive at his principles of justice, Rawls begins with the acceptance of a Kantian moral view. His theory "explicates the distinction between treating men as means only and treating them also as ends in themselves" (p. 180). This is a formulation of Kant's "categorical imperative." Rawls explicates the need for a deontology to determine autonomous judgements. He accepts the Kantian world-view which juxtaposes autonomy with heteronomy. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant depicts autonomy (self-law) as under the laws of universality and right reason, where freedom is "independent of determination by causes in the sensible world" (Kant, 1964, p. 120). Heteronomy (other-law), in contrast, is "the source of all spurious principles of morality" (108). In Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1950, p. 35), Kant derides an ontological gesture as "catching at bubbles." Reality is "not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation." Kant posited a world constituting consciousness from which "the form of the phenomenon...can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves, that is, *a priori*" (p. 31). In contradistinction, a heteronomous orientation is a gesture which assumes a world constituted with others. Kant maintained this to be spurious since the others of the sensuous world remain "unknown as to what they are in themselves" (p. 36).

Rawls suggests that in our failure to be responsive to such Kantian "causality," "we often acquiesce without thinking in the moral and political conception implicit in the *status quo*, or leave things to be settled by how contemporary social and economic forces happen to work themselves out" (p. 260). He disagrees with such an orientation. We lack "a suitable definition of a *status quo* that is acceptable from a moral point of view" (p. 134n). We must, instead, conceive principles of justice from the ideal stand-point of the "original position"—putting ourselves in "another order of things" (Kant). This is our stance *as* members of a general public—a stance decidedly idealistic:

> The parties [in the Original Position] do not know to which generation they belong or,...the stage of civilization of their society. They have no way of telling

> whether it is poor or relatively wealthy, largely agricultural or already industrialized, and so on. The veil of ignorance is complete in these respects. (p. 287)
>
> ....they know the general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice. (p. 137)

Rawls posits as his prolegomenon to justice this ideal position from whence "everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments" (p. 139). In such a time-less-space we escape the mutable sensible world to find "the situation definitive of moral deliberation" (p. 141): "To say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion" (p. 138).

In the mundane world "men suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, thought and judgement" (p. 127). Also, we must accept that society's distributional "arrangements are subject to the unavoidable constraints of everyday life" (p. 89). That is, the circumstances of justice are such that without a conflict of interest there would be no need for the virtue of justice. Even so, we cannot aspire towards a universal criterion of the good from which to settle disputes. Hence, we require a "deontological theory" (p. 30) to specify the right from which we may determine the good. We cannot assume "an independent criterion for the correct outcome" (the good) so we have to aspire towards "a correct and fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair" (the right) (p. 86). Imperfect procedural justice is one of four systems of cooperation which Rawls describes and one derived from a conception of the public interest (Elliott, above).

To know when such a right set of procedures can be followed, we must be assured that a "just basic structure" exists (Rawls, p. 87). This basic structure is the embodiment of the aforementioned principles of justice. The structure is one of "Democratic Equality" and it is the requisite of any just procedures. It is also the conception which Elliott argued to have been absent in the SAFARI ethic—rendering the democratic case study procedures incorrect

and unfair. What was lacking as a basic structure is the difference principle.

"Democratic Equality" is the proper conjoining of the two principles which Elliott calls, after Rawls, "equal liberty" and "fair distribution." The first principle concerns "fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls, p. 87). The second addresses the unfair "natural distribution of abilities and talents" which, if not countenanced (as with mere equality of opportunity) would lead to unfair distribution. The "difference principle expresses a concept of reciprocity...of mutual benefit" (p. 102).[10] Equality of opportunity is insufficient by itself since we each start from unequal stations in life (as a result of the "natural lottery"). The difference principle, hence, gives meaning to "the principle of fraternity" (Rawls). That is, it is the concept that leads to the "right" system of cooperation that provides the basic structure from which just procedures may be derived: "a further merit of the difference principle is that it provides an interpretation...to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off" (p. 102).

The difference principle is the manifestation of a just basic structure. We may see the importance of this requisite institutionalisation of ideal principles in Rawls' assertion that "the **basic structure** is the primary subject of justice" (p. 84). ***Imperfect procedural*** justice [Rawls' chosen option] relies upon "suitable political and legal institutions" (p. 275). We must assume that the basic structure is regulated by a just constitution that secures the liberties of equal citizenship. The difference principle is summarised as follows: **"Assuming**

[10]We may consider as an example the argument of "equality of opportunity" in education. Whether a student must fight her way to school out of the inner-city housing project, or whether she must fight her way to school behind the wheel of her sixteenth birthday present, makes no difference. Her school must receive the equal commitment of tax dollars, staff, etc.—regardless of the part of town or country. (This argument has been made to me, in a public forum and with assurance, by a superintendent of a large city school district.)

An alternative to such "equal opportunity" is the principle that all students have an equal opportunity to be treated unequally. This principle is to be found in Rawls (in following). This is a form of the "difference principle." The question that we may ask further, however, is whether or not such liberal notions of "compensatory education" serve only to legitimate the inequalities of school systems. "Deprivation" theories devalue the culture or experiences of those not represented in the middle class curriculum of the schools, while, at the same time, masking the hidden curriculum. The problem is not solved by Rawls' version of the trickle-down theory. The inner-city student is not lacking. Although her counterpart is certainly privileged with respect to the class bias of the hidden curriculum.

the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those better suited are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged member of society" (p. 75).[11] Equality of opportunity devoid of the difference principle is mere "liberal equality." There would be no principle to "mitigate the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery" (p. 74). Rawls feels that the Constitution of the United States of America, the U.S. form of representative democracy, positive law and private ownership are all necessary, suitable legal institutions.[12]

Following Rawls, Elliott would depict the democracy of the CARE group (since devoid of the difference principle) as one of three remaining sustems of cooperation. A set of procedures devoid of both equal opportunity and the difference principle would be a *meritocracy*. In this second type, the principle of efficiency would rule, and this concept does not countenance natural and social contingencies. This system of "natural liberty" ignores social circumstance, accident and good fortune, hence, it "permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view" (Rawls, p. 72). The CARE group rhetoric would not place them with this ilk. They were singularly concerned with questions of inequality—hence, the focus on the rôles of evaluators, decision-makers and participants.[13]

Rawls' third alternative (to the preferred democratic equality) is the system of cooperation which upholds the difference principle yet does not mitigate the unequal starting places of each person in society. This is the *natural aristocratic* system. Privilege is unmitigated, yet the higher expectations of the more advantaged are just only if they improve

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[11]Is Rawls predating the popularisation of the "trickle down theory"?

[12]See Rawls (1971), "Part Two. Institutions," especially the first three sections of Chapter V.

[13]Interestingly, the description of a principle of efficiency by Rawls is the same "efficiency" MacDonald offers as a justificatory concept for the bureaucratic evaluator—to which MacDonald juxtaposes his democratic evaluator. Nevertheless, the democratic evaluator is also guided by the aim to represent "a **range** of interests" (1974, p. 18). That is, as stated above, "success is the **range** of audiences served." The sentiment of the difference principle is, however, absent. It could be argued that an aim to broaden scope, rather than to increase expectations of the least advantaged, is after all, merely a utilitarian (bureaucratic) justification. This argument is implicit in the CARE critiques at hand.

the expectations of the least advantaged. Such *noblesse oblige* was explicitly criticised by MacDonald. He rejected the rôle of the "autocratic evaluator" —the "evaluator king"—whose actions stem from the "responsibility of office." Again, however, the unilateral decisions by the CARE Evaluation Team (devoid of a difference principle) which were made in the name of public interest could be argued as a form of the royal we.[14]

The last of the four Rawlsian alternatives would see the CARE group as proponents of *liberal equality*. This system of cooperation aspires to equal liberty and fair distribution, yet the basic structure does not encompass the difference principle. This system provides the most cogent backdrop for Elliott's critique of the SAFARI ethic. The CARE Evaluation Team is seen to lack a concept of voluntary acts which could render judgments in the public interest (i.e., a concept [from the original position] of the difference principle). To Elliott (viz. Rawls), without this guiding principle, the justificatory concept of the democratic evaluator is denied. There can be no right to know of members of special interest groups —they are acting *as* members of these groups and not *as* if behind the veil of ignorance and in the original position. Groups do not have an automatic right to know as the SAFARI ethic asserts (Elliott).

According to Rawls, rights in the system of justice as fairness are limiting: "they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one's good." "We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good" [i.e., Rawls proposes a deontological theory] (p. 31). Group members have rights to the extent that "Those who have been favoured by nature, whomever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out" (Rawls, p. 101). Their good (favour) is just only if the concept of right is embodied (*a priori*) in the system of cooperation.

Elliott, Jenkins and Simons rehearse arguments about a SAFARI ethical structure which is not arranged so that unequal contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate. To the contrary, the CARE approach is considered "a manipulative, technical device rather

[14]See the accounts of the HCP evaluations to follow in "Democratic Evaluation as Unfulfilled Aspirations," Chapter One.

than an ethical stance" (Elliott, 1977, p. 197).

E. The CARE Ethical Shift

In "An Adversary's Account of SAFARI's Ethics of Case Study" (1980), Jenkins labelled an ethical shift implicit in MacDonald's notion of democratic case study the "knight's move." To Elliott (1977), this shift is greatly exacerbated by the absence of the difference principle of justice. CARE negotiations were critiqued as actually a sequence of two ethics. First came the ethic of confidentiality agreed upon by the researcher and the participant. Much later, when the study was nearing completion, a second ethic was introduced. Participants who had been offered blanket confidentiality could and did find themselves confronted with the assumed democratic right of the public to know the facts of their lives. Furthermore, this later principle of the right to know pre-empted the earlier agreed upon right to privacy.

The Knight's Move

A scheme of the knight's move can be adapted from Jenkins (1980).



Jenkins wrote that the knight's move was a problematic of the SAFARI Ethic.

> SAFARI "case study ethics" is in part a rhetorical device to facilitate performance of this questionable knight's move. Between boxes 1 and 2 we have a gate labelled the **ethics of access**. Between boxes 2 and 4 we have a gate labelled the **ethics of release**. Softly. Softly. (Jenkins, 1980, p. 153)

The top left square (#1) represents the evaluator's initial position of low access to information. The top right (#2) is the position of high access. The evaluator promises confidentiality to get over the gate between these two boxes. However, rather than moving to the lower left position (#3), the evaluator attempts to maintain high access and to gain direct entry to a position of high release (#4). The inverted "L" shaped path of the movement from boxes #1 to #2 to #4 is that of the knight in the game of chess. Rather than such a move, an extension of the critique by Elliott and Jenkins could imply that after having all of the confidential information (#2), the evaluator would move to a position of high release

and low access (#3)—to give back, in a sense, the information. The gate then confronted between Box #3 and Box #4 would be one of two-fold negotiation. First, re-negotiation is encountered regarding re-access to the participant's individually established case record (there is a giving-back of what has been recorded, the use of which would never, actually, have been the evaluator's right if confidentiality is to have any meaningful ethical intent). Subsequently, negotiation of release of the agreed-upon understandings would take place [movement from Box #3 to Box #4]. With this alternative to the knight's move, where such re-negotiations or limitations are placed on release, the right to know or the good of the public cannot be invoked as an authority by the evaluator. The absence of the alternative procedure, however, sees an evaluator that has unequal advantage since he or she holds all the information. Furthermore, in Rawlsian terms, since no just basic structure exists, *ipso facto* the evaluator has no right to act in the public's interest. The alternative return to Box #3 presented above is essentially that of participatory case study evaluation [as recounted in Chapter Two].[15]

Missing Principles of Justice

An implication of the knight's move is that while the evaluator initially appears to be relinquishing power by forming a contract (Kushner & Norris, 1980, p. 33), the later negotiation of release shifts power. Walker stated that "offering blanket confidentiality [was adopted] in order to gain faster access....Release of data is then progressively negotiated" (1981, p. 55). The experience of this progression became problematic as CARE workers spoke of coopting participants into collaboration.

Jenkins pointed out that the confidentiality ethic had the effect of facilitating access to the researcher. Simons and Humble, two of the HCP case study evaluators, wrote of the effect of such confidentiality: "This guarantee of confidentiality would, we hoped, provide the kind of setting in which they [participants] would speak freely and honestly" (1978, p. 193). "In the hands of skilled interviewers," Walker stated, "most people are inexperienced

[15]See "Democratic Evaluation as Unfulfilled Aspirations," to follow (p. 32), which is a discussion of the ethical shift as it was experienced during the CARE case study releases.

and will reveal things they do not intend" (1981, p. 56). "Softly. Softly" (Jenkins, 1980, p. 153).

In "Getting Involved in Curriculum Research: A Personal History," Walker acknowledges a shift in the ~~power afforded the~~ researcher where he addressed the distinction between public and private knowledge: "This kind of shift in the position...allows the researcher a stronger hand in interpreting public statements, and, to some degree, makes it possible for the researcher to argue for the public right to know what individual subjects may prefer to suppress" (1981, p. 203). What the researcher had effected was a tone that pre-empted attention to the confidentiality of the data. "It is the relationship that has become confidential not the data" (Jenkins, 1980, p. 155). The participants were susceptible to the argument that the researcher could be trusted with information as release of data was off the current agenda. The "seducer," Jenkins stated, "is prepared to wait" (p. 155). Later, the participant would find that the ethics of consensus had been surreptitiously replaced by the ethics of power. The public's right to know would then become the justificatory concept. The centrality of confidentiality had been pre-empted.

Walker paraphrased this criticism by others of the SAFARI ethic as follows:

> Protection of the subject's rights is seen as a device for breaking down their resistance, and, while presenting a rhetoric of subjects controlling the uses made of data, this is used to disguise a range of social and informal pressures that are brought to bear in order to secure their agreement to the release of sensitive data. Far from being a position of weakness, it is argued, the SAFARI position is, in fact, a position of disguised strength. (1980, p. 204)

In a later article, after this criticism had "rattled around between [his] ears" for some time, Walker became more convinced of its veracity. From merely recounting the argument above, he later declared:

> As David Jenkins has pointed out, although the design makes it sound as though a lot of power is being handed to the subject of the study, in practice, because the researcher/evaluator actually holds the information, all kinds of ploys and suspicions

can come into play. (1983, p. 158)

Two other CARE workers, Kushner and Norris, appeared to have substantiated the criticism. The SAFARI team was given to employ "quasi-legal principles and procedures" intended to allow greater access.

> The team's vocabulary was heavily suffused with quasi-legal terminology, and their appeal for legitimacy was to loosely defined concepts of jurisprudence and political service. The aim was to coopt the respondents into a collaborative stance by promising them a certain degree of control.... (1980, p. 34)

While the confidentiality ethic restricted the evaluator's use of information, Elliott maintained that without the principle of justice the ethics of release permit "all kinds of manipulative devices which restrict the participant's control over the data and increase the evaluator's" (1977, p. 196). Jenkins referred to one such device as the shift in the status of the evaluator from outsider to quasi-insider. The evaluator could later claim superior knowledge when advocating the management of negotiation. Jenkins (1980) argued that the "whole structure [of democratic case study] is manipulative." The knight's move described the devious internal logic governing the shift of ethics. When the negotiation of the release of data took over from the negotiation of the right to privacy, there was a shift in the power base between the confidants and the researcher.

The SAFARI phrases that describe negotiation are most revealing when confidentiality later becomes tenuous. CARE writers wrote of the coopting of participants; the real politick of the schools; the help of the authoritative position and the usefulness of provoking divergency. When there is no safe-guard for the preservation of confidentiality —given the ethical shift—then, as Elliott stated, the SAFARI ethic does "not begin to qualify as an ethical stance."

> MacDonald is wrong in his assertion that democratic evaluation has no conception of 'information misuse.' The evaluator cannot escape responsibility for judgement against public criteria if he is to remain genuinely democratic. (1977, p. 194)

"Public criteria" could not be construed as the evaluator's unilateral interpretation of what is

in the public's interest. Lacking a "difference principle," ("responsibility for judgement against public criteria" [Elliott, above]) the CARE group lacked "rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions" (Rawls, p. 138). Elliott maintained that the SAFARI ethic could not suggest a correct and fair set of procedures: Rawls stated that "justice as fairness holds that natural duties and obligations arise only in virtue of ethical principles....chosen in the original position" (p. 348).

In the final analysis, Jenkins allowed that the SAFARI workers may have unintentionally negotiated the hidden agenda: "It is more humane to consider the SAFARI case students as hopelessly caught in the crossfire between conflicting aspirations" (1980, p. 152). From the other side, Walker allowed some veracity to the knight's move critique: "As Jenkins has pointed out in his critique it is often much more difficult for people [participants] to edit the record than we tend to assume" (1981, p. 206). He became more convinced with time. When more recently discussing the rights of individuals within the relationships of evaluations, Walker introduced the two moments of free access to information versus currency of power. "The interaction of these two sets of conflicting assumptions marks a fundamental discontinuity between the worlds of the researcher and of the subject" (1983, p. 164). Walker's discussion of authority substantiates the need for on-going confirmation of principles and procedures, including the heretofore missing principle of justice. The authority of the evaluator, Walker concluded, "cannot be ignored as a factor in the situation." He called for procedures "which build in countervailing forces in order to strengthen the position of those who are subjects of, and to, such research" (p. 164). Could this be the need of a difference principle?

Simons, similarly, offered a principle of control to ameliorate the problems of the SAFARI ethic.[16] Simons stated: "the principle of giving control to participants offers some protection in such uncertainty and may be a necessary principle to maintain (whatever the immediate losses) at this stage in exploring the democratisation of the research process" (1977, p. 43). As interpreted from the Rawlsian perspective of justice, the immediate loss

[16]We see above that control has also taken a central place for Elliott, Jenkins, MacDonald and Walker.

which Simons suggested is the good given up by the evaluator (the right to the release of certain information) in order to have a just right to higher expectations (increased access to the facts of people's lives). The principle of participant control becomes the difference principle realised through the right procedures: procedures which Walker described as countervailing forces to protect the expectations of the least adavantaged. We may now conclude the CARE discussion by looking to the experiences of MacDonald, Simons, Walker and others, where they practiced the SAFARI ethic during the HCP evaluations. Such experiences provide ground from which to consider the situation of participatory case study evaluation, especially with respect to the originative notion of justice-as-control.

F. Democratic Evaluation as Unfulfilled Aspirations

At the time of the first two evaluations of the Humanities Curriculum Project (1968-70) and also during the conduct of the second two (1970-72), the "importance of negotiation as a method of data collection and involvement of participants" was under-estimated (Simons, 1977, p. 26). Whereas Walker (1981, p. 203) wrote of a style of case study "already developed" during the HCP evaluations, MacDonald wrote of "clumsy" "failures" (MacDonald, 1978b). Suggestions were made that the evaluations would be conducted much differently a second time around (Simons and Humble, 1978).

MacDonald case studied a number of schools, but he published only two cases, *per se* in The Experience of Innovation: Volume Two of the Revised Edition of the Publications of the Humanities Curriculum Project Evaluation Unit (1978b). One was fictitiously named Rosehill and the other Canon Roberts. The names of participants also remained anonymous. Both studies were of the experience of innovation during the trial stage of the HCP curriculum development (1968-70).

In 1970 the second or implementation stage began. The evaluation team was expanded to include Stephen Humble, Helen Simons and Gajendra Verma. Verma concentrated on the "measurement phase" (1980). Simons and Humble conducted case studies of eleven schools. Case studies of the six "trained" schools (teachers attended a local or central training course)

lasted from one to three days on four separate occasions. From the maximum of twelve days at one trained school, the visits to the untrained schools (the 'control' group without the benefit of in-service) were shorter than one day each, on less than four occasions.

One of the untrained schools was the subject of the shorter case study titled "A Disaster Call: The Study of Redmore's Dealings with the Project" (Simons and Humble, 1978). Humble and Simons studied the "unique circumstances" at Redmore and presented a portrayal which would contribute to "understanding the general process of curriculum innovation" (p. 19). The second longer case study was also published in From Council to Classroom: An Evaluation of the Diffusion of the Humanities Curriculum Project. This study of a trained school was titled "A Case Study of the Management of Curriculum Innovation: Brookland Comprehensive School, Brookshire County."

In addition to the two case studies, the authors included four "profiles." These "tried to distil the case study information" and were acknowledged to be at "risk of distorting the experience and oversimplifying" (p. 114). These also did not pretend any democratic stance. There was no suggestion of negotiation for access nor release.

MacDonald began conducting one of his reported studies after an outline of his interests had been presented to a headmaster in the summer of 1969. He visited the school the following September. Five weeks after his visit two students that he had interviewed were "hauled out" of class and forced to reveal what they had discussed. This incident escalated the tension between the HCP teachers and other staff. Finally, a meeting was called to sound out the differences. MacDonald attended. While this meeting could have afforded an opportunity for negotiation, MacDonald suggested the meeting reached no conclusions but dispersed amicably. He did, however, address his rôle as follows:

> I did so briefly, and I think bluntly, emphasising that I did seek information about the authority structure of the school, the pupils' experience of discipline, and their experience of relationships with the staff. I also said that I used the information obtained from pupils to cross-check statements made by their teachers. (1978b, p. 143)

This was the extent of the rôle discussion. Neither confidentiality nor anonymity were mentioned.

At the conclusion of this Rosehill study, MacDonald asked the staff for advice that they would give to headmasters who were about to begin the Project. This material was summarised into four of the one hundred and forty four pages of text on Rosehill. The teachers agreed on each of the points in this brief submission. This inclusion was the extent of their participation in the negotiation of the case. In the absence of any other suggestion, the initial approval of the headmaster was the sum total of negotiation for access and release.

The second (Canon Roberts) study forced upon MacDonald (1978b) more of the negotiation held out as central to the CARE work. Before reference had been made to the publication of the case study, the teachers shared in conversations critical comments about the headmaster. Not knowing that their "remarks would find their way into print" (p. 278), the teachers demanded a later written response. However, this co-requisite to release came only after MacDonald had first sought release on the authority of the headmaster —who was by then removed from the school with a new assignment. The headmaster would not agree without the teachers "centrally concerned in the work being of like mind" (p. 259). MacDonald had to return to the teachers to seek release.

When the school team was then given a first opportunity to read the case study, they were extremely critical of the portrayal. Initially, they were in no mood to have it published. They wrote that "We were concerned to keep the commentary at the level of professional disagreement" (MacDonald, 1978b, p. 261). Given the nature of the portrayal by MacDonald "this did not always prove possible." MacDonald agreed to their offer to allow publication subject to the inclusion of a "written critical assessment." This addendum was "Canon Roberts —Part Two—A Refutation of Part One" (pp. 254-284).

MacDonald's access to Canon Roberts was gained with the suggestion that he wished to share information with "fellow educationalists" in order to obtain their professional judgement. The headmaster agreed on the condition that the information would not impugn the professional integrity of any staff member. There was no mention of the case study report

nor was this mentioned in the two years of the "trial stage." In the interest of professional sharing, the teachers openly discussed whatever aspects of the life of the school appeared to be of interest to members of the central team.

In addition to the feeling of deceit regarding no possibility of publication, the teachers had no confidentiality with respect to the use of information within the school. This had resulted in MacDonald 'putting some of the critical remarks by teachers to the headmaster.' The HCP school team deeply resented this.[17] What exacerbated this resentment was the fact that much of MacDonald's account had been made without his ever entering the classroom of the teacher most slighted. In fact, the majority of MacDonald's account came not from his evaluation team (at this point only himself) but from the observations of a member of the developmental team, John Elliott. This fact added strength to the teacher's criticism that the case study was "blind assertion."

MacDonald suggested that the Rosehill staff were "brave" in their "willingness to support the publication, even granting the safeguards that inclusion" (i.e., the refutation) may have added (p. 281). For his own part, MacDonald acknowledged "clumsy attempts to grasp and construe a complex reality" (p. 6). Yet, he was willing to learn from his "failures."

Humble and Simons reported to have built upon MacDonald's "learning experiences." Following the trial of the curriculum, materials were re-edited and began to flow out to the open market. The Evaluation Team wanted to compare the nation-wide reception of the curriculum with and without the benefit of training. This evaluation was also reported to have "explored much further in practice...shifting the control from the evaluator to the case study contributors" (1978, p. 190).

In one of the two published case studies, the majority of the information gathered was, again, not from the evaluators but from a member of the development team, Jean Rudduck. Furthermore, the extent of the negotiation for release was the inclusion of a methodological post-script by a teacher centre warden which described the misunderstandings central to Redmore's disaster call. This one and one-half page appendix was titled,

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[17]A more extensive discussion of the events of this case study, as well as the other CARE published portrayals, may be found in my magistral study (Bath, 1983).

"Afterthought by Daniel Findlay" (Simons and Humble, 1978). With this extent of democratic participation, the evaluators acknowledged that "Right of reply to a finished product is not sufficient if we are to make headway in giving prominence to recording participant's perceptions and judgements, and to engaging them in the educational and political process of evaluation" (p. 201). The problem goes deeper, however.

In the Redmore study the authors accepted confidentiality as a principle, then "faced the need to clear" the study. Two Local Education Authority personnel had mistrusted research, having had bad experiences previously. They would not agree to have their conversations recorded. Similarly, when the time came to clear the report for publication, they refused to give permission. The evaluation team responded: "Our decision to publish without their consent is based on the judgement that the issues raised by the case study are important for understanding the process of curriculum innovation; we also, as with other studies attempted to anonymise the participants" (p. 195). And so we have the knight's move.

While the extent of the negotiation to clear became "asking participants for their agreement to circulate to a wider audience information they had given" (p. 194), when there was no agreement, the evaluators shifted their ethics. They "gave more weight to the decisions of those who granted permission...than those who did not" (P. 195). The evaluators "chose to accept the majority decision."[18]

In the subsequent, second case study the ethic was altered so that participants were given control only to delete, amend or add "personal data." There is no mention of in-school confidentiality nor if the participants had access to the final report when considering "to delete or amend those staments of [their] own that [they] did not wish to be shared, or to raise other points" (p. 195).

In the Redmore study the unilateral substitution of anonymity as a "countervailing force," when an agreed upon principle of confidentiality was retracted, would not seem sufficient justification for the shift to the public's right to know. That is, the "higher expectations" of the evaluators (evoking Elliott's "difference principle") would seem to lack a

[18]Is this a notion of a "democractic principle"—majority rules?

necessarily just procedure.

It is interesting to note that another large scale case study evaluation also resorted to anonymity as the ameliorative justification for over-riding an agreed upon principle of confidentiality. Robert Stake attended the CARE Cambridge conferences, contributed to SAFARI and had CARE members work on his own Case Studies in Science Education Project (1978). The ethical stance of the CSSE research was "to follow the lead" of MacDonald and others—with respect to "control of data release" (p. 33). This path, however, led to the same ethical quagmire.

The CSSE statement of principles of confidentiality and anonymity "presumed that —after clearing the report with all persons possibly jeopardised—the actual names of cities and schools would be published." However, the evaluators later "realised that person by person clearance was too enormous a task" (p. 32). Despite the initial and elaborate statement of the centrality of "granting review rights," this "full right to withold any information" was never fulfilled (p. 34). The study ended without ensuring that "all persons potentially in jeopardy did have such an opportunity" (p. 36). In fact, access was gained solely at the superintendent level; then confidentiality was promised fully to facilitate an "increase in openness and honesty" from participants; but later release was sought only from top administrators—disregarding promised "review rights." Softly. Softly.

The CSSE evaluators determined that it was "too much work to 'declassify'." Hence, they resorted to the "comfortable" expedient: the belief that participants were "reasonably well protected" by institutional anonymity. Participants had no inclusion in the question of their own anonymity—never mind confidentiality. Stake, et al., followed the CARE group in more ways than initially suggested. Resting comfortably on their expediting principle of anonymity (absolving themselves of the violation of promised "rights to confidentiality"), the CSSE methodological discussants concluded: "Still, better techniques are needed" (p. 36).

The implication that things could be different a second time around was the same conclusion reached by the CARE evaluators. Simons went as far as suggesting that "one is tempted to argue from experience that an autocratic mode of research is an inevitable

consequence of condensed field work" (1977b, p. 35). The evaluator, as we have seen, may be "compelled to over-ride the participant's right of control for the sake of securing release" (Elliott, 1977, p. 196). "So what happens in practice to those seeking to follow the SAFARI's ethic advice?" Jenkins answered his own question: "The desert, as T.S. Eliot once said, is the heart of your brother" (1980, p. 152).

A more recent CARE evaluation was conducted in North America. MacDonald's Bread and Dreams: A Case Study of Bilingual Education in the U.S.A. is a report of a study in the Boston area (1982). After many months of absence, one of the CARE team was given the chore of returning to the school (from England) to negotiate the release of the study. None of the school staff had "cleared" the case record nor any of the case study draft. The case study worker, Sackville Kushner, tried for weeks to negotiate beyond the great disappointment of the participants. Finally, he stated that the school staff more or less gave in. They no longer cared that the study failed to reflect their perceptions—they no longer cared to give any time to what they considered a disappointing experience. This was an improvement from the original and "considerable hostility" he met (p. 272). The sentiment of release was not that of confirmation. Rather, the school staff eventually "did not object." After much travail, they declared themselves "satisfied but unimpressed" (p. 275). Norris declared that "all involved almost certainly would do it better next time" (p. 276). We hear the same lament more than a decade after the first studies. The problems persist.

G. Other Evaluation Influences

My magistral analysis of the CARE group's evaluation approach was carried out at the Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, the University of British Columbia. Studying under Walter Werner I had opportunities as the supervisor of a Provincial forensic adolescent treatment centre school to implement some of the curricular orientation of Werner, and his former Doctoral Programme Chair, Ted Aoki. I mostly worked with their concept of "mutualism" introduced in Programs for People: Introducing Program Development, Implementation and Evaluation (Aoki and Werner, 1977).

Aoki was an original director of the U.B.C. Centre, but he returned to Alberta to take up the Chair of Secondary Education. Having completed my Master of Arts with Werner, I came to Alberta to study with Aoki. Both Werner and Aoki have a commitment "to turn (if not re-turn) to the experiential, concretely lived world of ours" (Aoki as a PACCR case study participant). This commitment to a revitalisation of curriculum-as-lived is combined with a focus on "Programs for People"—as demonstrated by co-research work with diverse groups such as teacher's associations, Indian bands, multicultural agencies and provincial/federal ministries. Their late seventies orientation towards "mutualistic sense-making" strongly influenced the development of participatory case study evaluation.

Mutualistic Sense-Making

The beginning orientation towards mutualistic or situational sense-making is present in the two provincial evaluations of which Aoki was a leader and Werner an associate. This evaluative work with curriculum and instruction has a vital tension between the critical/theoretical and the situational/practical. In his article "Competence in Teaching as Instrumental and Practical Action: A Critical Analysis," Aoki (1984d) writes of the essential tension as a dialectic. And from the perspective which holds "Theory and Practice in Dialectical Relationship," the required approach involves: "Becoming aware that personal praxis involves social praxis...becoming aware of the personal, social, cultural and political context in which praxical activity is conducted." Hence, the evaluation questions become:

> What is the quality of the underlying perspective of my action? What makes it possible for me as a human being to act the way I do in my pegagogical activities? Is it adequate? (1984c, p. 79)

To convey something of the quality of the directional criterion of participatory case study evaluation and of that which underlies the mutualistic perspective for evaluative action, we can briefly focus on the "dialectical relation" found in the B.C. and Alberta evaluation activities.

Aoki was involved in the two provincial evaluations: The Social Studies in Alberta Assessment (1975) and the British Columbia Social Studies Assessment (1977). Werner contributed directly to the Alberta evaluation. Aoki was a member of the directorate of the Alberta study which was conducted under the auspices of L.W. Downey Research Associates Limited and came to be known as the "Downey Report." The B.C. evaluation was carried out under Aoki's chairship. Both evaluations involved numerous provincial publics and both covered the full extent of the provincially prescribed curricula. These assessments were attempts to go beyond traditional evaluation approaches.

Aoki and Werner had been strongly influenced towards curricular innovation by Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interest (1971). They found in this work a way of situating the interests of traditional evaluation and of pointing beyond. Specifically, beginning with the Alberta Evaluation of the early 1970's, there was an attempt to integrate a set of epistemological perspectives called the technological, the situational-interpretive and the critical. In the subsequent B.C. Assessment, these three perspectival definitions were complemented by three world views. Aoki and Werner caution us not to reify such abstractions. The three knowledge perspectives and the three world views are heuristic concepts and are not mutually exclusive nor collectively inclusive.

In the Alberta evaluation when introducing an integrative perspective to these concepts Aoki and Werner quoted Paulo Freire:

> All educational practice implies a theoretical stance on the educator's part. This stance in turn implies—sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly—an interpretation of man and his world. It could not be otherwise. (Freire, in Aoki and Werner, 1975b, p. 68)

A theoretical stance was made most explicit in the "B.C. Critique," where Aoki introduced a set of perspectives used to guide the evaluation (Aoki and Harrison, 1977b). This set of perspectives was attributed primarily to Habermas (1971) and secondarily to commentary on Habermas' three ways of knowing by Aoki (1977d), Apple (1975a, 1975b) and J. Macdonald (1975).

Aoki's own cited commentary is found in "Theoretic Dimensions of Curriculum: Reflections from a Microperspective" (1977d). He wrote in this article:

> An authentic radical departure [from taken-for-granted curriculum preoccupations] calls for not only a lateral shift to the practical but also a vertical shift that leads us to a deeper understanding of the program developer's theoretic stance. This stance may be implicit or even unconscious, based as it is on assumptions that are frequently taken for granted in dealing with the practical problems of program development. (p. 51)

Aoki's theoretical stance during the Alberta Evaluation relied on Habermas—especially his essay, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" (1971).

In Habermas' writing we find the caution that a certain "perspective in which the development of the social system seems to be determined by the logic of scientific-technical progress...[can] become a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness...where it can take on legitimating power" (1970, p. 105). The questioning of the evaluator's theoretical stance prescribed by Aoki [above] speaks to this same concern: not allowing the evaluator or her or his evaluation method to be taken for granted. Turning methods upon oneself, therefore, requires a questioning of the authenticity of one's convictions which must stand or fall with belief (Habermas). We find, herein, a movement from the purely epistemic to the normative—a shifting of focus from theoretical stances to worldviews. "It could not be otherwise" (Freire).

In his later reflections on both evaluations, Aoki refers to the "dynamic of the dialectic between the knowledge structure of life experience and the normative structure as well" (1984). Calvin Schrag, a scholar alluded to in Aoki's teaching, adds to the caution concerning this essential dynamic. In his commentary on "The Current Crisis in the Human Sciences," Schrag writes of that danger evidenced when inquiry loses "the truth of its own position." The result is an "arrogation of certain epistemic privilege" to one knowledge structure (1980, p. 5). To preserve the dialectical dynamicism to which Aoki refers, it is necessary, in Habermas' words, to consider not only the structural determinants of one's

theoretic stance (culturally determined epistemologies), but one must also consider "Worldviews [which] are determined by cognitive, linguistic and moral-practical forms of consciousness" (1970, p. 168).

In the Alberta Evaluation, Aoki and Werner brought to the fore this fundamental premise that curricular perspectives—regardless of which view of knowledge—are grounded in a particular world view, and that both underlying prolegomena must be made explicit in curricular critique.

In the B.C. Evaluation, three types of world views were explicated from M. Maruyama's discussion of "Three Paradigms for Planners" (1974). The three interpretations of humans and their world became a framework within which provincial views of social studies were coalesced (and later developed in Programs for People).

Three World Views

A first world view offered in the B.C. Evaluation was the individualistic —also referred to as the "random." Aoki, et al., found that this ego and ethno-centric approach found little legitimation in the curricular or public views documented in the B.C. evaluation. The more pervasive world views were the hierarchical and the mutualistic.

A second, hierarchical world view [to quote from the B.C. Assessment] "is held by those who generally believe that unity and uniformity seen as sameness is desirable; that planning should be done by experts; that decisions be arrived at through majority rule, consensus, or by those in authority; that there exists but one truth; and that diversity be seen almost always as a source of conflict." A hierarchical world view sees a "layered world" (Aoki, et al., 1977).

Lastly and most fundamental to Aoki's own work, [again quoting from the B.C. Evaluation], The mutualistic world view "is held by those who believe that harmony in diversity is both desirable and feasible; that planning should be done co-actively by members of the community; that there is no one fixed truth and that there exist multiple ways of knowing and multiple realities."

The mutualistic world view was the normative basis for much of Aoki and Werner's early curricular work.[19] The acceptance of "multiple ways of knowing and multiple realities," moreover, is that interpretation of people and their world that led to an appropriation of three separate ways of knowing from the theory of Jürgen Habermas. This appropriation, however, is mitigated by a more prevalent concern with the mutualistic worldview. Before this quality can be illustrated, the three ways of knowing that constituted Werner and Aoki's evaluative theoretical stance may be rehearsed. In each of the evaluations we find inclusion of the technological, the situational-interpretive and the critical ways of knowing. These perspectives provide the remaining three definitions recurrent in the mutualistic evaluation orientation.

The Three Ways of Knowing

The technological way of knowing is that approach which Habermas calls the "purposive-rational." We may see the manifestations of such instrumental rationality in curricular phenomena similar to the accountability movement, the behavioural objectives approach, the ends-means orientation or general systems theory. When introducing this perspective in the Alberta Evaluation, Aoki and Werner quote Habermas where he wrote: "Instrumental action is governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge...—[rules which in every case] imply conditional predictions about observable events" (1975b, p. 69).

In the Alberta Evaluation, Aoki and Werner provided a "critical examination of the perspective of the Master Plan of the Alberta Social Studies program" (1975b, p. 66). In this analysis, the authors assert that the curriculum "was, without a doubt, at the forefront...almost alone in Canada" with its emphasis on "'value issues' as the venue for...the processes of valuing and inquiry." Nevertheless, "When the perspective concerning man is examined, it becomes obvious that the major orientation of the Alberta program is the technological [the first of the three ways of knowing]" (p. 68). The analysis goes on to show

[19]The discussion of mutualism in Aoki's work may also be found in a paper presented to the Bergamo Conference, which was held in his honour. See Bath, (in press).

how this curriculum primarily falls under that orientation "called by Habermas purposive-rational." The analysis also highlights examples from the "Master Plan" of the remaining two knowledge perspectives which are less prevalent and primarily implicit. In concluding, recommendations are prescribed to extend the situational-interpretive and critical perspectives.

Within the B.C. Assessment, Aoki and Harrison provided a similar critique in "The Intents of the B.C. Social Studies Curriculum Guides: An Interpretation" (1977b). Overall, they interpreted and described examples of the three ways of knowing within the B.C. curriculum. However, "the program [did] not provide a balance between these perspectives; rather it emphasize[d] scientific knowledge" (p. 62). Scientific knowledge had been articulated as that of technical knowing —distinquished from situational knowing and critically reflective knowing.

The second way of knowing articulated in Aoki and Werner's theoretical stance was the situational-interpretive—that perspective considered by Habermas to underly the interests of the "historical-hermeneutic" sciences. During the mid-seventies, at the time of the evaluations, Aoki included within this perspective the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz; the sociology of knowledge of Berger and Luckmann; the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel; and the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, Palmer and Gadamer. He stated that the guiding interests of situational knowing are "insights into human experiences as they are lived...clarifying, authenticating and bringing to full awareness...the deep structures of meaning" (Aoki, 1984a).

The section of the B.C. Assessment entitled "Interpretive Studies of Selected School Situations" (Aoki, et al., 1977c) was explicitly a reporting from a situational-interpretive perspective. The overall B.C. Evaluation saw a significant elaboration and extensive inclusion of this approach in comparison to that which had been deemed the situational-interpretive study of the earlier Alberta Assessment. The Alberta "site visit" section of the study was given only to provide background and afford glimpses. The intent was illustrative or suggestive and did not attempt a rigorous methodological logic-in-use (Aoki, et al, 1975b,

p. 256).

The later B.C. Evaluation's situational-interpretive report is an account of five in-depth studies of school situations. To quote the report:

> Information concerned with the everyday activities of the students and teachers enriches and therefore complements the generalizations arising from information obtained from the paper-and-pencil instruments. Hence, each study outlines the setting of the situation, describes the nature of the Social Studies programs, and interprets the meaning of significance which educators and students ascribe to them. (Aoki, et al., 1977a, p. 26)

The B.C. interpretive inquiry was presented as a "case study approach" and it anticipated many of the ethical principles and procedures herein associated with case studies. There was an inclusion of anonymity, confidentiality and participant validation (Aoki, et al., 1977c, p. 90).

Finally, the Critical Evaluator's concerns (the third conceptual realm of the evaluative theoretical stance) may be illustrated by the following questions:

1. What are the perspectives underlying curriculum X? (What are underlying root interests, root assumptions, root approaches?)
2. What is the implied view of the student or the teacher held by the curriculum planner?
3. At the root level, whose interests does Curriculum X serve?
4. What are the metaphors that guide the curriculum developer, the curriculum implementor, or the curriculum evaluator?
5. What is the basic bias of the publisher/author/developer of prescribed or recommended resource materials?
6. What is the curriculum's supporting worldview?

(Aoki, 1984a, p. 11)

The two analyses previously discussed that identified the B.C. and Alberta curricula as primarily "Technological Ways of Knowing" were the two explicit expressions of critical

rationality included in both evaluation approaches (Aoki and Werner, 1975b; Aoki and Harrison, 1977b).

The Relevancy of Mutualistic, Interpretive Sense-Making to Participatory Case Study Evaluation

Aoki and Werner safeguarded a healthy tension between the situational-interpretive and the critical ways of knowing. They turned foremost in their evaluation writings, however, to the interpretive. A tendency towards practical, lived experience mitigates the risk to reduce interpretation in the other direction (i.e., as with a strident form of critical theory). Aoki and Werner developed a perspective towards the practical interest that reduced the tendency which, according to Schrag, "uncritically legitimates the transcendental-empirical framework of question posing." This is a tendency that Schrag ascribes to Habermas—at least before the latter underwent his "conceptual sea-change" with the "linguistic turn" in his writings (Schrag, 1980, p. 22).[20] The two early, large-scale evaluation approaches were attempts to go beyond adopted "technocratic strategies and allied decision-making social theories." These ventures required a "radical re-examination of the foundations of social theory and an exploration of alternative modes of inquiry and socio-cultural organization" (Aoki, 1984d, p. 74). Mutualism is this dwelling with "radicalness"—with the sense of re-examining the "root" of our theory but more importantly with the rootedness of praxical, lived-inquiry. Schrag maintains that beyond the purely epistemic there is the "originative question." To Aoki and Werner, this rootedness in the originative stance is the turning towards the other—the gesture fundamental to mutualism. Such a gesture is an orientation towards situational knowing.

This strong assertion concerning the quality of Aoki and Werner's world view requires illustration. In his book Why Democracy? , Alf Ross illustrates in a more general way the tensions which Aoki and Werner presented in the concrete, lived way of educators. Such a discussion also provides a context to support the mutualistic claim. Ross wrote that:

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[20]This "linguistic turn" is discussed in Chapter Three.

> [T]he people's exercise of political power can be visualised as taking place in two different ways: either the people make their own political decisions directly by the "ancient plebiscite," or else they register their decisions through specialized organs particularly devised for that purpose, which act "on behalf of the people"....These methods may be called, respectively, direct and representative democracy. (p. 202)

The salient example of representative democracy is the federalist government, where the people's participation is pushed into the background—as the ultimate ground for political legitimation—while political decisions, themselves, are made by others. A terse criticism of representative democracy was offered by Ross where he quoted Jean Jacques Rousseau:

> "[P]eople believe that they are free, but greatly deceive themselves. They are free during parliamentary elections, but as soon as the members of Parliament are elected, they are once more enslaved and are nothing." (Ross, 1952)

Direct or participatory democracy, on the other hand, demands constant, actual participation as the basis for the conduct of government.

We may see similarities between participatory democracy and mutualism. The mutualistic world view is held by those who believe planning should be done co-actively by members of the community. Mutualism has a focus of power in decision making that is shared among participants. In the B.C. Evaluation, certain responses were identified as those indicating the mutualistic world view. These included the statement: "I think problems involving people are best handled by letting groups work together in order to find a solution." And finally, mutualism has as a goal the "decentralisation of decision-making" (Aoki, et al., 1977c).

Representative democracy, in contrast, is supported by a hierarchical world view. People do not legislate, they elect an elite. Responsibility and autonomy are then regulated to ensure efficient and accountable administration—to carry out and to elaborate the supreme authority of the people which is vested with elected representatives. State officials have particular public duties. Organizational charts, official policies, operational definitions and job descriptions become the guiding concerns. The bureaucracy must be responsive and

accountable—instrumental rationality must prevail.

It is against such hierarchical attitudes—which stifle "authentic communicative action"—that Aoki advocated a liberation which is grounded in the moral attitude of emancipation. Mutualism, when expressed through the situational and the critical ways of knowing, has as its aim to promote a more open and public decision making.

Similarly, unmitigated criticalness is reflection "oriented towards making conscious the unconscious by dis-covering underlying assumptions and intentions." Mutualism, however, becomes distinctive with its orientation towards the other, as a criticalness which is considering together. Reflection becomes a "critical venturing together,... [which has] its interests in liberating man from hidden assumptions and techniques, [and which] promotes a theory of man and society that is grounded in the moral attitude of liberation" (1984c, p. 77). The normative gesture becomes the prior ground of inquiry. The strident application of Critical Theory is mitigated.

Where Alf Ross referred to direct or participatory democracy as the "ancient plebiscite," we may also consider Habermas' assertion that moral consciousness (as opposed to technical consciousness) once dominated the pre-modern traditional structures of society. With modernisation, however, such "conventionally structured systems of action" became increasingly and permanently subordinated to conditions of instrumental or strategic rationality (1970, p. 98).

Herein, we gain the sense of the originative question of mutualism—a pointing to the way. Where the mutualistic perspective insists that curricular activity is political, and that authentic communicative action is praxical, we may think of Habermas' statement that, "Structural violence does not manifest itself as force; rather, unperceived, it blocks those communications in which convictions effective for legitimations are formed and passed on" (1977, p. 21). A mutualistic approach grounded in the rootedness of meaning as communicated *in situ* safeguards a commitment to lived-understanding which promotes the emancipatory interest. On the other hand, actions stemming from "transcendental-empirical" criticalness (Schrag) have the potential to reify power in institutions or "vested authority"

and to violate empowerment of individuals.[21]

Aoki illustrates the "dynamic of the dialectic" and reveals his mutualistic orientation where he suggests that we might turn for support to a "framework" interpreted from Karol Wojtyla's The Acting Person:

> Within such a framework...[to make sense afresh] is anchored in a situation of inter-actions among teachers and students mediated in everyday language, oriented towards practical interest in establishing open inter-subjectivity and non-violent recognition on which communicative action depends. But these interpretations are rooted in a network of meanings actors within that situation give. Hence, understanding the day-to-day life of teachers and students in the classroom requires at least understanding in terms of the learning structures actors in the classroom give. However, to be able to venture forth together in the meaningful way Wojtyla speaks of, requires not only an understanding of this meaning structure but also action rooted in critical reflection on these meaning structures. (1984c, p. 76)

The sense of "critical venturing together" given by Aoki is the same that Habermas describes as a moral consciousness which can only become coherent in living relationships in everyday conversation (1977, p. 17). Praxis implies an orientation towards empowerment—seemingly towards participatory democracy. Representative democratic structures pull in an opposite direction —towards increasing hierarchical streamlining, where power is vested in authority.

This polarity is a fundamental tension in the curricular criticism of Werner and Aoki. They have referred to those who act as representatives and who effectively impose their curricular definitions on others as "gate-keepers." The "keepers" serve to exclude definitions which do not correspond to accepted institutionalised versions. Such top-down imposition "represents an unequal distribution of power among groups within schooling contexts because everyone does not have equal power to control the content of curricula and in part the attitudes and activities of students" (1979, p. 49). The mutualistic evaluation stance attempts

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[21]Refer to "Directional Criteria: Participation to What Aim?" and "The Epistemological Problem of a Critical Moment in Evaluation," in Chapter Five.

to disperse power and to provide inclusiveness.[22] In a general sense, Werner and Aoki used this position to question at least one hierarchy of representative democracy—the school system that influenced the curricula evaluated. The alternative, sense-making approaches militated against such representative rôles for school officials and advocated for the inclusion of multiple, participant understandings of reality. On the other hand, the *status quo* of the principles and procedures institutionalized by representative democracy blocks mutualism.

The evaluation activities of participatory case study evaluation have carried on a search for alternatives. The present study resulted in a report submitted to a review of the Department of Secondary Education by the University of Alberta's President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews (PACCR). This dissertation concerns, at one level, the methodology developed as a challenge to "problems of control" suggested by the experiences of the University of East Anglia's CARE group. The participatory case study evaluation concerns the inclusion of principles and procedures of justice to an ethic of access and release of evaluation information—the absence of these ethical concerns was identified as problematic in the CARE work (Bath, 1983; Elliott, 1977; and Jenkins, 1977). Aoki and Werner also have influenced my response to the question: "What makes it possible for me as a human being to act the way I do in my...[evaluation] activity" (Aoki, 1984d, p. 79)? My gesture towards people and their world is to be committed to participation —to engage in evaluation "co-actively." Furthermore, there is a pertinacious, interpretive stance towards making explicit the prejudices which must underlie any educational practice—including my own, the participants' and the recipients' of the evaluation report. As Aoki and Werner suggest, this is a blade which cuts both ways.

The discussions which follow return again and again to this need for criticalness. Such is the necessity of the hermeneutic task. The thesis question is: What are just rôles for participants and evaluators in participatory case study evaluation, and how do these effect the validity of the case study report? This question can be approached from methodological,

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[22]This problem, initially viewed as one of control, could well serve as the sub-title of this present dissertation.

epistemological and ontological stances—although understanding is not so neatly hewn. Having situated the study, we may now return to a more pedestrian account of the implementation of the evaluation. We will return, again, to this discussion with added criticalness. But first, I may recount the events of the evaluation with taken-for-granted concepts.

Chapter II

EXPERIENCING INVENTING THE STUDY AND IMAGINING THE CASE

A. Inventing the Study

An opportunity was presented to go beyond the CARE work at the University of Alberta within the context of a review by the President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews. The opportunity seemed right assuming that the academic community is, generally, open to alternatives and assuming that when becoming immersed in the ethical quagmire, the professional preoccupations of a university department (one explicitly concerned with curriculum and instruction) could provide an informed and critical group with which to consider matters of control.

The PACCR publication, "Some Comments on Campus Reviews," described a broad purpose which also seemed most relevant to the issues at hand: "In the broad sense the purpose of reviews must surely be to seek ways of serving the public interest as effectively as possible." In the "Methodological Introduction" to the case study I wrote a response:

> What do we understand to be "the public interest"? If we consider "the public" to be the plurality of ethnic, cultural and socio-economic groups, then the concern becomes the **interests** of varied and various groups. Given the pluralistic actualities of the Canadian political spectrum, such interests are often competing, sometimes inimical and usually not well defined. Furthermore, while we may accept the existence of cultural plurality, what definitions do we bring to ethnicity and what **structural** plurality exists—*vis-à-vis* equal and fair distribution of social advantage?
>
> How, then, is a review or an evaluation to make judgements of "effectiveness" of service (or any other normative appraisal) when the interests to be served may be ambivalent? More specifically, how can the evaluation be just in respect to the possibly competing interests of the programme participants, the reviewers and the decision makers to whom the review is destined?[1]

[1]See Appendix Eight.

Inquiry concerning the evaluation of the Graduate Studies and Research Programme of the Department within the context of the PACCR review proved to be most suitable for a continuing exploration of the questions posed by the CARE group as well as the work of Aoki and Werner.

B. Going Beyond Democratic Case Study

In the "Methodological Background"[2] of the case study report I asserted: "Evaluation is a political act that affects the lives of those involved." I suggested that a participatory case study attempts to make this fact a prominent concern in the determination of just principles and procedures. The participatory case study approach to evaluation is a significant change from the tradition of democratic case study evaluation. The participatory approach includes the inquiry asserting the principle of justice, a principle which was planned to increase significantly the control extended to participants.

This study actually began with my magistral research "Negotiation of Ethical Principles and Procedures in Case Study Evaluation: The Humanities Curriculum Project and the Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project."[3] Later, while continuing with doctoral studies at the University of Alberta, on May 20, 1984, I first discussed with my Committee members the possibility of conducting an evaluation as part of the PACCR review. In August, 1984, Ted Aoki (Chair of the Department of Secondary Education at the University and my Supervisory Committee Chair) and I discussed the suitability of evaluating the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Programme.

On September 10, 1984, a written proposal for such a study was submitted to the members of the Departmentally elected PACCR Self-Study Committee. After an in-camera meeting on September 13, I was invited to a subsequent session to present the proposal. At the meeting of September 18, this representative body gave support to the study (on behalf of

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[2]The following description of the planning of the study draws heavily from the case study report, Appendix Nine: "Methodological Background," pp. 225-230.
[3]Vancouver: Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, University of British Columbia, 1983.

the Department). The suggestion was made that the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Committee be approached about staff participation in this portrayal.

On October 15, 1984, a Doctoral Research Proposal for the evaluation and this dissertation was successfully defended at a Candidacy Examination and Proposal Defence. The Thesis Supervisory Committee also suggested that the Graduate Studies and Research Committee be approached to help identify staff participants.

On November 6, 1984, the resident graduate students of the Department met to consider their PACCR contribution. At this symposium, the case study evaluation was elected to be the collective contribution of the students. All interested graduate students could become participants.

On November 28, 1984, was the first opportunity where the case study proposal could be made an item on the agenda of the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Committee. The Committee members informally decided that the identification of participants was not within their mandate. They did, however, make three suggestions: 1) that all staff members be offered the opportunity to participate; 2) that the participants be chosen randomly; and/or 3) that the criteria determined from the case study methodology be used to select. The first and third options were utilised.

Planning a Mode of Release Appropriate to the Question

On December 6, 1984, a memorandum was sent to all Departmental staff requesting participation in the study.[4] A number of staff came forward. Others were approached in consideration of the following criteria. These criteria, *mutatis mutandis*, were also used in the selection of the graduate students, the external (to the Department and/or Faculty) professors and the administrative participants. The criteria were: gender inclusiveness; subject area (a wide selection); Graduate Programme exposure/non-exposure; colloquium (non-thesis)/thesis supervision; graduate student levels (Ph.D., M.Ed., thesis and non-thesis [also Undergraduate experience with the Diploma Programme]); and international/national student status.

[4]See Appendix Two, p. 195.

There were 19 participants: 9 Departmental professors (3 additional professors had to decline involvement because of personal commitments/circumstances); 4 external professors/administrators (one additional professor could not be included because of the lateness of availabilty); and 6 resident graduate students (4 additional graduate students withdrew after the "informed consent" interviews in light of the frank discussions of threats to anonymity and confidentiality and of possible effects from such threats). Some first year graduate students did not feel secure against possible repercussions.[5] There were 90 conversations comprising 115 hours of tape-recorded dialogue. Each participant was seen an average of 5 times. From the taped conversations, five hand-written log-books were transcribed and 92 typed, abridged transcript pages of participant understandings were prepared.[6]

C. Experiencing the Case Study Release Phases

Informed Consent Interviews

The initial interviews were those of "informed consent." The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada guidelines, "Ethical Guidelines for the Institutional Review Committees for Research with Human Sciences," were rehearsed with participants.[7] Furthermore, the issues arising from the extensive literature of the CARE group concerning their SAFARI ethic (The Ford Foundation's Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project) were taken up continuously. Several participants indicated that these rehearsals were perhaps "too heavy" and that the discussions of risks were "almost scary" —such was the

[5]As qualified in the report, the concerns were not directed against the Department, *per se*. Students discussed the general powerlessness of most students with respect to the University establishment. It was enough to contend with the exigencies of graduate studies without adding risks. It should also be observed that other students were involved for just these same reasons. This was an opportunity to take risks and to address some of these issues of power.

[6]The experience of this abridgement will be seen to be a quintessential tension to the inquiry concerning the evaluation.

[7]Ethical guidelines referred to in the evaluation are discussed in the section "Reflections on the Experience of the 'World' of the Work: Discourse or Dialogue," in Chapter Three—under the topics "Validity" and "Defeasibility."

intent.[1]

An example of the principles and procedures discussed was that participants were kept ignorant of the identity and positions of the other participants: beyond the broad descriptions of "students," "Departmental staff members" or "external participants"—there was one exception. While the knowledge of the identity of all participants was deemed necessary to the Chair (as the case study worker's doctoral supervisor) —confidentiality was maintained even here. No identities were discussed *vis-à-vis* specific, released understandings and the Chair, despite his varied rôles, had no access to the transcripts nor tapes. The SSHRC guidelines recommend that participants be afforded the right "to inquire about the research, and whenever practicable should have recourse to a knowledgeable resource person." With this suggestion in mind, and as a safe-guard for me as the researcher (given the exigencies of a doctoral programme), the Chair was provided the knowledge of participant identities. Participants were informed of this fact from the outset, as acknowledged in the "consent form."

The commitment that each participant was to have the utmost control over her or his understandings of the Graduate Programme was sustained as an integral part of the participatory case study approach. As will be discussed below, the acceptance of such control was not always deemed necessary by participants. However, I insisted on continuing informed consent via discussions of the principles of anonymity, confidentiality and justice. The participants' acknowledgement of this procedure was obtained.[2]

An important phase that occurred during the initial informed consent discussions concerned the trust necessary of participants that I could safe-guard confidentiality and anonymity. This trust was not merely ethical, I was frank about questions of competency. The ability to maintain had as much to do with my interpersonal skills and my mental and emotional endurance as it did with knowledge of the subtleties of such principles and procedures. For example, acknowledgment of seemingly extraneous information during a

[1] See the discussion, "Well, that is just fixin' things that ain't broke," in the section: "Reflections on the Experience of Participation," in Chapter Three.
[2] See Appendix Three: "Consent Form" and Appendix Four: "First Draft Release Letter."

conversation could inadvertently reveal the identity of a participant. The simple fact that I had contact with a certain person [as perhaps revealed by an offer to set up a meeting for some other purpose] could have indicated that the third person was a participant. "Inside information" learned during a case study conversation about Departmental functions, which did not have to do with the Graduate Studies and Research Programme (perhaps even a certain expression or phrase), could have indicated the source of knowledge as a certain person. And, as a final example, in a Department that then comprised 25 staff and 50(+) graduate students, to hide comings and goings is not always possible. (Fortunately, the tape-recorder fit into a brief-case.) The frank discussions of these and many other nuances of confidentiality and anonymity led some participants (primarily students) to not continue. The pressures of this ethical tight-rope walking also led me to several sojourns—to distancing myself completely from the study. However, no apparent breaches of these principles resulted.

The Case Record Conversations

Following the informed consent interviews, all participants agreed to have their conversations taped. Each participant received an average of three subsequent PACCR case record visits. After each session, the tapes were transcibed by hand into log-books. The previous dialogue concerning the graduate programme was taken up again at the next meeting. In this manner, the understandings were repeatedly discussed. The intention was that indicated in a letter written to the participants at the later "release interview":

> Throughout our interviews, the understandings have emerged and have been discussed recurrently. Each successive interview has seen the distancing of the initial dialogical context, bringing into place a shared understanding of the general context within which the statements may stand. That is, from the initial conversations, the themes have been refined to the point where the understandings may hopefully stand alone; the initial contexts have been confirmed in dialogue to the point where we now have an understanding of a broader context within which the understandings may be

discussed.[10]

Limited Release

During the conversations, certain ideas or understandings emerged which were considered important for the "larger conversation" among the 19 participants. These few instances required limited release of the ideas, which entailed rehearsing the possible threats to anonymity and confidentiality. The participants were given sufficient context (release of ideas was not sought upon initial discussion, but only after the next meeting allowed "re-confirmation"). Each participant had complete control over the decisions for this limited release. Otherwise, all discussions were kept confidential. I sought limited release only occasionally since the overall intent of the study was to control "interventions." That is, for example, the thematic treatment of understandings was given to have been held off until three months after interviews began.[11] The intent was to keep my directing of the conversations to a minimum—to allow the understandings of the Programme to emerge spontaneously and independently from each participant.

Similarly, the participants were repeatedly told that I did not intend to interview for preconceived notions of the Graduate Programme. It was not expected that participants would have had the occassion to systematically and critically reflect upon the Programme. Instead, each separate dialogue would explore mutual sense-making (while I attempted to keep out the understandings of other conversations—a desire facilitated by the principles of anonymity and confidentiality). As the individual conversations progressed, other notions from the larger conversation were introduced—after limited release. A measure of this co-research intent was expressed by several participants with their perceptions that the dialogue was "exciting," "interesting" and "helpful" to their own research and Graduate Programme activities. Interestingly, some of those initially most tentative about involvement later expressed disappointment that particular sessions had run out of time or expressed anticipation of the

[10]Appendix Four.
[11]The implications of this assumed "bracketing" are questioned in the discussion of "Critical Understandings of Non-Intervention," p. 158.

next meeting. Overall, participants suggested that they enjoyed the conversations and found them interesting.

The Case Record Release Interviews

The final PACCR case study interviews were conducted after "the case record was closed." The participants and I went over typed transcripts, word-by-word. Two purposes were to ensure that the understandings could be confirmed—which could require deletions, modifications or additions—and to decide whether these statements could be considered for use in the first draft of the case study report. The participants were asked to keep in mind the possible threats to anonymity and confidentiality. Furthermore, each participant was asked to ground his or her decisions for release in a dialogue concerning justice. This procedure was expressed in the question "What notions of 'justness' or 'goodness' are you considering when deciding to include or exclude certain understandings?" As an example certain succinct perceptions were kept out since "They would not facilitate dialogue—they would close doors." On the other hand, rather explicit statements were kept in since these "had been stated in public before," or "I would stand up for this in public."

The decision to primarily include only the participants' words in the case record transcripts has already been alluded to in the excerpt from the "First Draft Release Letter." A further point was made that the statements in the final case study report were not to be accompanied with my previous dialogue. Rather, I would provide a new and unknown context. Hence, while the participants and the evaluator "bound" the understandings with reference to "general contexts" during the dialogical confirmations, the written statements needed to be seen as standing alone—in an attempt to reinforce the interpretive nature of the first draft contextualisation.[12]

[12]The hermeneutic understanding of the dialectic between conversational participation and written reporting turned upon this procedure. This decision, combined with that introduced in the following discussion of the first draft report release, became the crux of the inquiry concerning justice in participatory case study evaluation.

Release of the First Draft

The final stage of the case study was the release by participants of the first draft. Participants were given this first contextualisation of the report and were asked to consider, again, the principles and procedures of release. Such control did not, however, extend to other participants' understandings nor to my overall interpretation. This was the first opportunity that participants had to share the confidential understandings of others (except for limited releases). The first draft was confidential and the individual copies were returned and (requested to be) not copied. Modifications, deletions and additions of **their own** statements were written in. Where requested, additional meetings were offered. Constraints on time and the imposition on participants were factors which led to the decision not to meet again over this first draft. Release was primarily accomplished through written correspondence.

PACCR-SSC Release

From these submissions and my second returning to the interpretation of the report the final draft was prepared and submitted to the Self-Study Committee. This Committee had agreed (at the September 18, 1984, meeting) that should there be alteration or editing of the case study report, the text would be returned to me so that re-confirmation could take place with the participants. Subsequently, the case study report was presented at the Departmental PACCR Retreat. From here it was included in the Departmental submission to the Unit Review Committee—in the "Self Study Report." [13]

Justice Case Record Release

As a final stage of the case study research, the participants were asked to confirm and release to the dissertation stage, transcriptions of our discussions over the PACCR first draft release. Transcriptions of the conversations regarding the principles and proeedures considered as just reasons for their decisions to release the PACCR case study draft were cleared for this dissertation. Participants have also had an opportunity to respond to questions of anonymity

[13]See Appendix Eight for the text of the case study report, p. 202.

in the final thesis dissertation.[14]

The purposes of the case study evaluation were three-fold: 1) to inform decision making by those "across campus"; 2) to provide the Department with a portrayal of the Graduate Programme at a time when there was a change of Chair and 3) to provide the centre-piece of a subsequent doctoral study.

In reference to the third purpose, the thesis of this dissertation concerns the rôles of participants and evaluators considered as procedures and principles of justice within the context of access to and release of evaluative understandings. That is, the procedures and principles which were revealed when determining access to and release of understandings during the evaluation are discussed (in following) as an emerging understanding of these ethical, evaluative rôles. My assumption is that evaluating is an interpretive activity. This dissertation explores a deeper understanding of such interpretation—by participants, by myself and by recipients of the evaluation report. An evaluation that concerns questions of control must necessarily address considerations of power in social relationships. And an evaluation concerned with mutualistic sense-making must be concerned with the interests of participants, evaluators and decision makers (recipients of the study) as these interests effect understandings. This is to seek ways to question which effective, public interests are being served.[15]

As an example of the commitment necessary to conduct participatory case study evaluation; once approved, the conversations and the writing of the case study were experienced over five months. While some stages of the case study were more demanding than others, at one stage during the month of March, 254 hours were logged. Considering a five day week this amounts to 12 hours each day devoted solely to the study. Multiply this by 110+ working days. It would have been far easier to have conducted a value-free study under the guise of the autocratic evaluator. Participatory case study evaluation is very time consuming.

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[14]See Appendix Seven: "Dissertation Letter to Participants," p. 201.
[15]This sentence plays against the PACCR statement that the review seeks ways of serving the public interest, effectively.

The "Methodological Background" of the report concluded as follows:

> The reader of this study may pay particular attention to how and when the interpretation by the case study worker (the structure or description of the study) derives from the understandings of the participants (the perceptions of the case). The interpretation of the evaluator and the understandings of the participants are two moments of a dialectic.

The dialectic of the "invention of the study" (the conversations, principles and procedures of the evaluation) and the "imagination of the case" (the case study worker's written portrayal) were given to reveal a reciprocal relationship. To the extent that there was an authentic and genuine relationship between the contextualisation by the writer and the confirmed intentions, language and endeavours of the participants, there would be "internal validation."

I call this assertion into question.[16] An interrogation of the dialectic between participating and reporting—the lived-experience of participants and the "world of the work" (Ricoeur)—suggests that validity is not internal to the case study nor to the report. Validation is external in an ontological sense—such beliefs in justification and justification of belief involve the praxis of the reader, in front of the text. Nevertheless, even if the lived-experiences of the evaluation participants are not accessible to empathetic understanding by recipients of the report, there is still much purposefulness in the participatory case study evaluation ethic. The "matter of the text" suggests, however, an alternative gesture towards mutual sense-making—one which is a turning from the notion of justice-as-control.

Experiencing Justice as Confirmation

I began to implement the study guided by a mutualistic notion of justice-as-control. However, justice-as-control revealed an increasingly inadequate orientation. At the outset of the study, control was a guiding principle and participants'c onfirmation was seen as a means of control. This posture was in response to the CARE group's ethics of negotiation. Kemmis wrote: "The evaluator must find procedures appropriate to each context by which he or she

[16] This assertion is also made by the CARE group and Stake's (1978) CSSE group—as discussed herein.

can negotiate the disputed territory between the public's 'right to know,' managers' 'rights to relevant information' and the individual's 'right to discretion'" (1980, p. 237). Consideration of the dictum "appropriate to each context" provides some insight into the initial shifting of the ethics of participatory case study evaluation. While justice-as-control can be viewed as an *a priori* attempt to safeguard all possible "disputed territories," justice-as-confirmation seemed to allow a necessary, open orientation towards others and towards concrete situations. My treatment of on-going dialogue as text, subjected to further explication and interpretation, opposed the consideration of written quotations as "facts" or "information." Understandings were subject to continuous explication—modification, reinterpretation and re-confirmation. This vital process between spoken and written discourses would take the place of concerns with ownership of the data—with evidential outcomes subject to *a priori*, ratified agreement. Indeed, "data" became a problematic notion. Transcriptions of verbal renderings of understandings were treated as reconstructed text that were continuously re-appropriated. Confirmation became a principle that allowed a gesture towards the happening of discourse, rather than a ratification which attempted to reify the utterances made in one particular context.

In March of 1985, I made a note in my "Phases" file: "Dialogue, otherness, text—to what do these speak and why am I so interested?" These notions became increasingly important as they framed the experiences of the confirmatory procedures developed in the evaluation.[17] In the participatory case study evaluation, whenever there was doubt regarding the disputed territory between the right to know and the right to privacy, the higher value was placed upon confidentiality. The right to withhold or reconstruct understandings typified the principle of confirmation. And it was believed that this principle would verify or stengthen the case's justification. The principle of confirmation allowed reinterpretation.

An explicit experience of this principle was realised in the limited release phase. Participants were asked to give consent to limited release of understandings only after a

[17]Confirmation has its roots in the Latin *con*—together—and *firmare*—to make firm, strengthen, establish. In the context of speech, the O.E.D. offers a definition, "to corroborate or add support to (a statement, etc.); to make certain, verify, put beyond doubt."

subsequent interview. That is, when an understanding was identified as potentially meaningful to share in conversations with other participants, considerations of the impact on anonymity and confidentiality as a result of such sharing were not discussed until the next meeting. In this way the tape of the initial conversation could be transcribed in the interview log. The transcribed thoughts then could be re-confirmed in a later context—altered, deleted or released as is. Thus, the participants had an opportunity to give informed consent. The principle of limited release applied to the larger conversation of the case record interviews—sharing from the smaller conversations with each participant. Confidentiality is waived with such release (but hopefully not anonymity). This limited release was only to the case record stage of the evaluation as broader release needed a second set of confirmations —that is, possibly further reconstructions.[11]

A more tangible result of the principle of confirmation (enacted as limited release) came later in the study during the PACCR Case Record Release Stage. The PACCR case record was comprised of those transcripts re-confirmed and released by each participant. The interviews conducted for such clearance were, as always, taped. Participants invariably wished not only to re-confirm the transcripts before them but to add or continue the dialogue initiated. Since any new understandings would, in turn, necessitate re-confirmation at subsequent meetings, the "case record had to be closed." Participants were asked to concentrate deliberations to the presented final transcripts. To continue the conversations would continue the case record and necessitate yet another meeting for re-confirmation. The confirmation of the interplay of spoken dialogue and written text would be never-ending.

The release of the case record (as indicated above) necessitated closure to the Case Record Interview Stage. Saturation was another precipitate for such closure. At the final stages of the case record interviews, some conversations became redundant. A few participants began to observe "We have been over this several times before." Whereas the first interview appointments were kept without exception, a number of participants began to find competing

[11]At a different level of the study, the discussions and principles considered in both release phases provided the experiences for my interpretation in this present dissertation on principles of justice.

commitments. A more pragmatic reason for closure was that the date of the Departmental Self-Study Retreat had been announced. All Departmental Council members were to attend a two-day session to review all Departmental submissions to the "Self Study Committee Report." I was a graduate student Council member (independent of involvement in this study) and was to attend. Furthermore, since the participatory case study had been accepted for consideration as a submission to the PACCR Review, the final case study report had to be ready for pre-reading by Departmental Council members prior to the retreat. Before a first draft of the report could be written, the transcripts to be used were re-confirmed for release. This was the "Case Record Release Phase."

Experiencing Problems with Case Record Release

The need for closure of the case record interview phase necessitated topics. Prior to February 1985, there was a deliberate and consistent attempt to resist thematisation. The explicit move to identify topics was at first pragmatic. In order to prepare the transcripts for the case record release phase (for re-confirmation/release interviews), the materials had to be organised as word processing files. Looking ahead to the time when extracts would have to be part-loaded from these files, dates and headings were necessary. After initial hesitation, I decided in the interest of expedience to make the headings "meaningful." First, a complete review of all notes, logs and files was completed. This was a time of organisation, review and reflection. After this review—which included re-reading the handwritten rough translation notes—the tapes of all conversations were listened to and transcribed, with selections "filed" according to descriptors or topics.

By this time each dialogue had been (1) experienced as conversation, (2) listened to as the tape was reviewed for the next session, (3) roughly transcibed in the interview log, (4) re-confirmed in a subsequent interview, (5) re-listened to when this subsequent re-confirmation tape was reviewed, and then (6) re-written in its second roughly trancribed state. The "Case Record Release Stage" transcriptions entailed (7) listening to the tapes again and (8) hand writing transcriptions. (9) This material was re-read as it was typed into the

word-processing files. Furthermore, any themes ascribed at this point were part of the case record transcript print-out reviewed when (10) re-confirming the PACCR case record with participants during a taped conversation. The tapes of these release interviews were then (11) reviewed to tease out participant reconstructions, and modifications were (12) added to or deleted from the case record transcriptions. The number of reflections upon each thematic consideration was substantial. The interpretive problematic (when and how topics were selected) was hopefully to have been affected by dwelling with each understanding, reconfirming dialogue with the participants on numerous occasions and including the principle of confirmation-as-release. It was hoped that justice-as-confirmation would mitigate premature closure.[19]

During the case record release interviews, understandings could be confirmed or could require alterations and deletions. Participants were asked to discuss such considerations when deciding to include or exclude certain understandings. The first intent of the release interviews was re-confirmation. The second was to record notions of justice brought to bear when deciding upon release. The element of control was still quite apparent.

The decision taken under the guise of justice-as-control (i.e., to exclude from the transcriptions the evaluator's original words) proved to be a major turning point in the evaluation and the study. This impetus can be considered a move to distanciate the participant understandings from the ostensive reference of the interviews. The interpretation of the report was presented as a decontextualisation which would see the original statements stand alone in the new written dialogue. The most profound implication of justice-as-confirmation emerged with this decontextualisation. I sought to provide participants with control by underscoring the concerns about later interpretive contextualisation. The instrumental nature of this gesture is revealed in an excerpt from the "First Draft Release Letter." Control is the operative word.

> The control over interpretation does not mean that the released transcriptions can be dealt with out of context. To the contrary, before a final draft may be released, each participant now has the opportunity to identify his or her own perceptions as included

[19]The danger of such an assumption is taken up in the discussions of Chapter Three and Four.

in the first draft, and to modify these as he or she desires. This control, however, does not extend to the written treatment of other participant's understandings, nor to the overall interpretation. These auspices must remain within the control of the other participants and of myself.[20]

A number of the participants were vehemently skeptical of the one-sided "dialogical" transcriptions. Some felt that the understandings "seemed out of context." I responded that this was intentional—to simulate the realities of the "unknown contextualisation of the first draft" and to introduce an ambiguity of future context to consider while re-confirming. I stated that the very questioning by participants of the simulated de-contextualisation afforded an opportunity to reflect on how the understandings could appear in the non-ostensive context of the first draft. The prior re-confirmation of the "naked" transcriptions would re-assert the "sense" that could be carried into the later interpretation of the first draft. In the written case study my dialogue would become explicit in the selection, presentation and placement of participant understandings. Such a reconstructed logic of the case study record release procedure (presenting primarily participant statements) appeared not to have convinced the most ardent questioners.[21]

D. Experiencing Case Study Responses

Experiencing the First Draft Release Responses

The apprehension which I felt with the "de-contextualisation" procedure of the PACCR case record release phase became exacerbated with the similar movement from verbal to written confirmation of the first draft report release phase. Close relationships had been engendered during the hours of intense and light-hearted dialogue. Many participants were friends, colleagues and mentors. Others were acquaintances and only a few began as strangers. We experienced increasing confidentiality and intimate conversations. In retrospect, to exclude

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[20]See Appendix Four.

[21]The turn that is disclosed herein is taken up in Chapter Three as the "hermeneutic turn" of the study.

my participation from the dialogue—deleting my words—without prior warning, may have appeared to violate this friendly dialogue. To participate is to share, to take part with people. The reduction of the transcripts could be seen as taking out the part shared. Justice-as-control was becoming problematic—ironically exacerbated by the confirmation procedures. However, when the First Draft was completed and sent out for participants to confirm, control was still the guiding principle.

I experienced and discussed with others a profound sense of a loss of control, when the report went out for approval. The date of the PACCR retreat was fast approaching. Some participants had been quite disappointed by the earlier handling of the case record transcription release procedures. All participants had volunteered much time and energy. More than understandings were felt to be at stake.[22] The fate of the report and of the research was out there. The offering of the case study placed the evaluator in a position of waiting for acceptance. The integrity of relationships and promises was now subject to judgement. The confirmation by participants would be the agreement to release the report to a greater public. This was high release. Yet, each participant could reconstruct or delete her or his contributions. My "loss of control" was the acceptance of such low access or uncleared text. The responses which came back to meet me were thundering silences.

The CARE group case studies were met with mixed reviews. Some participants were upset. Some were outright hostile. Others acquiesced without recourse.[23] The reception of the participatory case study evaluation seemed non-eventful. While a non-eventful confirmation might seem positive (especially given some of the CARE experiences), in this case the relative lack of feedback was felt to be onerous. It was as if participants did not know how to respond. Copies were returned (as requested) with one word or single-phrase replies: 'This seems fine'; 'I see no objections'; 'Perhaps a bit more balance?' Many copies came back unmarked. One had nothing but a bold check-mark on the front page. After literally hundreds of hours in conversation there was a ringing absence of comment.

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[22]As one example, influences on the efficacy of this dissertation were involved.
[23]See the earlier discussion of "Democratic Evaluation as Unfulfilled Aspirations."

Trying to understand the palpable lack of response, my supervisor and I dwelt with the possible dynamics involved. Perhaps the principles of confidentiality and anonymity had evoked a humility during the case record conversations which now militated against criticism. There had been a non-aggressive dialogical exploration within the knowledge that all was off-the-record until explicitly released. The writing, in stark contrast, was a solitary enterprise leading to a product which was mailed out. Given the nearing retreat, there was not the time to meet in dialogue over the First Draft.[24] Another explanation may have been that spoken dialogue had been transformed, aesthetically. The cadence of the case record interviews and case record release interviews seemed to have faded into silence—quieted by the written word.

Reflecting upon the initial concerns with the one-sided transcriptions, then trying to fathom the relative absence of dialogue over the First Draft, I began to question the interpretation of this draft. The *modus operandi* of my writing (and interviews) had been to juxtapose differing opinions about issues in the Department—to chronicle "Essential Tensions." This was the belief that tensions within institutions and interpersonal relationships evoke opportunities for interpretive understanding. Nevertheless, the initial attempt at explication was problematic.

From the outset of this research the orientation to justice-as-control had brought with it a focus on the control of the evaluator's interventions—a gesture better left to the perspective in experimentally designed studies. Yet, the selection involved in drafting, writing and editing is inexorably interventionist. Furthermore, the contrived attempt to remove myself from the interpretation could have resulted, again, in participant concern. The response I made to my felt concerns was to become more explicitly present in the case-study-as-written. I sought out further conversations with participants. But more significantly, there was an attempt to be more authentically present in the interpretation. The transformation of this phase was described to the participants in a letter that accompanied the revised or "Second Draft."

Having accepted the premise that the evaluator cannot be unobtrusive, in the first

[24]I further felt that the substantial commitment of participants had already begun to render my study an imposition.

> draft I seemed to have fallen back on habits of 'objectivity.' My interpretation was not developed. I chose, but then I left the dissonances to resound. In the later writing [i.e., the "Second Draft"] I have attempted to provide for further understanding. I appreciate a participant's suggestion of an approach by questioning. (Appendix Five)

I rewrote the report to include criticism more prominently and to reveal the interpretation that was already present, more overtly. The revised draft became the copy which was submitted to the Department for purposes of the PACCR Retreat. It became the Final Draft which was included in the Self Study Committee Report. But first, it too had been circulated to the participants. No one responded with considerations for change. Justice-as-control, even in the guise of justice-as-confirmation, was impacting significantly on my experience of the study.

Experiencing the The PACCR Retreat Responses

The final draft of the case study report was included by the Departmental Self Study Committee in the package distributed to all Departmental Council members. The reading of this package was the preparation for a Departmental PACCR Retreat—a two-day session away from the University to consider how to include the submissions in the final SSC Report. I attended as a Council member. One-third of an afternoon was set aside to deal with the "*Participatory Case Study Evaluation of the Graduate Studies and Research Programme of the Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta.*"[25] Small groups discussed the case study report then reconvened in a large group for recommendations and discussion. I sat at the head of the room beside the new Chair of the Department—taking notes. The experience of the debate regarding the inclusion of the case study report revealed a sense of justice-as-genuineness.[26]

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[25]See Appendix Eight.

[26]One measure or quality of authenticity may be thought to be genuineness. Whereas authentic carries with it the denotation of first-hand or being-towards-self, genuineness derives from the Latin *genuinus*, "of the original stock, pure bred...from the Latin *genu* knee." This is a reference to the early Greek tradition where a father acknowledged a newborn child by placing her or him on his knee.

An example of the effect of such justice arose in response to an initial statement by a non-participant that the case study report was "out of kilter" with the other submissions. A member [known to me to be a participant] rallied to the defence stating that consistency was not necessary, indeed not even desirable. The uniqueness of the case study provided "texture" which gave a sense of the varied orientations in the Department.

Another non-participant claimed that "I read this and understood it, but I can't get a handle on whether it is good or bad." A participant responded with another vindication of the study: "But, it provides a real picture." When one member [a participant] asked why the case study had been chopped into so many parts, referring to the use of indexes, I stated that this was in response to the new Chair's suggestion. Under great pressure to reduce the amount of material in the SSC Report, the Chair stated that I should provide indexes that could, if necessary, be deleted—analagous to a zero-based budgetary approach where different packages are prepared to facilitate options for cuts. Since the Unit Review Committee would only be on site three days, the issue of the length of the case study report (72 double-spaced pages) became central.

However, to reduce the length of the report would have been a drastic event. From the original discussions with the Self Study Committee the following agreement had been reached:

> CONCERN 3. *At the Release of the Case Study*
>
> CONSIDERATIONS: The case study is a bounded portrayal. The interpretation is wrought from negotiations that make the text all but inviolable.
>
> BACKGROUND: The negotiation of the release of information is contextual. Participants consent to release of specific information as presented in specific contexts. Unilateral reorganization or reinterpretation of the 'data' both violates negotiation and undermines veracity.
>
> JUSTIFICATION: To be genuinely dialectical the case study proceeds by assimilating contradictions, disconfirmations and triangulations within new accommodated perspectives. To tamper with this dialectic (in addition to impinging on negotiated

ethics) reduces the text's reasonableness.

IMPLICATIONS: The Self-Study Committee may be left with a 'take it or leave it' option, when considering the inclusion of the case study in the over-all review. The 'data' is bound by confidentiality. Independent access is unethical and renegotiating at a late date seems infeasible.[27]

The middle ground between take-it-or-leave-it and "provide a summary" (the Chair's intimation before the Retreat) would have been a drastic revision which would then have to be re-confirmed with each participant.

Participants again came to the study's defence (anonymously of course). One stated that "The integrity of the case study needs to be maintained." Another participant volunteered, "The case study is tight and coherent and should not be edited." "The integrity has to be maintained." Others expressed the same sentiment. In conclusion, it was recommended that the report remain intact, and if necessary, it could be submitted as a separate addendum. Some participants were strongly opposed to this latter compromise. They felt that appending the study could marginalise its importance. In the end, the participatory case study was submitted as an integral part of the Self Study Committee Report—its confirmed status intact.

Had justice-as-confirmation or as-genuineness saved the day? Had participants acknowledged their belief in the legitimacy of the report with their public support? Ironically, after thousands of hours of evaluation, the "confirmed status" of the case rested precariously upon consideration of the desired number of pages in the report. In appreciation of the confirmed text, however, the burden was shifted to the Unit Review Committee. They were expected to commit the extra time to read the full version.[28]

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[27]See Appendix One: "An Agenda of Concerns: Meeting of September 18, 1984." The stridency and the nescience of this earlier writing is embarrassing.

[28]Whether the victory was a hollow one, given a hermeneutic understanding of the "matter of the text," is taken up in what follows.

Experiencing The Departmental Response

There was an unexpected midwife at the delivery of the participatory case study evaluation report to the Unit Review Committee. The Unit Review Committee received the case study (as part of the SSC Report) accompanied by a "Departmental Response." This was an unusual and wholly unannounced event. To my knowledge no other Departmental submission received the benefit of such a chaperon. The task had been delegated to a member of the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Committee. This person had not been an original member of this Committee when the participatory case study evaluation proposal had been presented for approval in November of 1984.

The three and one-half page response became known to me when I was asked to provide a critique of its first draft. The new Chair simply announced its presence and asked for input. My critique was given in the form of marginalia. With a notable exception, most suggestions were incorporated. A pervasive change involved the replacement of such phrases as: "Stephen's report," "Stephen suggest," "Stephen claims," "Stephen points out," and "Stephen highlights." I suggested and the Departmental staff member changed these to read: "The document provides," "participants suggest," "The case study suggests," "A number of points rise to the surface," and so on. In a meeting with the author, it was agreed that the informal tone and the seeming personalisation of the case study report served to undermine the participatory nature of the research—the principle of confirmation. These were not all my understandings.

My further critique of the Departmental response was its manner of presenting the focus on dissonance of the case study. My intent of a focus on healthy tensions was reduced and paraphrased. While many salient issues were highlighted, these issues were phrased with problematic qualifications. For example, there were numerous limiting references to the study: "It contains, explicitly, particular perspectives chosen from a number of possible perspectives"; "dissonance is only one dynamic aspect of Departmental life"; "It is, however, instructive that the approach of the collective Graduate Student Submission would choose to focus on this tension"; "the understandings correctly represent only the self-criticism of the

evaluator and the 19 participants"; "the reader should accept the document as revealing particular truths about the Department, not as a definitive word" and in concluding, the respondent wrote:

> A participatory case study, by its nature, opens the researcher to the possibility that some points may be stressed to the exclusion of others. **This is essentially true in any research enterprise: and, it has happened in Stephen Bath's report to the Department.** A small number of aspects of the Programme have been stressed from the particular viewpoints of the participants. Other aspects have not been raised by either the participants or the researcher. Such a document is, then, important not only because of what is says, but also because of what it leaves out. Both inclusions and exclusions can give insight into the Department of Secondary Education Graduate Studies and Research Programme. [**Emphasis** added.]

In the first draft the respondent had not qualified his critique of perspectivism as emphasised above. Lacking such a qualification, the impression left could be seen as a criticism unique to participatory case study. Upon my suggestion, this counter-qualification was provided. However, another of my responses did not find its way into the revision. To the statement that the participatory case study document is important for what it leaves out, I asked the question: "Whereas other approaches are not?"[29]

Experiencing the Unit Review Committee Response

The final document that I encountered in the evaluation research was the "Campus Review: Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta," submitted in the Spring of 1986 by the Unit Review Committee. This report came a number of weeks after the URC three day visit to the Department (March 10-12, 1986). I had an opportunity to meet with the URC but as a graduate student representative—rather than to specifically address the case study report.

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[29]The underlying issues of this Departmental Response provide much grist for the consideration of interpretation in all research. The Response and these issues are further taken up in the following chapter.

At the meeting with the URC, when an opportunity presented itself, I asked the Committee if they had read the case study report. The members exchanged knowing glances and the URC Chair replied, "Indeed, we have." There followed little direct comment. In fact, another Committee member immediately asked whether I wanted to change anything or add to the comments of the case study report. When the reply was no "The report must stand complete," the conversation went on to more general student concerns.

The URC had received thousands of pages of material. Yet, only two documents are named explicitly in the final report. These were the "Participatory Case Study of the Department of Secondary Education Graduate Studies and Research Programme" (p. 22) and the "History of Secondary Education" (p. 1). Unfortunately, the style of writing of the Unit Review Committee Report is not specific regarding the sources of issues. It is next to impossible to ascertain the influence or sources of the recommendations and discussions—to provide a form of redaction criticism. Many issues seem to me to stand out as similar to those in the case study report. Such conjecture is sensitised by the hours of conversation and the intimacy with the words of the case study report. However, even where the understandings of the case study seem to be the same as the ideas of the report, it could not be determined if these were given independently to the URC Committee by participants.

An exception to this anonymity of sources, however, seems to be with the treatment of the case study's focus on tensions between research orientations. The major URC discussion of such tension directly follows the citation of the case study. This central theme is also taken up in other sections of the URC Report. To quote from the report:

> The [Departmental] "Self Study Report" is basically a programmatic report and does not deal extensively with scholarship activity. Scholarly activity is defined here as efforts to generate knowledge through systematic inquiry....The Self Study, particularly the "Case Study of Graduate Studies and Research Programme," reflects the tension which frequently exists on University campuses among professors of various persuasions relative to the nature of research. The tension is healthy and does not appear to be unique to the University of Alberta. (p. 22)

Significantly, in the entire text of the URC Report only one comment was deemed necessary for underscored emphasis. The authors wrote: "The major problem seemed not to be the tension between research traditions but rather that a number of faculty are not engaged actively in any type of long term research activity" (p. 23).

This attempt to explain away the tension—as healthy and not unique—takes on significance when the research perspective of the URC Report is, itself, taken into consideration. There are recommendations in the URC Report which, perhaps, reveal a lessened understanding of the Department's research dynamic. For example, in the report there is a discussion of "subject area" departments outside of the Faculty of Education (Music, Germanic Languages, Mathematics, etc.). An issue presented by the URC concerns the perception that the Department has "a protected area of interest in this regard: a stated (or implied) fear that to share subject courses would *de facto* be to relinquish control over them" (p. 28). To calm this alleged fear the report stated that the "majority of representatives of these areas indicated that they are more than willing to leave the pedagogical aspects of the subject areas (that is, the curiculum and instruction elements) to the Department of Secondary Education, and deal only with content" (p. 27). This suggestion reveals a lessened understanding of the "essential tension" which was dwelt with in the Department and in the case study. This diminished understanding concerns the relationship between theory and practice (the URC's stance concerning content versus pedagogy).

In the participatory case study report, when addressing the tension between theory and practice, and between orientations in the Department, Aoki was quoted as follows:

> For many of us, to understand praxis requires an estrangement from the dichotomised view of "theory and practice" and an embracing of that view which sees them as twin moments of the same reality. Rather than to see theory as leading to practice, we need now more than ever to see it as a reflective moment in praxis. (Aoki, 1984c, p. 13)

He went on to write, "If the wholeness is missing, researchers may not realise the fixedness of research problems....traditional notions of research get in the way" (p. 18).[30] The URC

[30]This "interpretive turn" in social science research is discussed in the section concerning "The Praxis of the Reader." See also note no. 7 in Chapter Four,

Report does suggest that the "more deeply [embedded] practical" orientation and the "more remote research focus" are not "mutually exclusive." The ameliorative attempt is appreciated, yet the dichotomisation of "content" (theory) from the "curriculum and instruction elements" (practice) can be viewed as excluding the praxical orientation. In the recommendation *vis-à-vis* "content" departments, to dichotomise content and pedagogy *ipso facto* precludes that praxical gesture portrayed by participants in the case study report.

The assertion that the URC may not have fully understood the tension addressed by the Department is further substantiated by an apparent contradiction. The authors suggest that the Department has a unique "international leadership...in ethnography, phenomenology and other forms of interpretive research" (p. 22). Such leadership is that which Ted Aoki described in the study as the interest in the wholeness of inquiry. The intention to turn towards a re-searching of the wholeness of inquiry is the "interpretive" turn that the URC admits of the Department. And it seems a contradiction then to place this unique orientation on a continuum—but to describe the particular dynamic of that continuum as not unique. That is, the Department is said to be an international leader with an approach that has this "interest in wholeness" — the situational-interpretive approach. Yet, the fundamental tension of this unique approach with "traditional" orientations is given to be not unique to the Department. It would seem that the Department either leads and is unique, or it is not. Either staff and students explore new paradigms of inquiry, or they do not. The commensurate orientation expressed in the URC Report belies a complete understanding of that "nature of research" suggested by the case study report.[31] Perhaps what is missing in this conception of the Department's research dynamic is "the meaning of coming to know or to understand curriculum and instruction as a domain unto itself," to quote from the case study.

The suggestion of the URC Report that the tension is not unique also brings to mind a caution shared by the evaluator, Michael Patton. At a workshop with the Alberta Evaluation Society he stated that, arising from too many negative experiences, he now adopts a policy of

[30](cont'd) p. 142.

[31]This issue of commensurability and mutually exclusive paradigms is taken up in the section: "Discourse or Dialogue: Sense, Reference and Meaning." Especially see the discussion of "Hirsch's Concept of Validity," in that section.

asking for explicit advanced statements from the recipients of his evaluations. He wants to know what they expect the evaluation to reveal. The condition to be avoided is that where the recipients greet the final evaluation report with such statements as, "We already knew that" or, "That's not a very significant finding." There is an allusive phenomenon whereby recipients spontaneously appropriate evaluation insights, accompanied by a (tacit) assimilation of previous understandings regarding such insights.

Gadamer writes in Truth and Method that "understanding is always an assimilation of what is said to the point that it becomes one's own" (1975, p. 360). The danger lies in not being conscious of the effect of our own interpretive prejudices as we appropriate in this manner. Without "expressly reflecting" on our task, understanding "assimilates what is historically different to what is familiar and thus, despite all objectivity, has already subordinated the alien being of the object to its own, conceptual frame of reference." The result of not countenancing a "*naïveté*" as we interpret is to be "dominated unquestionably by such concepts and prejudices" (p. 358). Thus, we may now re-turn to reflect more critically (with more "*naïveté*") on the experiences of the implementation of principles and procedures of participatory case study evaluation.

Chapter III

REFLECTING CRITICALLY ON THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY EVALUATION

A. Reflecting on the Experience of the Relationship between Participatory Case Study Evaluation as Spoken Dialogue and as Written Discourse

Reflecting on the Experience of Participation

In planning participatory case study evaluation, I had received much from the CARE democratic case study approach. Yet, the situatedness of the Alberta PACCR study and my desire to go beyond (with the inclusion of a principle of justice) provided fundamental differences. The predispositions prevailing in my own approach emphasised (mutualistic) participation. This is a directional criterion which implies a prior gesture to the study. An absence of an acknowledgement of such predispositions by an evaluator was criticised by Barry MacDonald: "The political stance of the evaluator has consequences for his choice of techniques for information-gathering and analysis" (1974b, p. 16). The attempt to make explicit the participatory case study evaluation biases was an aspiration from the outset.

During the study, a memorandum was sent to all Departmental staff and prospective participants which gave justice as the central principle of the participatory approach.[1] And justice meant "giving control" to participants. Participation was limited by this purposive-rational understanding of justice-as-control. In a profound sense, this rationality not only has "consequences for [my] choice of techniques" (hence, in MacDonald's view my "political stance"), but there is a more pervasive prejudice—one that presences the interpretation of experience. Control became an instrumental posture which posited a rational, deductive stance: "There will be a conceptual analysis of the taken-for-granted ethical notions encountered during the study"—was my bold statement to the Department.

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[1]See Appendix Two, p. 195.

The political predisposal was to participatory democracy. This stance was informed by a notion of mutualism.[2] Participation was viewed against representation. As an example, in the memorandum to potential participants an early version of the thesis question was stated as: "What understandings of justice are revealed as confirmations of principles and procedures when bounding a participatory case study evaluation of the Department of Secondary Education Graduate Studies Programme?" The case study was given to emerge from these "Mutual confirmations of participant confidentiality, public responsibility and negotiated justice." The ideal was then to have the release of interpretations mutualistically determined. Negotiation had been replaced by confirmation since the former had a business connotation: interested parties across the table rather than equal participants bounding the case. Participants were not to negotiate, they were to be given control. The irony is that control, too, has a business-like derivation. To control is to exercise restraint, to hold in check or to restrain from action. The Latin source is the word denoting counter-roll. This was the duplicate rolled registers (sheaves) used to check or verify payments, receipts or accounts. The principle of control became a counter-measure presumed to shift ownership of the "data" to participants.

Throughout the study the explicit choice had been to err on the side of the participants. They had been given unilateral veto power over the release of their understandings. A further assumption, one that was carried over from the CARE group, is evidenced in an example from my rehearsed discussion with a participant about informed consent: "[Evaluator] Some people are not in a position to be able to choose effectively, when control is extended...to exercise control." The principle of justice-as-control—despite the aspiration towards "fair practice"—is herein a procedure to instrumentalise desired behaviour, to extend control. Participants are to be skilled in effective choices and to learn how better to safe-guard their interests.

The under-complication of the (technical) rationality of control is made evident in the following exchange over release:

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[2]See Chapter One: "Other Evaluation Influences."

[Evaluator] I would like to consider with you the issues of confidentiality and anonymity—as well as meaning. That is, whether we need to release these or not and whether we need to alter the wording.

[Participant] This is just revision of words?...whether we should include things or not—and the reason why or why not?

[Evaluator] Yes. Exactly.

The penchant for a technical understanding can be read in the jump to affirm a focus on phrases such as "these wordings" and "things to be included." Such pre-emptive reification of dialogical understandings is even more pronounced in the following statement to a participant:

[Evaluator] The SSHRC Guidelines are a good format, but some of the terms are ambiguous. What do we understand to be individual rights? What do we mean by the public's right? What is in the public's interest? As soon as we become involved in research we become involved in these fuzzy areas.

My thesis concerns how we understand these terms—how we decide what is private knowledge and what should be [made] public. We all have our beliefs. I don't expect that we have brought out all of these beliefs and have seriously reflected upon our notions of justice. What I want to do now is to collect our taken-for-granted notions. I will interpret these after the case study has been written. What do people in educational research believe about their actions? How do they make decisions?

To be "in the middle" is to experience interpretation continuously. Becoming involved is fuzzy in that area between private, dialogical knowledge and public, written discourse. Yet, the belief in an unproblematic separation of practice (collection) from theory (interpretation) is implied above. This reduces understanding to notions that may be collected. 'Facts' could then be reflected upon seriously— later critical moments could provide interpretation. Given an uncritical understanding that interpretation occurs at a later time, the "data" were pursued in earnest. The concerns were choices, decisions, notions and things which could be collected.

In pursuit of notions to critique, I was often insensitive to immediate experiences of interpretation. As an example, I busily coached a participant to discuss decisions for

release—this participant had no concerns.

[Participant] It doesn't worry me.

[Evaluator] [But how did you make this choice?]

The question has to be, If we are here searching together, we have to allow a certain amount of understanding at the level of how that will affect one's situation.

[But what if this metaphor (a signature phrase) is used in another context?]

The risks are not that big....I guess that it would matter if the understanding was placed in a context that makes political judgements.

In the shared context there was no danger "worrying" the participant. Only when pushed to consider future contexts was there a concern about another "scheme of interpretation" perhaps becoming a danger. In the head-long pursuit of concepts to be gathered, we did not dwell on the searching together—nor, even, on the profound variation between the at-easeness and the dis-ease of the differing contexts.[3]

To this participant, inquietude did not emerge in the dialogical situation of "searching together." It is only the anticipation of another context which allows tension. Therein lies an essential tension, of its own. This is the distanciation between participation and textualisation. It is only in some other context—other than within spoken dialogue—that concerns arise. We may return here to the original stance placing participation at variance with representation. This can be a re-turning with a deeper sensibility to the issues of confidentiality and anonymity—as well as meaning—a returning to that fuzzy area which is the tension between private and public knowledge.

Experiencing Essential Tensions

Taking up the concerns with private and public knowledge as well as participation and representation, Habermas (1977a) responded to Arendt's "Truth and Politics" (1967). In his essay "On Habermas on Arendt on Power" (1979), Luban stated of the debate concerning

[3]The profound import of this conversational reference to "the matter of the text" [Gadamer] becomes central to the later discussion of the hermeneutic turn of the study.

participation and representation:

> Habermas...is willing to count as sufficient public participation a dialogue between politicians and scientists which involves public opinion only as its "horizon." [4] His point is to have a rational decision-mechanism, in the sense of representing the point of view of all interested parties in the deliberation process. For Arendt, on the other hand, the point is to have actual participation: only this can generate political power, the *elan vital* of the body politic. (p. 92)

Participatory case study evaluation, even though embracing actual participation, culminates in a written representation to decision-makers of the points of view of participants. But, how might the participants be represented by the text of the case study?

One participant was explicit about representation and cut succinctly through the rhetoric of participation. I asked whether "we" should leave certain "signature phrases" in the case record.

> [Evaluator] [...do we have to say this?]
>
> [Participant] No, you don't have to. But I don't object to this. It's just if you want to try to maintain the anonymity some of these peculiar forms of expression could be identified.
>
> [How do you make the decision that you don't mind being identified?]
>
> Because, I have been presenting these kinds of things so many years that as long as I am not being misrepresented in what I believe, I don't mind standing openly for these things.

The participant was clear about who would be writing and representing whom—despite the ambiguity of my initial question. In somewhat less explicit language, another participant expressed the similar recognition: "Generally, I take the stand that if I am prepared to say something, you are entitled to use it." Standing in favour of the entitlement of another to voice [or to write] expressions in one's behalf is a sound definition of representation.

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[4] Luban provides here a citation to Habermas, "The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion," in Towards a Rational Society, 1970.

Habermas was strident in his critique of "Hanna Arendt's Communications Concept of Power" (1977a)—where she argues for "actual participation." This criticism is fundamentally the same as that which he asserts in "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method" (1977b). Luban depicted Habermas huddled with the politicians over there on the horizon, representing the opinions of the non-present public. Ricoeur suggests, in his discussion of Habermas' Gadamerian critique, "The very word horizon indicates an ultimate repudiation of the idea of a knowledge wherein the fusion of horizons would be grasped" (1981, p. 75). In his account of "Hermeneutics and Critique of Ideology," Ricoeur goes on to state:

> By restoring the dialectic of points of view and the tension between the other and the self, we arrive at the culminating concept of the *fusion of horizons*....This is the dialectical concept which results from the rejection of two alternatives: objectivism, whereby the objectification of another is premissed on the forgetting of oneself; and absolute knowledge, according to which universal history can be articulated within a single horizon. (p. 75)

Ricoeur suggests that Habermas has adopted a gesture towards absolute knowledge within a single horizon. "Critical consciousness...anticipates a future freedom in the form of a regulative idea which is not reality but an ideal, the ideal of unrestrained and unconstrained communication" (p. 99). (This is self-reflection as an absolute, transcendental timeless-space—"the critical moment.") The "idea of *a* knowledge" is that "critical moment of epistemology" (p. 89) to which Habermas turns and to which Ricoeur suggests that a (Gadamerian) hermeneutic consciousness provides repudiation.

Gadamer, in divergence, "is turned towards a consensus which precedes us and, in this sense, which exists."[5] As stated, the bold posture offered in the participatory case study evaluation was towards critical reflection at a later time[-less-space] upon the "notions...brought out" during the evaluation. I would be able to provide a conceptual

[5]This is the "immanent connection of understanding and application." Our way of understanding is our being in the world-as-spaceless-time—which Habermas refers to as Gadamer's concept of the "happening of tradition."

analysis (single horizon) which could objectively represent the collected notions of justice.[6]

To repudiate such a posture necessitates an orientation more appropriately experienced as "a humble gesture"—to use Ricoeur's phrase. The experience of the interpretation of the case-study-as-planned may be taken up as an interrogation of this original, bold posture. The "matter of the [written] text," which now seems antagonistic to the dialogical case study experience, also can be interpellated from Ricoeur's orientation to "the sort of world opened up by [text]...the mode of being unfolded in front of the text" (1981, p. 93). Herein we may feel the liveliness of Gadamer's "essential tension between the text set down...and, the sense arrived at by its application in the particular moment of interpretation" (1975, p. 275). We may consider that "Understanding here is always application." Furthermore, the dissonance encountered with the transition between various aesthetic phases of the study may be understood as the "tension between the sameness of the shared reality and the changing situation in which it is supposed to be understood."[7] Within this tension is felt the "intrinsic rôle of application in all understanding...the fundamental hermeneutic problem of application" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 141). The hermeneutic turn of the participatory case study evaluation began with such feelings of the liveliness of essential tensions when the text was set down.

Experiencing Essential Tensions: Praxical Relationships

> In communication, individuals appear actively as unique beings and reveal themselves in their subjectivity. At the same time they must recognise one another as equally responsible beings, that is, as beings capable of intersubjective agreement—the rationality claim immanent in speech grounds a radical equality. Finally, the life-world is filled, so to speak, with praxis, with the "web of human relationships." This

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[6]This discussion is further addressed in Chapter Five, especially in the sections on "Directional Criteria: Participation to What Aim?" and "The Epistemological Problem of a Critical Moment in Evaluation."

[7]T. McCarthy's translation of a citation in German of Gadamer by Habermas, 1977, p. 352.

comprises the stories in which actors are involved as doers and sufferers.[8]

Initially, the participatory case study evaluation was planned as leading to an exploration of praxical relationships. The discussion of the CARE group's democratic case study as "praxical" was first encountered in Stephen Kemmis' "The Imagination of the Case and the Invention of the Study" (1980).[9] Kemmis referred to the inducement of this title of his article as the case study's "praxis in action" (p. 124). The "reasonableness of the case was **not** an appeal to this praxis but the provision of vicarious experience through the experience encapsulated by the case study report" (p. 101). In a later article, "Seven Principles for Programme Evaluation in Curriculum Development and Innovation," Kemmis wrote about the principle of rationality as reasonableness: "What will count as the truth to be told about the programme will depend on the quality of debate" (1982, p. 82).[10] To assist our understanding of a "truth" which depends on the "quality of debate" (Kemmis) and of how individuals reveal themselves and recognise intersubjective agreement (Habermas), we can gain from Richard Rorty's suggestion in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Rorty states: "If we see knowing not as an essence...then we are on the way to seeing **conversation** as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood" (1979, p. 389). Seeing knowledge this way shifts our focus away from "the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry"— and towards inquiry located in the experience of conversation. This leads Rorty to the conclusion that philosophers have no special claims to "knowledge about knowledge (or anything else)," their expertise hangs on the "fact that arguments...are punctuated by stale philosophical clichés which the other participants [of the conversation] have stumbled across in their reading, but about which the professional philosopher knows the pros and cons by

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[8]Habermas, paraphrasing Arendt's "communication concept of power," 1977, p. 8.
[9]Kemmis draws extensively on Habermas' work in his doctoral dissertation, particularly where he addresses "Evaluation as Self-Criticism" (1976, p. 8n). His more recent work, now joined by Rob Walker at Deakin University, is with "Action Research." One critic, who is "into churlishness" (Kemmis, 1986), wrote in a review that Kemmis' work is "the invocation of a secular saint (Habermas)" (Gibson, 1986).
[10]See Bath, 1986, for a discussion of rationality as reasonableness applied to autobiographical research.

heart" (p. 393). Understanding is not situated in philosophical knowledge. Philosophical knowledge is situated in the lived-conversations of philosophers.[11]

Arendt's "praxis" provides a fundamental condition towards "liberation from one's own private interests"—towards our taken-for-granted beliefs in justification: "[E]ven if I shun all company or am completely isolated while forming an opinion, I am not simply together only with myself in the solitude of philosophical thought; I remain in this world of mutual interdependence where I can make myself the representative of everybody else" (1967, p. 115). Arendt asserts a "radical equality" by virtue of our shared linguisticality. Even when we, as story-tellers, become representative, Arendt suggests that we are still caught up in the web of mutual interdependence. And in this world, "truth" (qua justification of belief) can only be known vicariously (as with Kemmis), only as it is caught in the "personal appearance" of the "truth-teller" (p. 125) (only as a recognition of the other as a responsible being [Habermas, above]). We must ultimately rely on beliefs about justification. [12]

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[11]This assertion may also be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in John Searle's Speech Acts, 1969.

[12]Arendt's assertions about "truth" are keyed to her understanding of facticity. The brute facticity that we witness is a "reality [which] takes its revenge on those who dare to defy it" (p. 127). The paradox of brute facticity is that "factual truth is no more self-evident than opinion":

> Factual evidence, moreover, is established through testimony by eye-witnesses—notoriously unreliable—by records, documents and monuments, all of which can be suspected of forgery. In the case of dispute, only other witnesses but no third or higher instance can be invoked, and settlement is usually arrived at by way of majority, that is, in the same way as the settlement of opinion disputes, a wholly unsatisfactory procedure, since nothing can prevent a majority from being false witnesses; on the contrary, under certain circumstances the feeling of belonging to a majority may even encourage false testimony. (1967, p. 116)

Given her distinctions between factual truth, philosophical truth and opinion, Habermas (1977) accuses Arendt of succumbing to "the classical distinction between theory and practice; practice rests on opinion and conviction that cannot be true or false in the strict sense." This "antiquated concept" keeps Arendt "from comprehending the process of reaching agreement about practical questions as rational discourse" (p. 22). Habermas, on the other hand, believes in an "intepretation [which] can grasp its object and penetrate it." [Here-in we also read his disagreement with Gadamer—a debate taken up below.] Such is the arousal where "the interpreter reflects on the object and himself at the same time" (1971, p. 183). The paradox of truth (the truth of paradox) to Arendt is that a factual truth exerts itself with "unyielding, blatant, unpersuasive stubbornness" (p. 122). This truth is "witnessed with the eyes of the body and not the eyes of the mind" [not in the "Mirror of Nature"]. Hence, it is not through reflective, philosophical thought that we experience the interpretation of the life-world: "Plato's truth, found

One way both to communicate in the "world of human affairs" and to comprehend a process of reaching agreement is to experience a community. A participant stated:

> When I think of anonymity, I can't help thinking of community. Why are we concerned if things are to be traced back? But I'm not sure of your suggestion that things may be distorted in altered contexts. If we are able to discuss together the understandings that the words express, that should not be a concern.

We may answer the participant with the discussion of community found in Law and Modern Society, Towards a Criticism of Social Theory. Robierto Unger wrote that in Western civilisation, at least, "disintegration of community" has led to a "diminution of the extent of individual moral action." As a result of modern alienation, positive law must make concrete what such disintegration made "dark and slippery" (1975). The resultant desire to formulate rules is the "attribute of positiveness" in positive law (p. 50). This is a motivation towards reification of customary standards. "Customary law remains superfluous as long as there is a closely held communion of reciprocal expectations, based on a shared view of right and wrong" (p. 62). The move to a "process of articulation" presupposes a diminution of the extent to which men and women may be relied upon to act in set ways. The presumption is one of "lessened unreflective allegiance" towards "moral integration" within customary action.[13] Unger suggests that the movement to formulate rules is a "change in consciousness"

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[12](cont'd) and articulated in solitude, transcends by definition the realm of the many, the world of human affairs" (p. 112).

Arendt provides another truth that is the antipathy to Platonic truth. And in doing so she refutes the allegation by Habermas that she follows an antiquated dichotomy of theory and practice. Her praxical notion derives from an understanding of factual truth.

> Factual truth, on the contrary [to philosophical truth], is always related to others; it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved, it is established by witnesses and depends on testimony, it exists only to the extent that it is being spoken about even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature. Facts and opinions, though they must be kept apart, are not antagonistic to each other, they belong to the same realm (p. 122). The later discussions of validity, "defeasibility" and epistemological moments take up, again, these issues of truth and opinion. See: "Discourse or Dialogue: Sense, Reference and Meaning."

What is important at present is the assertion by both authors that truth depends upon the quality of communication.

[13]It is interesting to compare Unger's description of this necessary, motivating assumption with that critique which describes Critical Theory as based upon a

(p. 62). This "tendency toward increasing specialization and hierarchy" is very similar to the rational-purposive consciousness that Habermas believes emanates from instrumental rationality. Unger's analysis of the development of modern law has a beginning and end-point within an inquiry of the "predicament of social theory."[14] Moreover, he felt that aspiring towards "internal cohesion" was not an efficacious gesture when seeking improved community practices. Instead, "openness towards the future means that one must value the conflictual process by which communities are created over time and satisfactory relations are established among them" (p. 241). The relation between participation as community and dissonance in altered contexts is a fundamental tension which requires further questioning.

Experiencing a Focus on Dissonance

The tension between truth and opinion and the concern with reliance on intersubjective agreement were recognised by the CARE group and had suggested a focus upon dissonances. As Simons wrote of the HCP evaluation: "We looked for judgements; we sought ambiguity in order to broaden the range of views and so as not to over-simplify the complex real-life situation" (1978, p. 189). Simons also stated how "power and inequality...can result in the acquiescence of participants or the unfair use of authority by the researcher" (1977b). Similarly, Michael Apple suggests that the absence of a "treatment" of ambiguity or adverseness may lead "to political quiescence and the acceptance...of a perspective on social and intellectual conflict that acts to maintain the existing distribution of power and rationality" (1975b, p. 96).

In the participatory case study, justice-as-control led to ambivalent experiences—when I was confronted by participants about the deletion of my words from the case study record transcripts and when the first draft was mailed out. These actions involved the shift from the experience of a spoken dialogue to the sharing of a written text. I had described the writing as a solitary enterprise—but this understanding could, according to Arendt, also require a

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[13](cont'd) "negative anthropology" (Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 1973, p. 147).

[14]Unger's first and last chapters deal explicitly with this topic.

re-viewing. There was a feeling of "loss of control" that came with the sending-off of the first draft. There was an experience of a "thundering silence" by the "writer" to the "offering." In all, the shift or turn suggested that "the integrity of relationships and promises hung in the air."[15]

A participant in the participatory case study asked:

> Given the attitude towards tension that you describe, to what extent will people understand that meaning lies there-in? This notion of how good comes about from dwelling with the tensions, itself, requires an up-rooting. Because, typically, this is a dialectical notion.

The attitude towards dis-integration which allows such an experience of up-rooting to be good must be one which has openness to emergent possibilities.

Participatory case study evaluation had a planned, essential focus on the "conflictual process" (as Unger describes above). To illustrate, the Departmental Response appears to have taken issue with this approach. It was stated that "dissonance is only one dynamic aspect of the Department." The case study report was given to reveal only "particular truths" and was not definitive: "a small number of aspects of the Programme have been stressed from the particular viewpoints of participants." In contrast, the Unit Review Committee described the Departmental inquietude as "tension which frequently exists on University campuses...the tension is healthy and does not appear unique." Where the "Departmental Response" reflects upon this focus on tensions, there is a suggestion to the Departmental-we that disdain be

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[15]The discussion which becomes central to later interpretation in this dissertation pursues the phenomena given by Ricoeur as translocution and transaction (see note no. 23 on p. 106). Following Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics, we may comprehend that interpretation takes place "in front of the text" and that the reader confronts a sense of the text which has transcended the ostensive reference of the writer, the original conversation and the original reader. Cryptically, the meaning of the text may literally "hang in the air." (A fuller discussion follows of these two essential tensions in the evaluation: "Reflecting on Participatory Case Study Evaluation as a Hermeneutic Process: Here it is on Paper?.")

The participant who was not worried by our dialogical searching together, yet, who felt some trepidation with the anticipation of being represented in future contexts, also draws attention to the hermeneutic turn of the participatory case study evaluation. What becomes of the rationality claims immanent in speech when the dialogue changes to a written text? This ambivalence became a personally felt dis-integration of the confirmation of the first draft.

avoided: "It is, however, instructive to us as a Department that the approach of the collective Graduate Student submission would choose to focus on this tension, even though there is an acknowledgement of the Department's strengths in other areas." Upon such a "however"—"even though"—rests an insistence. "Tension" is juxtaposed to "strengths." "Particular truths" are opposed to "a definitive word." "The reader should accept the document as revealing particular truths." We may choose not to take issue with whether the document reveals particular truths, or, on the other hand, whether such truth are "not unique." A more fundamental inquiry is evoked by the very naming of the tensions as essentially or not essentially particular—as a "dialectic," as a "dissonance," as a "rift" or as "healthy and not unique."

The positive attitude towards tension was that which compelled me to become more authentic with a second draft—when I experienced an absence of response. One participant provided a poignant metaphor:

> When the profound changes, not just the surface changes, are revealed, people can respond to them. It is a way to display them and to have people become conscious. People can care for them or totally reject them. We are talking about everyone in the Department as they see these themes [of tension] emerging and coming into words—it is felt, it is lived. And once it has come into words, it's like a disease. You can cope with it. You can choose to wish that it would go away. Or you can choose to live with it—well, yes, I was just thinking how important it has become to give a name to whatever ailment we have. Once we have a name we can deal with its malific consequences or get treatment.

This dialogue spoke to the prejudice against distanciation, of the dis-ease of dissonance. The coming into words that is felt and lived bespeaks the origin of our fretting or agitation—it is the naming and not necessarily the words. It is "the quality of the debate," rather than the points made.

I spoke with a participant about "the desire to focus on dissonance, to illuminate meaning." We discussed a deeper sense of this debate over tensions. My initial first draft

embodied the "stance...that all I had done was present dissonances and the meaning came from these." "But," I asked, "where am I?" Following the path of control I assumed that I could limit "interventions" by not explicitly interpreting the tensions presented. This implies an assumption of neutrality: "I've just provided these tensions."

I had staked the integrity of the case study on the fact that simply presenting contradictions or dissonances would reveal self-evident truths about the Department. What was manifest was an inauthentic rendering of the experience of the case study conversations. The bold gesture was that I could act as a neutral broker of such statements. The instrumental understanding of justice-as-control led me to believe that I had effectively contolled my intervention. "Where was I?" I was being dominated by a methodology of my own and the CARE group's making.

The CARE Experience of Power Relationships

My predeterminations towards "justice-as-control" originated with reflections of the CARE group. Simons, in her article "Building a Social Contract: Negotiation, Participation and Portrayal in Condensed Fieldwork," wrote of the "control aspiration" and the time factor involved.

> [T]he control aspiration...[is] more than anything else [that] which takes time to establish. Yet it is precisely the control criterion which underpins the procedural principles and marks the SAFARI as a study which aspires to shift control of the research from the researcher to the participants. Giving up the control aspiration means giving up what is critical to establishing a shift in the research process. Taking time seems a small price to pay in exploring such a process. (Simons, 1977a, p. 41)

The principle of control has been discussed as an instrumental penchant. Even when such rationality is of a moral-practical tone, Habermas has discussed the relations involved as an affinity towards "strategic action" (1979, p. 158). The social contract that Simons refers to becomes a "system of social labour" and the "produced goods receive their abstract value as exchange value." This is an "exchange of declarations, not of things, but it has the same

validity as the thing" (Habermas, 1974, p. 160). To Habermas "strategic action" is a separate moral relationship to that of "communicative action" (the moral-practical interest is juxtaposed to the emancipatory). The strategic orientation is "not to reaching agreement but to success" (Habermas, 1977, p. 17). Successful shifting of control is the aspiration of the SAFARI procedural principles and was my original aspiration.

In another article, "Conversation Piece: The Practice of Interviewing in Case Study Research" (1977b),[16] Simons reveals explicitly how a successful establishment of the "theory [of control] into practice" brings a critical price to pay. Principles, indeed, become strategies:

> Whatever tactic is adopted it is important to try and disassociate yourself from the school establishment. At the same time to maintain credibility with the staff one must avoid the opposite danger of appearing to be on the side of the pupils. (1977b, p. 122)

The practice of interviewing may be reduced to trying a series of tactics. Simons does acknowledge the need to "articulate a socio-economic stance," and she did speak of the "complex real-life situation." However, these aspirations seem to be towards answering "the question of appropriate rules and procedure" which would reveal the "structure, methods, principles and procedures" of successful case study (p. 133). The emancipatory interest is not apparent.[17] The aspiration towards successfully shifting control was also most present in my own planning of participatory case study evaluation.

The disenchantment with justice-as-control was first experienced when reading the written comment of a participant to a transciption of our conversation—in the margin of the justice case record.

> Is control all there is to justice? What about reciprocity, dialogue, questioning? What is the fundamental framework that allows this control?

The concern raised by this participant speaks to the emphasis upon rôles or strategic stances rather that upon dialogue or communicative action. When recounting the CARE methodology, Walker provided a similar instrumental concern with successful conduct or "exchange

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[16]Nigel Norris, ed., SAFARI PAPERS TWO: Theory into Practice, 1977.
[17]Refer to the section: "Applicative Moments in Evaluation: How Shall We Understand the Rôles of Participants and Evaluators?" (p. 153).

declaration" (Habermas):

> I have discussed the SAFARI approach here as though it were a discrete and coherent methodology but this is misleading. What is distinctive about the approach is its concern to evolve a set of different formal relationships between researchers/ evaluators, subjects/participants and audiences. It is less a methodology than a set of ethical principles translated as procedures for the design and conduct of a research/evaluation project. Looked at another way, the aspiration is to develop an alternative rôle for educational reasearch. (Walker, 1981, p. 206)

The explicit aspirations of Simons are mitigated somewhat by Walker's. Yet, the concern is still "a set of formal relations"—procedures from which to "design and conduct" research. A third CARE worker provided a different understanding of the task, one which brings to the fore more of the tension within which we have been dwelling. Kemmis wrote: "Since the problem for the case study worker is always to explicate the nature of the case, and since the methods employed in the study will depend upon the hypothesized nature of the case, a 'methodological' definition will always seem inadequate to the experienced case study worker—it will not grasp the problem of the case study as the case study worker experiences it" (1980, p. 108).

Kemmis' problem for the case worker is the experience which underlies the CARE group's use of "participant observation." Habermas described the dynamic at play as follows: "For in an interaction that links at least two subjects in the framework of an intersubjectivity of mutual understanding produced in ordinary language through constant meanings, the interpreter is as much a participant as the one he interprets" (1971, p. 181). To Habermas, the "framework of an intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" must be founded upon an emancipatory interest. However, with the CARE ethical shift believed to have taken place between the right to privacy and the right to know, the "link...produced" between the participants and the researchers may have been experienced as the "force" of strategic action rather than the "power" of communicative action.

Habermas paraphrased "force" as that which Arendt distinguishes from "power":

> ..."force" would mean the disposition over resources and means of coercion, in virtue of which a political leadership makes and carries through binding decisions in order to realize collective goals. The idea has in fact inspired the systems-theoretic concept of power. (1977a, p. 5)

When the evaluator holds all of the cards (according to Elliott and Jenkins) there is a real possibility of the ethical slight of hand. The evaluator decides by virtue of the "collective goals"—the public right— what may or may not be a "disposition" over individual rights. Power shifts to force.

> The shift...implies a shift from man in the singular to men in the plural, and this means a shift from the domain where nothing counts except the solid reasoning of one mind to a realm where 'strength of opinion' is determined by the individual's reliance upon the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinions—a number, incidentally, which is not necessarily the number of one's contemporaries. (Arendt, 1967, p. 110)

The opposite to this arbitrary exertion of force is Arendt's concept of power as a relationship "in favour of radical democracy...which sees power emerging from mutual understanding or banding together." This is in contradistinction to the "strength of opinion" which relies on the force of a presumed majority—to a "view of power as something which gives its possessors dominion over other people."[18] We are reminded here of how the SAFARI ethical shift (the knight's move) was construed in this way—as giving "dominion" to the researcher (a possibility that Walker has acknowledged). The CARE evaluator evoked the "force" of public opinion by virtue of the right to know. This is to assume that the force of opinion is on the side of the researcher.[19]

The concern here with force may be exacerbated by the feeling of entitlement which comes from a perceived democratic process. Simons reveals some of this threat in her

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[18]Luban, "On Habermas on Arendt on Power," 1979, p. 82.
[19]Refer to the discussion of "Democratic Evaluation as Unfulfilled Aspirations," p. 32.

description where "trust" becomes the "basis for the exchange of information" [Habermas' "exchange value"]:

> If the researcher is regarded by the participants as an honest, understanding person who respects their point of view and selects with discretion, it is easy enough to get interviewees to clear their data. If the researcher has established an informal relationship with participants while gathering data he or she may capitalize on this in seeking release of confidential information for wider circulation. At best the trust established leads to the open negotiation of the data; at worst the researcher's personal skills or personality can dominate to get people to clear comments that suit the researcher's purpose and that in retrospect the interviewee would have preferred to keep private. One diffident participant, being asked to clear a report made the point when he said "it's difficult to refuse, he (referring to the researcher) is such a likeable chap." (Simons, 1977a, p. 29)

Simons again brings to light the significance of the integrity of the relationship (Unger's "communion of reciprocal expectation") and the potential of dis-integration. The critics, in fairness, have commented that the SAFARI ethical shift was not premeditated—"the SAFARI students were hopelessly caught in the cross-fire between conflicting aspirations" (Jenkins, 1980, p. 152). Jenkins asserted that the whole structure of democratic case study is manipulative since attention to the confidentiality of the data was "surreptitiously replaced by the ethics of power" (Elliot, 1977, p. 155). "It is the relationship that has become confidential" (Jenkins, 1980, p. 155), allowing the researcher a "stronger hand in interpreting" [i.e., "force"] (Walker, 1981b, p. 203). Within these statements we can perceive a more earnest question—one which considers authenticity and power relationships. The shift addressed by these criticisms may be encouraging rather than condemning.

> The self-deceived joker...who proves to be in the same boat as his victims will appear vastly superior in trustworthiness to the cold-blooded liar who permits himself to enjoy his prank from without. Only self-deception is likely to create a semblance of truthfulness, and the only persuasive factor which in a debate about facts sometimes

has a chance to prevail against pleasure, fear, and profit is personal appearance. (Arendt, 1967, p. 125)

The PACCR Experience of Power Relationships

The acquiescence to the force of control in the PACCR study may have, ironically, reduced the power of participants as well. When the case study had been closed and the case record transcriptions had been confirmed, I wrote in my files: "I've provided myself license to do an explicit interpretation!" The feeling was not that I had enjoyed a prank, but I felt that I had provided fair clearance (and still had the safeguard of the first draft confirmation to come). This gave me a freedom to write. Could this allusion to the provision of license be an indication of yet another manipulation? (Do participants really have power to affect the interpretation of the final report, or is their contribution merely the force to dispose of any personal, disagreeable statements?)

A participant suggested a locus for the concern: "I have no trouble with your particular study, but at an epistemological level, the notion of 'evaluation' is very problematic":

> Maybe this is the problem—an ideological one. Evaluators, even if they reconceptualise themselves to be democratic or participatory—if there is a fundamental base that sponsors them, an institutional base....Ted says, "Look, why don't you do a case study?" There is still a power context.
>
> In my way of thinking, to formulate evaluation is to try and see it as a discourse in context. In a school context, ideally those discourses would be hermeneutic, dialogical and mutually supported. But they often are not.
>
> Often when there is a need for evaluation, and the evaluation is done by the institution, they don't even know how to put it down on paper. What I would say is that an evaluation must first of all take a very low stance—with the kids. [Evaluator] [Well, my stance is with the participants—which is why you get to see the (confidential) transcripts and the first draft to take out words or to change—to exert

control.]

[Participant] But this is all, in a way, to tinker in other dimensions—to make the evaluation less than what it is.

Is this ideological problematic referred to that previously questioned "fundamental framework" which allows the perspective of justice-as-control? Is the semblance of truthfulness (Arendt) merely tinkering in another dimension—an ideological one? And is the participatory case study evaluator but a self-deceived joker? To experience the discourse in context and dwell within the power context is, possibly, an antinomy, as the participant suggests—especially with the problem of "even knowing how to put it down on paper." Yet, the contrapositions may be equally evocative. A discourse in context, perhaps, cannot be other than in a power context. Conversely, written text may be another realm which has become transactional to spoken discourse (Ricoeur). The question is then, What becomes of contextual power when spoken dialogue becomes written discourse? And how might this transformation reveal fundamental changes to the justice of such written portrayal?

The case study, indeed, revealed something of Ted Aoki's way of being as a scholar and a political figure in the Department. He was inexorably a part of the healthy tension. He sponsored the study, supervised the dissertation and is a mentor. One participant asked "Is the Department radical or is Ted?" This was a question which remained integral to the question of "power contexts" throughout the case study.[20] Aoki stated explicitly in the study that "What we need to explore is the dialectic of tradition and its ground." Is this not a fundamental base of sponsorship that makes evaluation more of what it is, rather than less? The power context remains explicit.

Each opportunity to encourage radical research must be seen as a chance for people to come together. They may come together as friends or enemies, yet as long as people come together there is a chance that things can be reconstructed—to deny or to allow certain things to happen. If we don't learn from those occasions, how can we be true

[20]Again, we may think here of that sense of radical conveyed in Arendt's orientation to "radical democracy"—her mutual approach rooted in the communicative concept of power (Luban).

to who we are as university scholars? At times people may lose—even be fired. (Aoki, as a participant.)

Aoki suggests that all research is rooted in a power context. This would seem also to have been supported by the central figures in the CARE evaluations. Walker and MacDonald wrote in "Case Study and the Social Philosophy of Education" (1975b):

> We believe that the dissemination of new knowledge ought to be a prior, not a post, consideration in the planning and conduct of educational research. Knowledge is the basis on which many forms of power are legitimated and, in the case of education, the medium through which power is exercised. (p. 6)

The concerns expressed by these CARE writers may not yet speak to hermeneutic discourse. There lingers a sense of a strategic practical interest in planned conduct— knowledge "dissemination" seems to reduce knowing to an act of transmitting "forms." But the concern with knowledge as the medium of power cannot be ignored.

The linking of this concept of knowledge with the consideration of planning and conduct may be similar to the perspective made problematic by Werner. Such thinking is "concerned with an administrative set of largely technical decisions...[where ambiguities and conflicts are] viewed as an annoyance to be dealt with through better planning, specification of procedure and clarity of rôles." To Werner "The point is that when we listen to accounts of experiences within schooling, we cannot overlook contradiction as a concept that helps us better understand some aspects of those experiences" (1986, p. 143). And he suggests that "as one takes a political perspective, contradiction is taken to be a central feature of public schooling: politics is necessary precisely because values and interests clash as groups want different things for schools." The political perspective is not, here, given as the panacea. Only some aspects are revealed as we "listen to...experiences."

Aoki and Werner have premised their major evaluation work on the belief that the "unequal distribution of power among groups within schooling contexts" is experienced as unequal access "to define social reality and to impose these definitions upon other groups" (1979, p. 49). The "ideological question" cannot be ignored. It would seem that attention to

this "problematic" can make evaluation more of what it is. On the other hand, the aspiration "to formulate evaluation" towards a vision of "mutually supported" discourse (suggested by the participant) may be an example of an "emphatic response to the problem of power and freedom....But this by itself is not enough" (Unger, 1976, p. 239):

> The mere existence of moral agreement within a particular association would not bring about this end [to the "problem of unjustified power"]. First, it would be necessary for the subversion of inequality to proceed to such a point that people would be entitled to place greater confidence in collective choices as expressions of a shared human nature or of the intrinsic demands of social order rather than as a product of interests of dominant groups. Second, it would be indispensable that this experience of increasing equality also make possible an even more universal consensus about the immanent order of social life and thus help refine further the understanding of what equality means. The first condition without the second is empty. The second without the first is dangerous because it threatens to consecrate the outlook of the most powerful and articulate elements in the society. (p. 240)

The "problem" of evaluation for the participant could be met where: "ideally those discourses are hermeneutic, dialogical and mutually supported." Likewise to Habermas "the notion of participation and consensus...in the idealized dialogical situation" was an answer (Luban, p. 93). Ricoeur introduces this implied "immanent order" of Habermas' as the "form of a regulative idea which is not a reality but an ideal, the ideal of an unrestricted and unconstrained communication" (1981, p. 99). As Unger implies above, Habermas' stance requires not only "subversion of inequality" (the "unconstrained") but a "universal consensus" (the "unrestricted"). This is the *consensus omnium* which Luban asserts to be fundamental and problematic in Habermas' critique of Arendt. It is to this "indespensible...experience" we now may turn in our attempt to "refine further the understanding of what equality means" (Unger).

Experiencing Positive Distanciation: Well, That's Just Fixing Things That Ain't Broke

Stenhouse wrote in "Case Study and Case Records: Towards a Contemporary History of Education," that with such questions of "critical intersubjectivity" the "immediate problem is how to approach the task of understanding" (1978, p. 33). Perhaps we may be aided by a vital tug to this question and can ask: How may we experience (or not experience) our approach to understanding as a task involving questions of empowerment? In less tortuous language, a participant questioned the need for an ethic of confidentiality, anonymity and justice by asking: "Are you fixin' things that ain't broke?" Implementing "justice-as-control" initially precipitated preconceptions of justice that mitigated necessary criticalness. The matter of concern is tied to the eventual and inexorable need to contextualise the events of the evaluation in written discourse. The import of this shift was pushed to the backgound by the assumption that control of release reduced the problematic of interpretation. This ultimately is a problematic of language. In the PACCR evaluation the crux (to quote the participant again) is "having to put it down on paper."

A global reason that the ubiquitousness of this problematic between participation and textualisation remains hidden was expressed by Gadamer as a modern "instrumentalist devaluation" of language (1975, p. 365). Language conceived as "form, separated from all content, [allows it] to become an indepenedent object of attention" (p. 365). This convenience alleviates attention to an ontological tension: "We can only think in language, and just this residing of our thinking in a language is the profound enigma that language presents to thought" (1976, p. 62). Gadamer posits a dialectical characteristic "where we are always already encompassed by the language that is our own." He has variously defined language as mysterious, strange, miraculous, secretive, even magical (p. 145). More critically to the problematic of language, it is the failure of Western philosophical thought that it "has not placed the nature of language at the center of its considerations" (1976, p. 60).

Gadamer describes how, "with respect to the written tradition" (p. 331), the task of hermeneutics shares the characteristic of the language of spoken dialogue: "the hermeneutical phenomenon proves to be a special case of the general relationship between thinking and

speaking, the mysterious intimacy of which is bound up in the way in which speech is contained, in a hidden way, in thinking" (1975, p. 351). The "language that lives in speech...takes in all understanding, including that of the textual interpretation" (p. 366). Hence, even where the immediacy of language is apparently lacking in the "abstract alienness of all 'texts,' " we have a further expression of "the fact that all language belongs in a unique way to the process of understanding" (p. 351).

Paul Ricoeur similarly refers to the mystery (1981, p. 190) and the miracle (1976, p. 16) of language. He also speaks of its dangerousness—"in the best sense of the word...[as play] shattering the illusion of the immediacy of the real."[21] This latter sense provides a departure from Gadamer. Ricoeur considers that "The problem for a hermeneutics of language is not to rediscover some pristine immediacy but to mediate again and again in a new and more creative fashion" (p. 24).

> Our task then is to reappropriate those resources of language which have resisted contamination and destruction. To rework language is to rediscover what we are....To rediscover meaning we must return to the multilayered sedimentations of language, to the complex plurality of its instances, which can preserve us from the destruction of oblivion. (p. 28)

Ricoeur agrees with Gadamer, and many others, that language is at the centre of the task of hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1975, p. 331). Yet, he provides a fundamental distinction. While it is true that "the hermeneutical task is to discern the 'matter' of the text (Gadamer)" (Ricoeur, 1981, p., 111), it is the dialectic of speaking and writing—and not speaking and thinking— which characterises the hermeneutic problem (p. 132). Ricoeur considers Gadamer's hermeneutic fusion of horizons not to be between dialogical actors: "Nothing is less intersubjective or dialogical than the encounter with a text....the 'fusion of horizons' expresses the convergence of the **world** horizons of the writer and the reader" (p. 192).

Ricoeur's emphasis on the world of the writer and reader highlights the prevailing distinction that he has taken up, in earnest, from Gadamer—between "having a world and not

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[21]In Kearney, 1984, p. 24.

merely a situation, a *Welt* and not merely an *Umwelt*" (1981, p. 177).[22] While Ricoeur agrees with the centrality of language, he makes fundamental distinctions from Gadamer. Martin Jay provides one example in a discussion of the manner in which Ricoeur agrees with Habermas in criticising "Gadamer's Heideggerian ontologization of language...everything consequently, does not arrive in language, but only comes to language" (1982, p. 108). Ricoeur writes:

> The autonomy of the text already contains the possibility that what Gadamer calls the matter of the text may escape the finite intentional horizon of its author; in other words, thanks to writing, the 'world' of the text may explode the world of the author....In short, the text must be able from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, to 'decontextualise' itself in such a way that it can be 'recontextualised' in a new situation—as accomplished, precisely, in the act of reading....The freeing of the written material with respect to the dialogical condition of discourse is the most significant effect of writing. It implies that the relationship between writing and reading is no longer a particular case of the relationship between speaking and hearing. (1981, p. 139)

This "matter of the text" is suggested in the case study where a participant stated that there had been no trouble with my study in particular, "But at an epistemological level, the notion of 'evaluation' is very problematic." The problematic eventually involved "how to put it down on paper." I suggested that I was aware of the problem. In fact, this was the primary purpose of the case study approach: "This is one story—our story—and the only way that I know how to make it our story—unless we all joint-author it —is to give as much control as possible." The matter at hand then and now is that at some point the story must be narrated.

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[22]Gadamer (1975) makes the distinction between the world as 'habitat' [*Umwelt*] (p. 414) and the world whereby a view of language is world [*Welt*]—our fundamental being-in-the-world as language (p. 368). In his section of Truth and Method where he interrogates "Language as Horizon of a Hermeneutic Ontology" he begins with a discussion of "Language as Experience of the World" (pp. 397-414). We learn that "Matters of fact come in language" hence language allows us to "rise above the habitat [which] means to rise to 'world' itself, to true environment" (p. 403). This distinction may also be seen in Ricoeur's discussions of "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics" and "The Hermeutical Function of Distanciation" (1981, en passim).

What is more, the reading of that narration may be an act which has limited relations to the intentions of the author and participants or to the dialogical conditions of the invention of the study. That is, the ethics of access and release may be transcended by the complex plurality of the text.

The previous discussion of power relations ended with the question of how we might consider or not consider our approaches to understanding as a task involving power. The bias which I expressed towards the consideration of contextualisation as a threat to the participants' anonymity and confidentiality (their right to privacy) was an insistence that we understand the release of understandings as a problem. What was emerging, moreover, was the understanding of this problem as not merely release to a broader conversation but release in an ontological sense—to "the autonomy of the text" (Ricoeur, 1976, pp. 76, 81). One participant considered my insistence: "Fixin' things that ain't broke."

[Participant] So you are suggesting, practically, that I look for what [when considering release]?

[Evaluator] [What would you think?]

Well, I don't know what the problem is. I have said this. And even if people identify this as me, what is the big deal? You seem to think that there is a problem. If I am identified, is it my problem or is it yours?

[It's your problem. But it is my problem as well. I want to give you the control over your anonymity and confidentiality.]

Then you have a problem. You have to take out everything that is aberrant and recognisable.

[No. No.]

Everything that is esoteric, then?

[No. It is up to me to make sure that you think about what the risks might be.]

Well, what risks? Why would I care? Don't people have to stand by what they say?

[....There is the 'broader conversation'—the other participants who will also see the first draft. You need to decide whether your statements can with-stand the

uncertainty—that you have thought them out seriously. Then you can decide if you "don't care."]

That's right. I am ultimately responsible for what I say. I'm not ultimately responsible for everything that anyone else says. Are you suggesting this by lumping everything together?

[What I am attempting to do is to present a larger context within which to consider each statement.]

Are you giving a "worst case scenario"?

[Yes, to expand the context or frame of reference wider. What happens if Caspar Weinberger says something on "Canada A.M.," in an off-hand manner, and it ends up on the front page of a Soviet newspaper—as happened at the "Shamrock Summit"?]

Well, I'm not Caspar Weinberger. And I can't consider this a problem.

[Well, O.K. Just accept that there is a wider context that I am asking you to consider.]

Well, that's just fixin' things that ain't broke.

This participant countered the concern for anonymity with the statement "Don't people have to stand by what they say?" Perhaps. The question that I would raise, however, is whether people can be understood correctly as standing behind the text. Or are participants' intentions and abilities to respond no longer part of the world of the text? My task was "to expand the context or frame of reference" within which to consider understandings. This context may be seen to go beyond what people say—indeed beyond the intentions of what I wrote about what they said.

The Linguistic Turn

In Ricoeur's words, the case record transcriptions and the case study report are trans-actions of the original dialogical inter-actions (the case study conversations). That is, the dialogical events of interviewing become the actions later contextualised. Actions have become trans(inter)actions. Co-extensively, the writing of the propositional content of the

interviews—the sentences which are the locutionary representation of the interlocutionary, dialogical situation— undergo a translocution.[23]

When the dialogical situation or interlocution of the case study is exteriorised in writing, the concrete, conversational experiences cease to be the ostensive reference of the text. What is more, the psychological intent of the author is transcended. And thirdly, the original or intended readers of the text are also "escaped." These three events constitute the three-fold autonomy of the text. Such escaping may call into question the ethical conditions believed to have been implemented with the principles and procedures of access and release. That is, the phenomenon of translocution may be an effect which raises the concern that democratic aspirations are co-option—that the justification of co-research as participant validation is suspect if the ethics of the case are not something that can be written into the report.

Ricoeur describes one of these three autonomies—the antithesis to the quintessential quest for authorial intention by Romantic hermeneutics—as follows:

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[23]Ricoeur draws upon John Austin's How to do Things with Words (1962) and John Searle's Speech Acts (1969). The different classes of discourse described by Austin and Searle are used by Ricoeur to discuss "The Fixation of Action" in his "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" (1977). Ricoeur writes first:

> The act of speaking, according to these authors, is constituted by a hierarchy of subordinate acts which are distributed at three levels: (1) the level of the locutionary or propositional act, the act of saying; (2) the level of the illocutionary act or force, that which we do in saying; and (3) the level of the perlocutionary act, that which we do by saying....The locutionary act exteriorizes itself in the sentence....the illocutionary act can also be exteriorized through grammatical paradigms (indicative, imperative, and subjunctive modes, and other procedures expressive of the illocutionary force)....the perlocutionary act is the least inscribable act of discourse and that by preference it characterizes spoken language. (pp. 318-319)
>
> [He goes on to elaborate how] meaningful action is an object for science only under the condition of a kind of objectification which is equivalent to the fixation of a discourse by writing. This trait presupposes a simple way to help us to the stage of our analysis. In the same way that interlocution is overcome in writing, interaction is overcome in numerous situations in which we treat action as a fixed text....[that is, in the same way] as spoken language is caught in the process of interlocution, or, if we may use the term translocution. (p. 332)

Also see: Ricoeur, 1981, pp. 134 and 368, 1976, pp. 14 and 18; Thompson, 1984, p. 179; Jay, 1982, p. 88; Habermas, 1977, p. 4, 1979, en passim; and Luban, 1979, p. 85.

> With written discourse, the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coexist. The **dissociation** of the verbal meaning of the text and the mental intention is what is really at stake in the inscription of discourse. (1977, p. 77)

The omission of the triple autonomy by Romantic hermeneutics (1976, p. 75) meant that the fundamental "problem of interpretation" had been missed (p. 76). The problem is how we may comprehend and explicate a text that is autonomous "with respect to the intention of the author; with respect to the cultural situation and the sociological conditions of the production of the text; and finally, with respect to the original addressee" (1981, p. 91).

The "broader context" which I was asking the participants to consider may be understood as related to Ricoeur's mediation of the text. My concern with the "changing dialogue" is the fundamental concern of Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics. This is a concern I tried to make problematic and which one participant considered "Fixin' things that ain't broke"—since he would "stand behind" what he had said.

> Insofar as the meaning of a text is rendered autonomous with respect to the subjective intentions of the author, the essential question is not to recover, behind the text, the lost intention, but to unfold, in front of the text, the 'world' which it opens up and discloses. In other words, the hermeneutical task is to discern the 'matter' of the text. (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 111)

My concern to rehearse considerations of contextualisations may be viewed as searching in this direction of the hermeneutical task. In one correspondence to the participants I referred to the "decontextualisation" that my written "interpretation" would effect.

Similarly, Ricoeur addressed decontextualisation in a discussion of "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology":

> In short, the work decontextualises itself, from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, and is able to **recontextualise** itself differently in the act of reading. It follows that the mediation of the text cannot be treated as an extension of the dialogical situation. For in dialogue, the ***vis-à-vis*** of discourse is given in advance by the setting itself; with writing, the original addressee is transcended. The

work itself creates an audience, which potentially includes anyone who can read. (1981, p. 91)

Ricoeur establishes a succinct distinction between spoken and written language: "Dialogue is an exchange of questions and answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer and the reader" (1981, p. 146). "The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading" (p. 147). Writing is the "emancipation" which takes place at the "site of speech," yet it sees the "birth of the text" (p. 147). The most striking characteristic of writing, then, is that "writing preserves discourse and makes it an archive available for individual and collective memory" (p. 147). To collapse all language to conversation (as Ricoeur describes of Gadamer) is "too limited to cover the whole field of explication" (p. 108). The "dialectic of speaking and writing" becomes for Ricoeur "the linguistics of discourse where event and meaning are articulated." "This articulation is the core of the whole hermeneutical problem." Hermeneutics must be, at least, "understood as the linguistics of discourse as opposed to the linguistics of language" (p. 134).

The mediation of the text that Ricoeur elaborates provides a positive sense of distanciation (1981, p. 131). This productive sense may be taken as a grounding for the discussion of my insistence: "just accept that there is a wider context...to consider." This prejudice, revealed in my prescription to the participant, was the most difficult understanding for participants to take up. Most could not or would not "care."

Almost without exception, when considering release the participants in the study understood the future contexts of the study in dialogical terms—as future conversations. (We are reminded of the participant's question "Don't people have to stand behind what they say?") A typical response was: "I am saying that I, as a person, would stand up in a Graduate Committee meeting and say this, and I don't see why I should be afraid to say it." This distinction between my wish to consider written contexts and the participant's penchant to consider conversational contexts was at times clearly delineated, at other times ambiguous. At times I was the most ambivalent of all. One participant introduced this tension with the statement:

[Participant] For me, there is nothing to hide. I may tell everything. I don't think that there is a risk. I don't think that the understandings are at risk.

In another conversation the distinctive future contexts of "saying" were discussed with more clarity.

[Evaluator] [How are you deciding that these excerpts are O.K.?]

[Participant] They are my ideas. I return to what I said before. If I am prepared to say these things in an interview, then I am prepared to back them elsewhere. I guess that it has to do with the way that I choose to deal with things. I try not to maintain two different systems in my life: opinions that I hold but won't make public, opinions that I will make public. As far as I am concerned, to the extent that what I say with you represents what I believe, then if I am prepared to share with you, I'm prepared to share with others.

If you always told the truth, then you don't have to worry what it is that you have told anyone. That is what it comes down to here, for me. If I don't try to think of what would be acceptable to say, then I would always be dealing with that sort of issue in my life. I prefer to either guard my tongue in the first instance or be prepared to defend what I do or say.

The participant was most lucid in this account. And the references were consistent in their orientation to future conversations or spoken, public defences. In retrospect, we may answer some of these points from a shift in orientation towards the matter of the text. Yes, there is an insistence to consider "two different systems," yet this is not to set up a situation where the participant must always be checking speech against thoughts—in relation to what is acceptable. The question that we may consider is, What would be acceptable to have quoted in this other system of the non-ostensive reference of the written text? In this domain there is no second instance where the participant may defend what has been said. Moreover, if the participant is identified in the study, there is no way to even know this nor what it is that people believed him or her to have said. The participant may have been prepared to back ideas elsewhere, but this was not the anticipated situation of fundamental consideration—at least in

the mind of the evaluator.

The consideration of a future, dialogical forum where participants would back their ideas—standing behind what they said—was a repeated topic. As the previous reference to the "Graduate Committee meeting" exemplified, some even made this imagined situation explicit. The world of these references was singularly dialogical:

> Well there is nothing said in this transcript that hasn't been said right out in the open this last while. I don't have a problem with this statement. It has been a general conversation to me in different situations.

I have suggested that my own ambivalence in this regard may also have contributed to the lack of clear distinction between the contextualisations kept in mind. But a more central influence might have been the very nature of our concrete situation—in dialogue. After all, I was to write the thing. The participants had experienced the study as conversation. As one participant stated, if I had been a "head office person coming in" who did not exemplify the commitment I wished to review:

> Then it would be different. But right now the context is different. And I know that confidentiality is central to your topic, but right now, for me as an interviewee, it is not an issue.

As an interviewee this person was correct. I trust in my own abilities and commitment to maintain confidentiality—as the participant seemed to. But the context that I would have hoped to have been considered was not right then in that situation as an interviewee.

How shall we understand why in the dialogical situations of the release interviews it was so difficult to develop this concern with the matter of the text? How did participants come to consider future contexts such that their replies were "Yes. And I would be willing to stand behind that in public." This last reply was made in response to my question "Do you still feel it [a particular statement] needs to be said?" While I may have led us to consider a dialogical re-contextualisation (with the reference to saying), the ensuing discussion returned to the problematic. To the participant's statement of a willingness to "stand behind" the statement in public, I replied, "Yes. And I **am** going to have to!" The participant replied,

"No, you are not." He was correct. But in more of a sense than intended.

The matter of the text that we are considering and which participants, for the most part, did not readily take up, was a development Ricoeur attributed to the "wave of anti-historicism" which moved the cultural sciences to accept the "logicity in the general explanation of cultural expression" (1976, p. 91). The text acquires an objective sense (although limited)—an autonomy from the intentions of the author and the ostensive reference of the original dialogue. In order to understand the importance of the linguistic turn in my own study, it is necessary to provide more of a "provisional circumspection of the problem of hermeneutics: the status of written texts *versus* spoken language, the status of interpretation *versus* explanation" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 166). There is a "kind of atemporality" which Ricoeur admits to embracing and which is given to overcome the historical process of the text's creation.

Ricoeur wrote: "I admit that I take this anti-historicist trend into account with my efforts and that I agree with its main presupposition concerning the objectivity of meaning in general" (1976, p. 91). Yet, Ricoeur's atemporal position is distinct from that of Husserl's "objective phenomenology" (ibid.). Ricoeur posits a genuine, referential power of the text. This is the link between disclosure and appropriation which he considers the cornerstone of hermeneutics. The distinction established "the omnitemporality of the meaning" and "opens it to unknown readers" (1976, p. 93). Omnitemporal, referential power belongs to the text and is disclosed to unknown readers. As these readers bring their plurality of horizons to the text, thus the synchronistic, referential power of the text explodes the idiosyncratic, intentional actions of the author. The participant was correct. I would not be standing behind the text as it lives out its own destiny. But neither would the participant. All we need to consider is the potential readership of this dissertation to realise how the world of its possibilities transcends the power of participants or its author to stand in public and defend statements.

The fundamental distinction that Ricoeur makes between the linguistics of discourse and that of speech is worked out in his chapter, "Language of Discourse," in Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (1976). The sense of surplus that he refers to

is derived from the "famous essay" of Gotlob Frege to which Ricoeur makes numerous references.[24] Ricoeur, significantly, provided the essay title as: "On Sense and Reference." He makes a citation to the edition edited by Max Black: Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege (1970). The chapter title translated in an earlier edition by Black and Peter Geach (Frege, 1952) is, "On sense and Meaning." Coinciding with Ricoeur, we may take up the nuance and understand the meaning of the text to be a dialectical relationship between its "objective" sense and its non-ostensive reference—the sense of the text has reference and is made meaningful with its opening to the horizon of the reader.

In an essay on "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics," Gadamer provides the originating concept which Ricoeur later appropriates as his own. Gadamer wrote, "the language of art means the excess of meaning that is present in the work itself" (1976, p. 102). Gadamer dwells with the aesthetics of art (and more elaborately in Truth and Method) in his attempt to expand "the hermeneutic perspective to include the language of art...aesthetics is an important element of general hermeneutics" (1976, p. 102). Gadamer begins his discussion of philosophical hermeneutics addressing the aesthetics of art only to end with his assertion that "the universality of the hermeneutical perspective" derives from the truth that "being that can be understood is language" (p. 103).

Richard Bernstein (1983) reviews this centrality of language in Gadamer's work. He refers to the "linguistic turn" wherein Gadamer establishes that "Language is the medium of all understanding and all tradition" (p. 145). Gadamer describes this linguisticality as follows:

> [T]he event of language corresponds to the finitude of man in a...radical sense....It is the centre of language whence our whole experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds. (1975, p. 415)

Gadamer recounts in "The Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection" that Habermas worked with his analysis from Truth and Method. Habermas argued (with this appropriation of Gadamer's ideas) that the bane of sociological theory is the "failure to reflect upon its linguistic foundation"—a position with which Gadamer agrees (1976, p. 26). Gadamer felt,

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[24]See the discussion of the "Fregean Distinction" which follows.

however, that it was Habermas' "absurd" misunderstanding of the primacy of linguisticality [*Sprachlichkeit*] presented in Truth and Method that led to the "erroneous" criticisms of that work (p. 31). In his essay "Should Intellectual History Take a Lingusitic Turn," Martin Jay states that the "Habermas-Gadamer Debate" is centrally concerned with a linguistic turn in the cultural sciences. Furthermore, this debate is "the cutting edge of contemporary German hermeneutics." (p. 92). Indeed, we may recall that Gadamer argues in "Man and Language" that this lack of a linguistic turn is the failure of Western philosophical thought (1976, p. 60).

In the present research on participatory case study evaluation, taking up such a turn was accomplished with great apprehension. When I was attempting to fathom the "thundering silence" of the first draft release I had the following exchange with a participant.

> [Evaluator] [Another area that I wanted to discuss with participants was text—the effect of textualising oral language to written. How does this change meaning?]
>
> [Participant] But that would be a whole other study!

Indeed. The third year of my residency while undertaking this study was funded by a University of Alberta Doctoral Fellowship. The expectation of this fellowship is that the study is near to completion and should be finished within the funded year. Justice-as-control had been, to my mind, shot to pieces—exploded by the matter of the text. The ethical commitment to the University fellowship tradition weighed heavily. However, I could not ignore the impact in the study of the movement from dialogue to discourse. First the one-sided transcripts and then the lack of responses to the first draft were dramatic episodes of the study coming to language.

Gadamer has described the linguistic turn as follows:

> [I]t is literally more correct to say that language speaks us, rather than we speak it....language constitutes the hermeneutic event proper not as language, whether as grammar or as lexicon, but in the coming into language of that which has been said in the tradition: an event that is at once assimilation and interpretation. (1975, p. 421)

The expedient understanding of justice-as-control was no longer a choice. If "Language

speaks us," the dissertation would surely reveal this importance of the textualisation. One participant provided an understanding that gave the predicament, even though the words were spoken about the release of the case record:

> Well why don't you get on with it. And if questions of confidentiality emerge, I'll ask you about—what things mean. I realise that confidentiality is your topic and you may wish to dwell on that. But for me it is not a concern until questions are posed. Then it becomes relevant. For now it is academic.

My concern with the "broader context" could no longer remain academic. I had to address the questions forcefully posing themselves: What happens when spoken dialogue moves to written discourse? And even more fundamentally, Are the principles of confidentiality, anonymity and justice translocuted by the autonomous sense of the text? Is participation an in-authentic expectation when considering the referential power of the written report? Assuredly, the "long detour" to follow through sense, reference and meaning does lead us back to these central questions of participatory case study evaluation.

B. Reflecting on the Experience of the 'World' of the Work: Discourse or Dialogue—Sense, Reference and Meaning

The "detour" that Gadamer and Ricoeur (1981, pp. 52, 143, & 193) prescribe as necessary for a conceptualisation of text and a theory of interpretation may seem ancillary to the curricular study of participatory case study evaluation. Nevertheless, the discussion is fundamental. In Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis, Richard Bernstein describes how his study speaks to "the present turn in the 'conversation of mankind'" (1983, p. 229). Moreover, his interest in objectivism and relativism would have been a "more appropriate title or subtitle of the book [Truth and Method], and indeed of Gadamer's entire philosophical project" (p. 115). While Bernstein acknowledges that Gadamer's project "begins with a discussion of works of art, he moves to the question of the interpretation of texts, to history, to anything that is 'handed down to us' through a living tradition" (p. 124). To follow Gadamer's project and to tell the complete story of the course

of twentieth-century hermeneutics, however, "would require nothing less that a study of the whole of continental philosophy in recent times" (Bernstein, p. 114). "Fortunately," Bernstein limits his own task. Similarly, while the case study report falls under the rubric of something "handed down to us," how might we limit the present "detour"?

We have read that Jay considers the Habermas-Gadamer debate, where this exchange addresses the linguistic turn, to be at the cutting edge of present hermeneutics. In John B. Thompson's Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas, we read that "The concept of the text and the theory of interpretation also provide a basis for arbitration in the debate between hermeneutics and critical theory" (p. 66). But more specifically, "Ricoeur presents this debate as an antinomy between participation and alienation" (p. 66). The concern with the antinomy between such participation and distanciation is the participatory case study evaluation problematic at hand. But we may limit this discussion further. Thompson also writes:

> The notion of reference occupies a key position in the theory of language elaborated by Ricoeur. The referential relation is one of the crucial characteristics which differentiates the semantics of discourse from the semiotics of the sign....the referential relation...distinguishes hermeneutics from the structuralist analysis of the text. (p. 191)

Thompson provides a discussion of Ricoeur's contention that "the semantics of discourse must acknowledge a distinction between the sense of an expression and its reference" (p. 192). This is the "Fregean distinction." The referential understanding that Ricoeur draws from Frege (1952) can be considered with two other concepts to provide the basis of his analysis—an analysis essential to an understanding of the particular experiences of participatory case study evaluation. These two further distinctions are discussed as "defeasibility" and "validation"—from H. L. Hart (1948) and E. D. Hirsch (1967).

The Fregean Distinction

As Ricoeur has suggested above, when discussing translocution,[25] the referential/sense distinction is not complex. Yet, the "trend" which arose from this understanding and which came "from Frege and from the Husserl of the Logical Investigations [1977]" (1981, p. 184), started the "wave of 'anti-historicism'" affecting the "whole theory of *Geisteswissenschaften*" (1976, pp. 90-91).

Frege asserted that "In grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of meaning anything" (1952, p. 58). We are familiar with the idea that a "sentence contains a thought." Hence, we may understand that the expression "that dragons exist" has sense, but it has no thought until provided with a context—"Spike believes that dragons exist." Frege provides an illustration.

> [T]he thought in the sentence, "The morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun" differs from that in the sentence "The evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun." Anybody who did not know that the evening star is the morning star might hold the one thought to be true, the other false. The thought, accordingly, cannot be what is meant by the sentence, but must rather be considered as its sense. (p. 62)

But this thought is not all which Frege ascribes to "reference" over "sense." We cannot deny "that mankind has a common store of thought which is transmitted from one generation to another" (p. 59). More significantly, these thoughts are not a "part or mode of the individual mind." The truth of traditional thought is not gained through innate and empathetic understanding. It is "the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense [thought] to the thing meant" (p. 63). We are driven to accept the "**truth-value** of a sentence as constituting what it means"—as opposed to constituting its sense (p. 63). Hence, reference has a *telos* in our lived experience. We bring judgements of "truth-value" to the sense of the text. This truth-value does not inhere with the sense of transmitted tradition.

To Ricoeur, Frege's distinction between sense and reference is fundamental—it provides the "epistemological instrument" necessary to understand "productive distanciation"

[25]See note no. 23 of this Chapter.

(1976, p. 89). Frege's sense provides a "limited field of possible constitutions" (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 133). Thus, the scope of making sense is not arbitrary nor unlimited. This is not the advocacy of a complete relativity of meaning.[26] Frege provides a caution against such reduction: "warning against logical mistakes arising from the ambiguity of expression" (p. 70). As an example, Frege gives "The will of the people...for it is easy to establish that there is at any rate no generally accepted meaning for the expression" (p. 70).[27] The import of the conception of a limited sense of the written text is that this provides a grounding for generally accepted judgements of truth about meaning: "To every sense attaching to a truth-value would correspond its manner of analysis" (p. 65). The will of the people finds truth value only with reference to the individual's lived-experience.

To consider more fully this relation of truth and meaning ("general acceptance" and "reference"), we may follow Ricoeur's lead to the work of Hart and Hirsch. From "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" (Hart, 1948), Ricoeur draws a general theory of validation based on the model of jurisprudence (1977, p. 332). From Hirsch's "Problems and Principles of Validation" (1967), Ricoeur gains a procedure for validation based upon jurisprudential procedures used in interpretation— set within the context of a general theory of hermeneutics.

Hart's Defeasibility

Hart (1948) provides the notion central to validation as "defeasibility"—he apologises for the need to borrow such a jurisprudential term "for which no word exists in ordinary English" (p. 175). We first need to consider the often misunderstood rôle of the judge. Conveniently, Hart uses an example of contract law which is most appropriate to our concern with participatory case study evaluation:[28]

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[26]Bernstein's title, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983), begins to have enriched meaning here.

[27]What, then, shall we understand as the common rationale for political action? Ross provides an insightful critique of the assumed representation of such a general will in Why Democracy? (1952). The PACCR mandate is also questioned in this regard [see the case study "Methodological Introduction," Appendix Eight.]

[28]Hart and Karl Popper were fellow Executive Committee Members of the

There are two important consequences arising "out of the truism that what a Judge does is to judge." First, the Judge's function is, **e.g.**, in a case of contract to say whether there is or is not a valid contract upon the claims and defences actually made and pleaded before him and the facts brought to his attention, and not on those which might have been made or pleaded. It is not his function to give an ideally correct legal interpretation of the facts, and if a party (who is *sui juris*) through bad advice or other causes fails to make a claim or plead a defence which he might have successfully made or pleaded, the judge in deciding in such a case, upon the claims and defences actually made, that a valid contract exists has given the right decision. The decision is not merely the best the Judge can do under the circumstances and it would be a misunderstanding of the judicial process to say of such a case that the parties were merely treated **as if** there were a contract. There **is** a contract in the timeless sense of "is" appropriate to judicial decisions.

Secondly, since the judge is literally deciding that on the facts before him a contract does or does not exist, and to do this is neither to desribe the facts nor to make inductive or deductive inferences from the statement of facts, what he does may be either a **right** decision or **wrong** decison or a **good** or **bad** judgement and can be either **affirmed** or **reversed** and (where he has no jurisdication to decide the question) may be **quashed** or **discharged**. What cannot be said of it is that it is either **true** or **false**, logically necessary or absurd. (p. 182)

The judge decides whether there is or is not a contract by a process of law that corresponds to the sense of the case: "the claims and defences actually made and pleaded before him [or her]." The judge relies on the contract that **is**. We see the similarity here with Frege's insistence that to every sense attaching to a truth-value would correspond its own manner of analysis. The sense of the contract is and will always be circumscribed by the facts of the case actually made ("the timeless sense of **is** appropriate to judicial decisions"). Interpretation is

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[21](cont'd) Aritsotelian Society at the time of the publishing of Hart's writing (1948). "Defeasibility" has strong affinities with Popper's procedures of falsification—which we know best as the "null hypothesis" in experimental design.

based on an analysis of what is at hand—not what ought to, could be or would be, but what has actually been presented. We do not have any ideally correct Archemedian Point (Rorty, 1979 and Bernstein, 1983)—an ideal contract case against which to judge.

The judge considers the illocutionary acts of the contractees as transacted. That is, events from the original concrete situation are transformed into "performatory actions" (to use a legal phrase). Similar to Ricoeur's translocution, however, such transactions have escaped the face-to-face situation. Utterances are no longer a "purely descriptive sense to describe the normal physical facts on which it is customary to ascribe rights and possessions" (Hart, p. 187). Given the autonomy of the case, we are left with "defeasibilty":

> ["Defeasibility" derives] of a legal interest in property which is subject to termination or **"defeat"** in a number of different contingencies but remains intact if no contingencies mature. In this sense the contract is a defeasible concept. (p. 175)

Applied to our example of participatory case study evaluation, we have an analagous notion of "informed consent." This principle is most similar to the "Principles of the Law of Contract" which Hart cites from Sir Frederick Pollock.[29]

Pollock describes the heart of these principles: "The consent must be true, full and free" (Hart, p. 177). To validate a contract (to believe that participants understood and accepted participatory case study evaluation principles and procedures) requires that we make "reference to the defences [by] which claims in contract may be weakened or met."[30] We may not, however, say we have a true contract—the judgement is one of defeasibility. We may judge that we do not have a contract, but in the absence of falsification, the contract stands (i.e., undue influence is not present as a mature contingency). The practice of law is to validate a contract by showing that "the exclusion of those facts which ordinarily constitute the defence of undue influence" can be established.

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[29]Indeed, a comparison of these principles with the "Ethical Guidelines—Research with Human Subjects" of the the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and with the proposed guidelines for evaluation from the American Educational Research Association would show little substantive variance.

[30]Here we see the affinity with the falisification principle.

Even though we have a formidable list of the factors considered to be "undue influence," we cannot establish the contract by testing "all necessary and sufficient conditions for its application" (Hart). That is, there is not a blueprint for a valid contract—not a set of *a priori* principles and procedures that are ideally correct. Instead, the concept of defeasibility implies:

> It is plain, therefore, that no adequate characterisation of the legal concept of a contract could be made without reference to these extremely heterogeneous defences in the manner in which they respectively serve to defeat or weaken claims in contract. The concept is irreducibly defeasible in character and to ignore this is to misrepresent it. (p. 176)

Defences against defeasibility can be seen as the mainspring for the continual rehearsal of risks to anonymity and confidentiality in the participatory case study evaluation. Despite the evaluation practices of many researchers and the case study release practices of many schools of business, the signing of a release contract after a one-time discussion or the unilateral approval of executive officers do not begin to qualify as grounds by which to weaken or defeat the rights to confidentiality or anonymity claimed by participants. Undue influence may be shown in an abundance of ways—the power of the Hawthorne Effect, the non-representative actions of an authority and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance are but a few.[31]

Interpretation in the cultural sciences does differ from the public function of the judge. Researchers are not bound to "deal with the claims and defences actually presented." We are not "relieved of the effort," according to Hart. Rather, we must seek out what might have been pleaded. Nevertheless, our judgements remain on the same footing. They are irreducibly defeasible. And to reinforce our understanding of this prolegomenon, we may draw upon Ricoeur's third source.

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[31]A further discussion applied to participatory case study evaluation is given in the section: "Whose Text is it?—A Question of Future Forums."

Hirsch's Concept of Validity

Hirsch begins "Problems and Principles of Validation" (1967) problematically. His starting point seems an oxymoron: It is a certainty that certainty is always unattainable. He places himself in a position which Lawrence Kohlberg derides elsewhere as the "relativity postulation." In "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It" (1971), Kohlberg suggests that nineteenth-century, cultural relativism was overcome by historicism. In its turn, he describes how the later ethical relativism of historicism was the inability of cultural scientists to realise that instead of basing their concerns for tolerance on "white civilisation's" universalisable principle of justice, they attempted to support their pleas for tolerance on the grounds that no principles were universal (p. 69). The mistaken attempt led to historicism. There was an attempt to bracket one's cultural relativism and to empathise with other cultures.

Kohlberg counters the solipsism of ethical relativism with his non-relativistic liberal proposition: "It is a valid [read universal] moral principle to grant liberty and respect to any human being regardless of his moral beliefs or principles" (p. 159). This *a priori* assertion counters the confusion of ethical relativism [we may consider Romantic hermeneutics a prime example] whereby we accept value neutrality as a universal value. In a description applicable to the early work of Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Husserl, Kohlberg criticises the belief of scientific impartiality on the grounds that such a belief confuses the desire to reject an *a priori* definition of morality (in terms of cultural relativism) with the necessity to conclude that morality is culturally relative. This in itself is an ethically relative doctrine since it prejudges morality—hence it cannot be considered impartial. It implicitly moves from a presupposed is to a categorical ought. Moreover, this move is both an error of confusion and an action that undermines the basic tenet—that is, there can be no is from which we derive oughts about questions of morality. It is a solipsistic position. (This understanding can be taken as one which reduces the hermeneutic circle to a vicious one.)[32]

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[32]It is significant to note that both Rawls and Habermas, *mutatis mutandis*, give merit to Kohlberg's position. Habermas relies heavily on Kohlberg in his development of an evolutionary theory (1979, pp. 69-95). As Ricoeur recounts:

> The critique of ideology must be placed, therefore, under the sign of a

Hirsch extricates himself from this apparent solipsism (that certainty is certainly unattainable) with the notion of the "semantic autonomy of language" (p. 165). He does not rest with the "slippery sort of problematic" concerning historicism. While he asserts that "When interpreters construe texts differently, the data they use to support their constructions are to some degree sponsored by those constructions" (p. 165), the qualification of "to some degree" is a fundamental distinction directed against simple relativism. Hirsch considers the autonomy of the text to be a means out of the "imprisonment in a hermeneutic circle" experienced by Romantic hermeneutics—with its empathetic quest for the intentions of the author. If we accept the autonomy of the text, an understanding aided by Ricoeur's concept of translocution, then we may accept an incommensurable set of interpretations, which does not imply accepting relatavism nor arbitrariness.[33]

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[32](cont'd) regulative idea, that of unlimited and unconstrained communication.

> The Kantian emphasis is evident here; the regulative idea is more what ought to be than what is, more anticipation than recollection. (1981, p. 87)

The Kantian position of Rawls has already been introduced. (See the discussion in Chapter One: "Missing Principles of Justice.") The question of solipsism versus regulative ideas—of relativism versus objectivity—is taken up more fully in the discussions of Chapter Five.

[33]Incommensurability has been discussed with great detail and in many disciplines as an issue of the philosophy of science and the sociology of science. The paradigmatic concept popularised from Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1970) is a common rallying point. As Kuhn suggests, 'Scientists' learn "from their problems to see situations....the consequential knowledge of nature acquired while learning the similarity relationship [is] thereafter embodied in a way of viewing physical situations rather than rules or laws" (p. 190):

> Far more clearly than the immediate experience from which they in part derive, operations and measurements are paradigm-determined. Science...selects those [experimental manipulations] relevant to juxtaposition of a paradigm with immediate experience that that paradigm has partially determined. (p. 126)

In another context, in Law and Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory Unger describes how "An adequate understanding of the legal system must account for the way the rule of law ideal is rooted in a peculiar form of social life" (p. 57). The points being made by Kuhn and Unger are analagous to Kaplan's depiction of the "law of the instrument" (1963, pp. 28-29, 277). And Habermas' version is that the "technical cognitive interest" is concerned with "information that expands our power of technical control" (1971, p. 313): "...theories of the empirical sciences disclose reality subject to the constitutive interest in the possible securing and expansion, through information, of feed-back-monitored action" (p. 308). The "constitutive interest" and its self-fulfilling nature is the constructive influence described by Hirsch—at the paradigamatic level. Reviews of this paradigmatic debate from the philosophical side are provided by Bernstein (1983) and Rorty (1979). Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science provides an introduction from that discipline introduced in

Renouncing the Romantic notion of empathetic interpretation relieves us of the "handicap" (Hirsch) of seeking either the authorial intention or the readership's orientation in the original situation. We are set free to pursue "objectively grounded discriminations between conflicting interpretations" (Hirsch, 1971, p. 179). This is not to assert that claims to veracity rely only on the interpreter's sense of conviction arising from her or his biographical, historical, psychological constitution and so on. Validation "has the more ambitious goal of showing not only that an interpretation is legitimate but that its likelihood of being correct is greater than or equal to that of another known hypothesis about the text" (p. 169). Here we have the basic claim that to give "objective sanction" to a particular interpretation is tantamount to providing a "consensus omnium" (p. 170). Hirsch writes:

> While there cannot be any method or model of correct interpretation, there can be a ruthlessly critical process of validation to which many skills and many hands contribute. Just as an individual act of interpretation comprises both a hypothetical and a critical function, so the discipline of interpretation also comprises the having of ideas and the testing of them. At the level of the discipline these two "moments" or episodes can be separated in a way they cannot be in construing a text, for any written interpretation is a hypothesis implying a number of subhypotheses, all of which are open to interpretation. Conflicting interpretations can be subject to scrutiny in the light of relevant evidence and objective conclusions can be reached....The discipline of interpretation is founded, then, not on a methodology of construction but on a logic of validation. The principles of that logic...are essentially the principles which underlie the drawing of objective probability judgements in all domains of thought. The inevitable tendency of those logical principles is away from generalized maxims and

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[33](cont'd) the title (Barnes and Edge, 1983). The CARE group argued the Kuhnian conception ardently (Hamilton, 1976a, 1980b; Hamilton and Parlett, 1976b; MacDonald, 1978; Stenhouse, 1978, 1979b).

Rorty provides a discussion of the hopelessness of "a neutral language of observation" (Kuhn, p. 126). He leaves us with a "struggle against" commensurabilty—one definitive of hermeneutics itself (Bernstein, 1983, p. 198).

The "massive and global fact" (Ricoeur) under consideration is analagous to the condition of our hermeneutic situation (see note no. 12 on pp. 154-155).

> towards an increasing particularity of relevant observations. The proper realm for generalizations in hermeneutics turns out to be the realm of principles, not of methods, for the principles underlying probability judgements require that every practical interpretive problem be solved in its particularity and not in accordance with maxims and approaches which usurp the name of theory. (p. 206)

The similarities with Hart's defeasibility are suggested here. We are concerned with principles of probability judgements and not with sets of methodological standards or procedures. As with defeasibility, we arrive at the likelihood of correctness rather than verification of truth. No alternative hypotheses (undue influences) have defeated the claim to validity, so we may judge the interpretation as probably correct or more correct than not. This judgement is not made, however, on the basis of greater inclusiveness of generalized maxims. The particularity of the actual case is the consideration required for the solution.[34] To Hirsch, validation is a fundamental concern of hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 330). And Ricoeur agrees with Hirsch's suggestion that validation "begins and ends as a guess" (Hirsch, p. 170). Hermeneutical justifications as "guesses...are closer to the logic of probability than a logic of empirical verification" (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 78).

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[34]Hirsch goes on to write:

> Nevertheless, despite its practical concreteness and variability, the root problem of interpretation is always the same—to guess what the author meant. Even though we can never be certain that our interpretive guesses are correct, we know that they **can** be correct and that the goal of interpretation as a discipline is constantly to increase the probability that they are correct. In the earlier chapters of this book, I show that only one interpretive problem can be answered with objectivity: "What, in all probability, did the author mean to convey?" (p. 207)

Taking his own assertion that "principles" and not "maxims" are the foundation of hermeneutics, we may (with Ricoeur) reject this maxim of "only one interpretive problem." Thus, while we may accept Hirsch's overall notion of validity as presented, we need not accept this latter conclusion regarding his belief in the necessary end to this justification. In this way we avoid the rehearsal of the many objections raised with Hirsch presented by David Hoy (1982): "Validity and the Author's Intention: A Critique of E. D. Hirsch's Hermeneutics." Moreover, Ricoeur's central problem for hermeneutics is quite different. The discussion of validity to follow describes this central task in respect to the Habermas-Gadamer debate.

Participants as Final Arbiters?

The construing of a text by the reader always involves guessing as well as the testing of guesses against the text and against relevant information the interpreter brings to the task. In this manner "the very process of construing a text involves validation of a sort" (Hirsch, P. 170). One kind of validation used in case study research was the sort described by the CARE group and appropriated from Robert Stake as "naturalistic generalisation" (1980). A corollary was that notion described by Stephen Kemmis (1980, p. 101) and Barry MacDonald (1977, p. 55) as "vicarious experience."

MacDonald considered this experience "to increase the generalisability of the data" (p. 54). There is a shifting of the responsibility of generalising from the evaluator to the practitioner. As an interpreter, the practitioner makes "educated judgements" following a "horizontal rather than a vertical pattern" from the case to another which is "fully known (i.e. to the one in which he lives)" (p. 55).[35]

With respect to generalisability, Hirsch concludes that the absence of a language of commensurability means that interpretation is not subject to verification. The appropriate criterion is validation: "the wit of man is always devising new guesses and his curiosity is always discerning new relevant information." "In other words, the practical concerns of interpretation are preliminary probability judgements based on past experience" (p. 170). The similarity with defeasibility is qualified only by the fact that the reader is judge, prosecutor and defence counsel. The task is greater, but essentially the same. The reader draws upon other texts, relevant information and synchronicity (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 5), yet the task is to comprehend according to the nature of the case explicated. External sources of the reader's horizon are the references fused with and opened up by the sense of the text. The explication,

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[35]A discussion by John Elliott in "Classroom Research: Science or Common-Sense" deals substantially with this notion. Elliott concludes that "It is therefore teachers and pupils which [as recipients] validate educational research and not the procedures of science" (1978, p. 22). Brugelmann (1974), Walker (1974), and other CARE workers agreed with Elliott, yet they placed much emphasis on the rôle of participants as final arbiters of the case study's veracity. Elliott in his essay, as well as Stenhouse (1978) in "Case Study and Case Records," debate the strength of such participant validation—hence its basis for generalisability. The issues are further described in Kushner and Norris (1981) and Kemmis (1980).

therefore, is not a movement to verify which is to show that a conclusion (comprehension) is true. Rather, the explication serves to validate that a conclusion is probably true on the basis of what is known—the most plausible interpretation available, but not the direct confirmation of certainty. The correctness of an interpretation may be true, yet it can never be known to be achieved. In the absence of known truth we have only "knowledge of the probable" (Hirsch, p. 173).

Hirsch goes on to state, "The basic and necessary assumption of all probability is the uniformity of class" (p. 176). This fundamental axiom implies that all members of the same class will tend to act in the same way. It is necessary to subsume all of the unknown of an interpretation under a known class in order to make a probability judgement. That which we subsume is the "nonce" or the "crux" (we can think of Kuhn's "anomaly" or Ricoeur's "antinomy"). Addressing such essential tensions in the interpretation provides "the basis for our choice of a particular sort of meaning [and is] always our appeal to what we assume we already know about the text" (p. 177). We understand the similarity here with the hermeneutic circle: what the reader posits is "the text as a whole its (posited) intrinsic genre" (p. 178).[36]

To affirm a probability judgement we must narrow the class. That is, we do not move in the direction of accumulating the greatest amount of favourable evidence. We do not withstand defeasibility by asserting a most comprehensive explanation of all known contingencies. Rather, "the evidence of the narrower class is always the more weighty" (p. 185). During times of scientific revolution we have an example, as Kuhn suggests. The better theory is not that which is most comprehensive. It is that which answers the "crux"—the anomaly which has transformed the existing paradigm into a phase of "extraordinary science." Contrary to the popular misconceptions of his notion of paradigms,

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[36]Attempts to describe the hermeneutic circle are: Bernstein, 1983, "The Hermeneutic Circle," pp. 131-139; Gadamer, 1979, pp. 107-108, and 1975, in the section "Prejudices as Conditions of Understanding," pp. 245-273; Habermas, 1977, pp. 343, 362 & 1971, p. 171; Hoy, 1978, p. 90; Ricoeur, 1981, en passim; and Thompson, 1981, p. 59. Also see the quotation from Bernstein which leads off the next section: "Whose Text Is It: A Question of Future Forums," p. 128.

paradigms do not spring Athena-like from the minds of scientists—then go into combat. They develop around the nonce that escapes subsumption. The new paradigm develops around a forthcoming solution to such anomaly. The new paradigm science then becomes a "mopping-up" development (Kuhn). Yet, the comprehensiveness of this new paradigm is not considered with respect to its explanatory power over the previous paradigm's world of facts. There is a new, reigning scientific world view. The previous paradigm is more or less banished with respect to asserting interpretive problems.

"Informed commonsense always follows the logic of probability judgement, since that logic is the foundation of common sense" (Hirsch, p. 188). The grave mistake made in adopting the direction of a quantitative criterion is to assume that the best interpretation makes most traits functional. This direction ignores the fact that "each [interpretation] makes functional different traits" (p. 191). When we consider that the horizon of the reader, when combined with the non-ostensive reference of the text, has such different traits from the original readership or authorial intentions, then we begin to see the acceptability of conflicting interpretations.

In his "reformulation of Ricoeur's interpretation theory," Thompson provides a succinct description of Ricoeur's appropriation of Hirsch—of a "primary focus of Ricoeur's theory of interpretation":

> The eclipse of the event of saying by the meaning of what is said, and the severance of the latter from the intentions of the authorial subject, imply that the objective meaning of a text is something other than the alleged intention of the author. The meaning of the text may be construed as a whole, acknowledging its character as a structured totality irreducible to the sentences of which it is composed. Such a construction is necessarily a guess, and one guess among others; a text contains an inherent plurivocity which enables it to be construed in more ways than one. This feature renders interpretation an open process but it does not hand it over to arbitrariness and caprice. For "it is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretation, to arbitrate between them and to seek

> agreement, even if his agreement remains beyond our immediate reach."[37] To argue for or against an interpretation is to adduce evidence, reasons or examples which show that one interpretation is more or less plausible than some other. It is more a matter of validation than verification, of probability than proof. The interpretation of texts is an argumentative discipline which can avoid scepticism without aspiring to certainty. (1984, p. 180)

The plurivocity of the sense of the text frees us from the quest for the univocity of the author (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 108). We are freed to experience the polysemy of the text.

This explanatory, long detour through sense, reference and meaning (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 143, 193) has been necessary to show that the sense and reference of the text are not the immediacy of the author's voice with which we, as readers, converse. With the meaning of the "referential function of the text" we are able to consider Ricoeur's primary dialectic: "between comprehension and explanation" (p. 333). More specifically, we may dwell with that particular formulation which he interrogates with the notion of alienation juxtaposed to participation: "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation." In the essay of this name, Ricoeur asked the question "What happens to discourse when it passes from speaking to writing" (p. 139)? We have seen this tension in participatory case study evaluation. The "invention of the study" must eventually become the "imagination of the case." The report must be written. What we now must consider is the impact of "This referential function....[which] exceeds the mere ostensive designation of the situation common to both speaker and hearer in the dialogical situation" (p. 333).

Whose Text is It?—A Question of Future Forums

> [The circle of understanding is] object oriented, in the sense that it directs us to the texts, institutions, practices, or forms of life that we are seeking to understand. It directs us to be sensitive to the play between part and whole in the circle of understanding....[We must also make an essential reference] to the interpreter, to the

[37] Thompson quotes Ricoeur (1976, pp. 78-79), where the latter discusses his agreement with Hirsch.

> individual who is engaged in the process of understanding and questioning...he or she must have the insight, imagination, openness, and patience to acquire this art—an art achieved through practice. There is no determinate method for acquiring or pursuing this art, in the sense of explicit rules that are to be followed. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 135)

A question raised concerning the dialectic between participation and the matter of the text was, How shall we understand the future dialogical situations assumed by participants during the release interviews? What future forums were they considering? One sure aspect of this question was the lack of clarity or common reference with respect to the issues of release—there was not a shared understanding of future contextualisations considered by all.

At a conference on "Curriculum as Lived," Walter Werner suggested that an important and analagous ethical point of research turned on such ambiguity of "future forums":

> The ethical point raised here is not that researchers neglect to negotiate permission from teachers on the access to, and the release of, such information (Bath, 1983). Rather, the question is whether these teachers really understand how such data are used beyond the actual research project. After a project is completed, the "academic commercialization" of teachers' lives may continue on for some time through conference papers, journal articles, and books. In this way the researchers make their own gains by using the information for their own purposes and in their own interests. For the teacher, however, initially giving informed consent is problematic because the researcher may not be sure at the time about the nature of future forums in which the information will be displayed and discussed, by whom, where, and for what purposes. (1986, p. 141)

The participants of the participatory case study evaluation will have had an opportunity to read and respond to questions of anonymity in this dissertation. This was a proviso of the informed consent of the study. This procedure, when coupled with the fact that the case study record was "sealed" with the writing of the final draft of the case study, goes some way to answer the concerns expressed above by Werner.

Moreover, the informed consent of participatory case study evaluation continued beyond an initial consent. The rehearsal of the problematic about the destiny of the text was insistent to the point of becoming "too heavy" and "scary" (to quote participants). Indeed, I responded that such was my intent given the uncertainty of future forums. This prejudice was the mainspring of justice-as-control. Given the linguistic turn and the matter of the text, however, we may approach the ethical point raised by Werner as having a differing sense.

Werner describes how researchers render the teachers' lives as information which is then subject to exploitation. The authorial intention of researchers becomes academic commercialization. This particular conception by researchers, which renders research to data and information, was avoided in the present study—leading to discussions of participant understandings, ideas, sentiments and the like. The feeling had been that the term "information" was an instrumentalisation of the dialogue.

My description of release to one participant was as follows:

> I want to confirm with you our dialogue—as it is put in writing. But I give to you the control of whether or not to release these understandings....The "illuminative evaluator"[38] still places herself or himself in the position of the expert who will "illuminate" your programme to you. Similarly, the democratic evaluator is a "broker" of information. The assumption is that "information" lies out there, and all that has to be done is to collect it.

An alternative understanding of the facts would render the case study record a coming to dialogical understandings[39]—which could be and were altered. We may question more radically this consideration of text ("conference papers, journals and books") as data or information.

> What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant: verbal meaning and mental meaning have different destinies....[The implication is that] the matter of the text may escape from the author's restricted intentional horizon, and that the world of the text may explode the world of its author. (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 91)

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[38]Hamilton and Parlett, 1976b; Walker and MacDonald, 1975b.
[39]See the discussion of *Verstandigung* to follow.

The psychological, commercial or other interests of the author may no longer be coincidental with the text's future forums. This is not to say that none of this sense will remain. It is to question the correspondence of the intended profit for the author's career with the meaning of the text to its readers. Surely we cannot deny that researchers spin out their findings. However, to paraphrase Werner, the ethical point raised concerns the correct understanding of the researchers and the participants about the nature of this forum—which may have less to do with intentionality than assumed. This is to question further the "problematic...[that] they may not be sure at the time about the nature of future forums." The question from the participants' perspective seems to be how the facts of their lives will be interpreted— not necessarily used (or abused). This may seem a moot point. But in the participatory case study evaluation, it is not. The matter of the text may take our inquiry to more fundamental questions of the conception of text as in-formation.

The case study record has been sealed with the writing of the case study report. That is, the transcriptions of understandings were to be used in the writing of the case study, but once the participants confirmed this contextualisation—recontextualising if they wished—the remaining case record was no longer accessible. It reverted to confidentiality. Only the case study report remains public knowledge.

Secondly, the participants were asked to release—beyond my dissertation—the transcripts of the taping of our conversations during the participatory case study evaluation release interviews. This was the Justice Case Record: understandings during the interviews about the release of the previous PACCR Case Record.[40] Release to future forums was introduced in the post-case study release letter. I wrote to participants that "This constitutes a broader audience that I ask you to consider." Informed consent had been the preoccupation of the study, much beyond the initial consent. And this insistence continued:

> Would you please seriously consider the principles of anonymity and confidentiality that we have rehearsed. I hope to share some of my interpretation about our notions

[40]In addition to transcripts of the justice case record interviews (about the release of the PACCR case study record), some of the transcribed understandings of the PACCR Case Study Record, itself, were brought forward for further release by participants.

of justice beyond my thesis dissertation. This constitutes a broader audience that I urge you to consider.[41]

Thirdly, participants were afforded the opportunity to read this dissertation and to express any concerns regarding the anonymity of their understandings. (This applied where possible, as three have left the province and the country.)

Finally, the principle of anonymity was applied to third persons as well. No professors, students or staff were named in the report—other than the Chair, as previously decided. The threats to such anonymity were also considered beyond merely eliminating names. We have no "Mr. Green's" or "Ms X's" in the study and no gendered, pronoun references to participants.

Beyond explicit and pertinacious rehearsals of possible future contextualisations, there is a further question. Can we ever act with surety of what these future forums will be, even if we have confirmation (as in the PACCR case study) of the final, participant-released text of the understandings that the researcher will use? What do we effect with our attempt to control future reference? Indeed, given the phenomenon of translocution, is this sought after control futile? What, also, may have effected my acceptance of this technical interest in control? And to what further effect? A participant suggested:

> There is a problem of extracting from a conversation. It [the transcription] isn't linear. Without the context, it may cut off dialogue.

This is precisely the point. The dialogue is cut off with the textualisation— the latter which now has a destiny of its own. The text begins its destiny as written discourse with an unknown readership. This "forum" is that which I was pushing to consider. Future verbal dialogues about the written text are probable. But the world of the written text would seem far more reaching in its scope. We may bury the tapes, destroy the discs and swear to secrecy over the dialogues. Still, the understandings put to paper are no longer within our intentional grasp. We have some recourse, perhaps, to discuss these at conferences (even participants may do so). But with an evaluation, what opportunity will participants have to meet with the

[41]See Appendix Six: "Justice Case Record Release Letter," p. 200.

President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews—to begin a dialogue about the case study report? They can submit independent concerns. But these would be written interpretive responses to the text—not verbal dialogue. Dialogical recourse to the exploded scope of readership of this dissertation is incomprehensible. The dissertation will become a part of the public record accessible to anyone. Yet, are these readers dialogically accessible to participants?

The participant who made the statement above also asked "What does dialogue mean?" The participant said, "I'm still surprised by my ignorance." I share this ignorance. Perhaps some light is added, however, with this new gestalt which renders ownership of the text a diminished concern. That is, with the inclusion of continuing and earnest rehearsal of the principles of anonymity and with the commitment that non-released understandings will remain confidential, to continue the question of ownership of information may be to adhere to an understanding of a linear, temporally immanent and non-differentiated dialogue—to recapitulate an instrumental reasoning. Ricoeur's omnitemporality suggests a differing conception, as does a hermeneutic understanding of the process of participatory case study evaluation.

Chapter IV

REFLECTING ON PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY AS A HERMENEUTIC PROCESS: HERE IT IS ON PAPER

> Dialectic, as the art of asking questions, proves itself only because the person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which involves being able to presence his orientation towards openness. The art of questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, i.e., the art of thinking. It is called 'dialectic,' for it is the art of conducting a real conversation....The first condition of the art of conversation is to ensure that the other person is with us. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330)
>
> [Participant] But you have one-half the dialogue [in these transcripts]. It is strange. Is not dialogue central? You accept a dialogical relationship and then you cut yourself out from this. Is this false objectivity? Here it is on paper?

A. Applicative Understandings of the Transcript Procedure

I present, again, the disturbing experience which resulted from the procedure that presented one-half the dialogue—the transcripts were ostensively only the participants' words. Had I violated the fundamental condition of real conversation? Had I undercut the premise of participation as mutual confirmation? Originally, the tension which I experienced with the case record release format was recorded in my files as a concern of how to answer potential criticism. Why had I chosen to do this—and especially since this same procedure had brought on incredulousness in another research project?[1]

Gadamer stated that the "task of hermeneutics has always been to establish agreement where it had failed to come about or been disturbed in some way" (1975, p. 260). He took this sentiment to the extent that "there would be no hermeneutic task if there were no mutual understanding that had been disturbed" (1976, p. 25). My interest in control had led me to deliberately disturb the mutual understandings of the verbal conversations. I stated that I believed this dissonance simulated the act of distanciation which would occur with the final

[1]This other research was an assignment done for Valery Suransky-Polokow and Ton Beekman for a Critical Phenomenology course.

interpretation. (I called it an anticipation of the "re-contextualisation.") The question remains, Did my transcript procedure reduce the meaning-fulness of the case study record?

The stance that I would take is that the one-sided dialogical transcripts are not—they are not dialogue and they are not one-sided. The verbal dialogue concerning the written case study record continued. Indeed, the conversations about coming to understandings of the case were greatly intensified by the disturbing transcription procedure. Following this suggestion, I answered to a participant about the strangeness of the transcripts:

> The reason that my words are not included is my hope that since we have gone back over these notions a number of times, the context will be understood....We are in a dialogue now. If you feel my words are not there and they are necessary, then they should be there.

The participant came to "understand": "The first context may have no bearing on your final context." Our dialogue had allowed this understanding (which we may consider an understanding of the matter of the text). Yet, was this still a "false objectivity"? "Here it is on paper?"

In his conclusion to a series of lectures on Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Ricoeur interpreted text as a "kind of atemporal object."

> I must admit that I take this anti-historicist trend into account in my own efforts and that I agree with its main presupposition concerning the objectivity of meaning in general....Placed against the dialectic between explanation and understanding or comprehension, the existential concept of distanciation receives an epistemological development. The text—objectified and dehistoricized— becomes the necessary mediation between writer and reader. (1976, p. 91)

Ricoeur's own efforts to countenance the trend above is his affinity with structural analysis. The objectivity of meaning in general is the mainspring of this approach—text, objectified and dehistoricized [that is, 'dehistorisized' in the sense that text becomes rehistorisized when appropriated within the reader's own effective historical consciousness]. Yet, he does not appropriate this epistemological development as a "dogmatic method"—which Hoy asserts

(1978, p. 89). Ironically, to the present discussion of the distinction between verbal dialogue and written discourse, Hoy considers Ricoeur to have "a traditional **linear** account of understanding" (p. 90). To the contrary, it is the distanciation which disrupts such linearity which marks Ricoeur's fundamental departure beyond the "structuralist explication" to which Hoy would reduce his project. That is, Ricoeur rejects the notion presented by Hoy as belonging to Ricoeur—that an "immanent text...does not depend on external references" (p. 91). It is precisely the establishment of the text's referential power (its sense) fusing with the external, non-ostensive reference of the world of readers which marks his distinction of interpretation as comprehension.[2] "Execution" (as understanding) is one side to the dialectic of interpretation. It is a movement by the reader from his or her understandings (external to the text) towards explanation of the sense of the text. "Comprehension," as the other moment of interpretation, moves from explanation to understanding—from a "reconstruction" of the text to its interpretive understanding. Interpretation is the play of this dialectic.[3] Far from independence to external reference, the lost richness of the dialogical situation (once undergoing translocution) may only be revealed as the spirituality of the text in front of the text— that is, as the fusion with the reader's horizon.

The external nature of the text's referential power is that distinction which also separates Ricoeur's theory of discourse from Gadamer's premise of an alienating

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[2]The essential distinction of understanding as a "concept of comprehension" (1979, p. 92)— that is, distanciation as the "epistemological complement" to appropriation— may be understood with Ricoeur's interrogation of the "two movements of understanding" (Thompson 1981, p. 65). Refer to his discussions concerning, "Explanation and Understanding" (1976, pp. 71-88); "The Paradigm of Text-Interpretation" (1977, pp. 327-334); and "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics" (1981, pp. 101-130). See also Thompson's discussion of "Paul Ricoeur and Hermeneutic Phenomenology," especially where he discusses "Explanation and Understanding" (1981, pp. 36-70).

[3]We may consider this reconstruction as a necessarily first positing of a wholistic sense of the text—of its intrinsic genre—which is taken up in the play of interpretation. The ontological aspects of the experience of play were taken up by Gadamer in his discussion of "The Ontology of the Work of Art and its Hermeneutical Significance" (1975, pp. 91-146). Ricoeur especially deals with the theme of play in his central discussion of "Appropriation" (1981, pp. 182-196). Gadamer considers this understanding of play as fundamental to the hermeneutic problem, itself (1975, p. 446)—as does Ricoeur: "For it is in the participation of players in a game that we find the first experience of belonging susceptible to being examined by the philosopher" (p. 117).

distanciation. The negative aspect of Gadamer's conception is revealed in the paradigm case which he develops as aesthetic differentiation (of an alienated spirit). This is juxtaposed by Gadamer to a more authentic, non-differentiated aesthetic ([hence his radical ontological bias] Habermas, 1977b). Ricoeur suggests a differing "productive distanciation" (1981, p. 161)—one which Hoy suggests "conflicts with the spirit of Heidegger's and Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics" (p. 89).[4]

Ricoeur's departure from both dogmatic, structural analysis and radical, ontological hermeneutics leads to his development of an understanding of appropriation as "dialectically linked to the distanciating character of **writing**." "Appropriation is quite the contrary of contemporaneousness and congeniality: it is understanding at and through distance" (1981, p. 143). The directional criterion that Ricoeur is given by Hoy is appropriation dependent on the illusion of an objective beginning for interpretation. We may accept, as Hoy suggests, that Ricoeur differs fundamentally from Gadamer. We may leave off, for the moment, judgements on his illusions.

Gadamer's hermeneutic gesture is clearly different from Ricoeur's where he writes:

> [T]he fusion of the horizon that takes place in the understanding is the proper achievement of language....In other words, we are seeking to approach the mystery of language from the conversation that we ourselves are.
>
> If we seek to examine the hermeneutical phenomenon according to the model of conversation between two persons, the chief thing that these apparently so different situations have in common—the understanding of a text and the understanding that occurs in conversation—is that both are concerned with an object that is placed before them....To reach an understanding with one's partner in a dialogue is not merely a matter of total self-expression and the successful assertion of one's own point of

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[4]The Gadamerian directional criterion is "from the fundamental towards the derived"—as a "descending dialectic" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 89). The similar Heideggerian "obsessive concern with radicality" is the "concern to anchor the circle more deeply than any epistemology [which] prevents the epistemological question from being raised on ontological grounds" (ibid.). This directional criterion is that which Habermas considers Gadamer's "principle flaw." See the discussion of Chapter Five: "Directional Criteria: Participation to What Aim?"

> view, but a transformation into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were. (1975, pp. 340-341)

Ricoeur describes his own project as "most critical" of the tradition in hermeneutics which takes the "dialogical situation as the standard for the hermeneutical operation applied to the text" (1977, p. 328). The dialectic involved in reading and writing has an "irreducibility" to speaking and hearing. It "develops a problematic of its own which is not merely an extension of the speaking/hearing situation constitutive of dialogue" (ibid.). Ricoeur draws the main feature of his own paradigm of text from the status of the text as constituted by its objectivity. This autonomy of the text with its existential concept of distanciation is applicable to our understanding of participatory case study evaluation.

The Praxis of Participation and the Praxis of the Reader

It is revealing that the participant most vehement about the strangeness of the transcript procedure seems to hold to a Gadamerian-like understanding of a dialogically grounded hermeneutics:

> In my way of thinking, to formulate evaluation is to try and see it as discourse in context. In a school context, ideally these discourses would be hermeneutic, dialogical and mutually supported.

This model of conversation between people was the basis for the participant's suspicion that democratic and participatory case study evaluations were tinkering in other dimensions. The participant's own formulation of evaluation, however, often confronted a fundamental problem of "how to put it down on paper." We may take up this problem with earnest, for it allows a focus on the distinction between verbal and written discourse— between participation and the matter of the text. We may understand this distinction as the establishment of the praxis of participation distinguished from the praxis of the reader.

An originative question for research on the principle of justice in participatory case study evaluation was how to involve the participants as final arbiters of the written case study. This intent was originally manifest as justice-as-control. The later interest in control

with the notion of justice-as-confirmation may also be questioned through appropriation of Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics.

The initial concern was to develop better means of allowing participants control over their understandings. The hope was to foster a form of co-research or co-ownership of the invention of the study. This was to dialectically allow participatory imagination of the case. At a meta-level, my initial question was how such implementation revealed understandings of just rôles for participants:

> What understandings of justice are revealed as confirmation of principles and procedures within the bounds of a participatory case study evaluation of the Department of Secondary Education Graduate Studies and Research Programme? ("Departmental Memorandum Regarding Participation," Appendix Two)

The notion of bounding implied an *in situ* focus on the logic-in-use revealed in the concrete experience of the participants (Kaplan, 1963; Aoki and Werner, 1977). This approach was juxtaposed to a second order reconceptualisation or theoretical application (e.g., from theories of justice) applied to understanding—that is, a reconstructed logic (viz. a conceptual dissertation). The notion of situational bounding also lent an air of mutualism to the confirmation (Aoki and Werner, 1977; Aoki, et al., 1977c; Bath, 1986, in press; Maruyama, 1974).[5]

The matter of the text seems to cast doubt upon the possibility of mutualism. At some point the autonomy of the text escapes the finite conditions of the dialogical (mutualistic) situation, the author, the participants, and even the original PACCR/Departmental readership. There is a distanciation which Ricoeur calls the "ontological presupposition" of the reporting in human sciences. The matter of the text is "more than a feeling or a mood, it necessarily implies a taking of distance, which in its turn expresses the destruction of the primordial relation of participation." (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 156). If the participants, in their rôle as final arbiters, are "cut loose" in a referential sense from the destiny of the text, what becomes of the validity claims of the case study report? Does the

[5]Refer also to Chapter One: "Other Evaluation Influences."

validity basis of mutualism or participation cease to have force? Is ostensively grounded veracity transcended?

The hermeneutical function of distanciation need not imply this antinomy between participation and written discourse. There may be a positive dialectic. Yet this is not the conclusion which Ricoeur ascribes to Gadamer. Ricoeur considers a conception of negative distanciation to be "the mainspring of Gadamer's work, namely the opposition between alienating distanciation and belonging" (1981, p. 131). While Ricoeur agrees that the "dominant problematic" is that of the text, his own work "reintroduces a positive...productive notion of distanciation" (p. 131):

> My own interrogation proceeds from this observation. Would it not be appropriate to shift the initial locus of the hermeneutical question to reformulate the question in such a way that a certain dialectic between the experience of belonging and alienating distanciation becomes the mainspring, the key to the inner life, of hermeneutics? (1981, p. 90)

It is by following Ricoeur's shift that the present dissertation question became:

> What are just rôles for participants and evaluators in participatory case study evaluation and how do these effect the validity of the case study report?

The question could be reformulated to ask, What is the relationship between evaluative participation and the world of the report? This inquiry must address the fundamental ethical and justificatory dynamics between participation in the evaluation and comprehension of the case report.

The dialectic of the participatory case study evaluation is, in part, a formulation of that which Ricoeur offers as the movement between the two concepts of guessing and validation—understanding [*Verstehen*] and explanation [*Erklären*] (1973, passim). He draws upon Hart's general theory of validation as "judicial reasoning" (qua defeasibility) and on the Fregean "nature of the referential function of the text....[which] exceeds the mere ostensive designation of the situation common to both speaker and hearer in the dialogical situation"

(p. 333)[6] What Stephen Kemmis referred to as the "imagination of the case" and the "invention of the study" adds to this discussion where he later introduces this dialectic as the "justification of belief" and "belief in justification" (1982, p. 82). For Kemmis, a praxical doing or inventing of the study (the lived situation) provided a basis for justification—yet the justification of belief in the case report was not an appeal to the praxis of the study. It is "the provision of vicarious experience through the [reading] of the experiences encapsulated in the case study report" which provided such reasonableness (1981, p. 101). In other words, this moment of vicarious experience was not a moment of judgement concerning the authenticity of the invention of the study. Reasonableness is a matter involved in the reading of the text. An understanding of how this determination of reasonableness is not depenedent on a critical moment of rationality—to a judgement based on the reasonableness of the praxis presented—will help also to understand a problematic in Rob Walker's assertion that "case studies serve to validate the procedures and the techniques we adopt as well as presenting data, *per se*" (1974, p. 25).

The participants' lived-experience provides a juxtaposition. Participants belong to the study which allows critical understanding. The ability to negotiate, confirm and invent the study provides a coming to common understandings. This shared basis for belief in the justification of the study provides grounds for justifications as to the validity of assertions, procedures, and principles. As a result "What will count as the truth to be told about the programme will depend on the quality of debate" [its coming to language] (Kemmis, 1982, p. 82). These considerations, however, have to do with the telling. The writing and the reading are different. The truth to be ascertained by the reader may not depend on acceptance of the justifications of belief portrayed as this quality of debate.

The previous discussion of Arendt's (1967) factual truth teller is important here:

> A factual truth-teller, in the unlikely case that he would stake his life on a particular fact, would achieve a kind of miscarriage: what would become manifest in this act

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[6]See the discussion above on "Dialogue or Discourse: Sense, Reference and Meaning."

> would be his courage or, perhaps, his stubbornness, but neither the truth of what he has to say nor even his own truthfulness. (1967, p. 121)

Judgements, if at all based on the attestations of participants, involve such avowals only as "transactions"—judgements involve defeasibility dependent on the translocuted sense of the text. To presume to judge the case with reference to the lived, praxical understandings of participants assumes that there can be acceptance of the truth of the case according to judgements concerning epistemological or commensurable criteria for praxis. Such an assumption reduces praxis to *techne*. Walker's assertion that the invention of the study may be validated by the reader's judgments of the imagination of the case confounds these two ways of knowing. Any praxis involving the text must belong to the reader, just as the praxis of the study belongs only to the participants.[7]

The readers of the case study (which also applies to participants as readers) understand in a manner that may be understood by us, as present readers, with a gestalt shift. Whereas the participants begin with a dialogical understanding that transforms with the distanciation of the textualisation of the case study report, the reader begins with a distanciation from the text that ends with a comprehension of the portrayal. This latter appropriation is not accomplished as a result of vicarious experience of the praxis in action: "Appropriation is quite the contrary of contemporaneousness and congeniality: it is understanding at and through distance" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 143). Thus, we are not here concerned with empathetic understanding. Rather, "appropriation no longer has any trace of affective affinity with the intentions of the author" (p. 143)— and we might add, nor with the participation of the concrete situation. Hermeneutic distanciation provides a critical moment similar to the phenomenological *epoche* (p. 116). But (mindful of the Hoy discussion above) this "epistemological complement" is not the idealist reflection associated with the methodology of empirical-analytic sciences—not the judgement of verification according to

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[7]For further discussion of the issues of praxis see: Ball, 1977; Habermas, 1974; and Bernstein, 1983; as well as the discussion of "Praxiology" in the PACCR case study, Appendix Eight, p. 218. For more specific discussions to this issue of praxis and truth see: Aoki, 1984b; Arendt, 1967; Habermas, 1977; Kemmis, 1980, 1982; and Luban, 1979.

the Archemedian Point (the "objective beginning" which is Hoy's criticism of Ricoeur).[3]

"The critical moment can be integrated with the relation of belonging only if distanciation is consubstantial with belonging" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 117). This is to say that our hermeneutic consciousness may realise praxical moments when we dwell with the dialectic between explanation and comprehension—which requires that we resist the dichotomy between theory and practice. When we accept that spoken dialogue and written discourse are distinct interpretive ways of being, then the belonging of the participant and the belonging of the reader are ontologically unique. This is not to say that the reader is to judge the validity of the case from her or his taken-for-granted beliefs in justification. "Hermeneutics similarly begins when, not content to belong to transmitted tradition, we interpret the relation of belonging in order to signify it" (p. 117). Our gesture to the case study report becomes "an intentional movement of consciousness towards meaning." We may not rely on empathetic understanding of the interlocution of the study. "We must place at the very heart of self-understanding that dialectic of objectification and understanding we first perceived at the level of the text....distanciation is the condition of understanding" (p. 144).

Ricoeur wrote: "As readers, we may either remain in a kind of state of suspense as regards any kind of referred to world, or we may actualise the potential non-ostensive reference of the text in a new situation, that of the reader" (1977, p. 333). (We may add to Ricoeur's assertion an implicit qualification of the "critical" reader, conscious of the effective, historical conditions of interpretation.) The justification for belief will come from the reader's own horizon, as this is 'grasped' by the sense of the text. There is an injunction of the text which is the premised sense of the text dialectically evoking the reader's reference to his or her effective-historical consciousness. The reader's own praxical experience of the text becomes the source of belief in justification (a source distinct from the participants' *in situ* experience). This grasping may be a praxical realisation of the potential, referential power of the sense of the case.

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[3]Such a stance was also opposed in the PACCR case study with the rejection of "conventionally justified sets of explanatory categories and a set of standardised procedures" ("Executive Summary," Appendix Eight).

An Originative Participatory Case Study Dialectic

September 18, 1984, I addressed the Self-Study Committee (SSC) of the Department with a first proposal of my study. One of the arguments advanced was to establish the "inviolability" of the final report:

> JUSTIFICATION: To be genuinely dialectical the case study proceeds by assimilating contradictions, disconfirmations and triangulations within new accommodated perspectives. To tamper with the textual construction of the case study (in addition to impinging on the negotiated ethics) reduces the reasonableness. ("An Agenda of Concerns," Appendix One)

With an appropriation of Ricoeur's understanding of productive distanciation, this justification to the SSC seems problematic. What is the rationale for the inviolable reasonableness of the text? Is the concern with impinged upon ethics truly related, dialectically, to the reasonableness of the case? Or does this conception attempt to "encapsulate" (Kemmis) lived situations in written discourse— rather than realising that discourse-as-read and the lived experience of reading are always reconstructions of the text? This line of questioning seems dissonant with common-sensical notions of confidentiality and anonymity. Surely, we all know what it means to be quoted out of context. This, initially, is what the participatory case study evaluation ethic was all about. But what shall we understand by Ricoeur's provocation—that not people but texts are always and existentially quotations out of context? We may take up this paradox by following the suggestion of a participant, who spoke of what I may have affected with my transcript procedure:

> You are providing a new context. The meaning of what they have said will shift. In a hermeneutic sense, this is a new turning.

Productive Distanciation: Quotation out of Context

A participant stated during the clearance of the case study record:

> In writing you have to have more perspective than talking. I would want to qualify some of these phrases. But I'm quite willing to let this statement stand.

The perspective taken by this participant considers the broader context which I had wanted all participants to consider. This allusion to the difference between writing and talking spoke to what we are now considering as the matter of the text (Gadamer) or the world of the work (Ricoeur). The participant's perspective is significant: to let the statement stand. This looks forward to the tension experienced in the study between the perceived future contexts of the text—that is, the antinomy between participation and translocution. The participant would not be standing behind the statement.

The world of most participants when considering release was not the world where textual statements stand on their own [as discussed below]. The play upon the difference between people being quoted out of context, and the text as an existential quotation out of verbal, dialogical context, is an insight into "the shift of the axis of interpretation from the problem of subjectivity to that of the world" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 112). Ricoeur considers "the task of understanding to bring to discourse what is initially given as structure" (p. 93). There is a fundamental difference with this understanding to Gadamer's "clear hermeneutical demand: to understand a text in terms of the specific situation in which it was written" (1975, p. 299). Ricoeur counters such a prejudice with another: hermeneutic interpretation is a "radical" engagement with "the world of possibilities opened up by the text" (1981, p. 112)—and not with the world of its specific situation when written. Yet, Ricoeur's embracing of the world of the text is not simply the semiotic world of structural meaning, which Gadamer considers to produce 'dead meaning.' For Ricoeur, while "semiotics...must replace the **inductive** method by a purely **deductive** procedure" (p. 281), he also asserts that structural analyses are limited if they do not "lead from a surface semantics...to a depth semantics, that of the boundary situations, which constitute the ultimate 'referent'" (1976, p. 87).

This boundary situation is the horizon of the fusion of the sense of the text with the ultimate referent of the reader. The sense of the text, with its non-ostensive reference, has a "destination of discourse as projecting a world"—it is "addressed to someone" who will take it up as an "unprivileged addressee" yet in doing so mark the "spirituality of writing" (1977,

p. 321). Ricoeur can be seen to rehabilitate distanciation by giving the phenomenon "a significance which cannot be reduced to the name of decline which Gadamer tends to give it" (1976, p. 139). Describing the "Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation," Ricoeur writes: "text must be able, from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, to 'decontexualise' itself in such a way that it can 'recontextualise' itself in a new situation—as accomplished, precisely, by an act of reading" (p. 139). The placement of distanciation at the "heart of reference" requires that interpretation not seek understanding "hidden behind the text but to unfold a world in front of the text, ...[authentic understanding] can be instructed by the 'matter of the text'" (p. 94). In short, "if distanciation from oneself is not a fault to be combatted, but rather the condition of possibility of understanding oneself in front of the text, then appropriation is the dialectical counterpart of distanciation" (1981, p. 94).

The discussion of a concern with the matter of the text as "Fixin' things that ain't broke" introduced the topic that the often perceived world of future reference for release was not the world of the text[9]. At first this seemed to do with the world-less-ness of the broken transcripts. As one participant stated: "The portions of our interviews you have selected do not make much sense apart from the remainder of our conversation, but, again, if you think they serve a purpose, feel free to use them." (This was an observation about the justice case record which was released without the benefit of an interview—i.e., by written correspondence.) Another consideration may be that the participant would not have been considering the non-ostensive, referential power of the text. The transcripts did not make much sense apart from the original conversations. This interpretation was referenced to why I had selected, what use I had in mind, and what purposes the sense of the texts might serve. The participant was seeking just those ostensive references to which Ricoeur considers the text autonomous.

The second major distanciation of the study was the matter of the text revealed when I sent out the first draft of the report for confirmation. The lack of response was suggested by one participant as "maybe the lack of your presence." My very presence would have

[9]See the section above: "Experiencing Positive Distanciation."

beckoned a response: "That is what your presence means." My presence would have been "an invitation." The participant concluded:

> But unless you are there, unless the person is committed, there is no invitation to respond. These are two different things—reading/writing and listening/talking.

The dialectic between distanciation and appropriation has reference here. The dialogical situation provides—as our very being in conversation—the pre-sense that provides meaning. We could have the sense of the first draft text, but what is more we would have the richness of the presence of our past, present and future conversations. With reading/writing it is different. Here there must be a commitment by the reader. This is Ricoeur's execution which the art of reading implies. And this may have been the more central problem.

When I tried, pertenaciously, to rehearse "the nuances and subtleties of anonymity," a participant was adamant that there was no problem. "I don't really care" was the final reply. "Am I like all of the others when I say that I don't care?" What ensued was a recognition of some caring—to treat the principles as a game: "It could be fun." "Then we could run around like [in] 'Hollywood Wives'—trying to guess everyone's identities." The care-lessness of the participant may seem matter-of-fact. But we may understand this lack of caring more critically.

The same participant came to this conclusion about not caring with the expressed rationale that "I would stand up in the Graduate Committee meeting and back what I have said." If the participant had expressed an understanding of the broader context, this would be a separate questioning of the care-lessness. Then participant statements like this would have been, perhaps, a disagreement with the provacative gesture of phenomenological hermeneutics (Thompson, 1984, p. 203). Yet, an alternative understanding is that participants did not countenance what was being asked— "what is the big deal?" An exchange over release signifies this understanding:

> I'm not sure how these transcribed statements fit together. Are they sequential? What is the context of the conversation?
>
> [Evaluator]Well, I hope that we have gone over these enough that we recognise the

themes. The headings placed at the beginning of each are emerging themes.[10] When I come to write the first draft, all of these statements will be used devoid of the initial context. So I wanted to clear these as somewhat independent thoughts.

Oh, I see how you are doing it. That's good you did it this way. I can judge how you are going to use them—how you will analyse these in your own interpretation.

The themes were prompts to consider that gave a sense to the thoughts [to posit a Fregean, reconstructed logical understanding]. More importantly, the context of the release interview allowed the exchange whereby the participant came to "see how I was doing it."

The above reading reiterates the coming to understanding already introduced where a participant first saw the procedure as "strange." The expression of disagreement was what I termed a Gadamerian, hermeneutic alternative.

[Evaluator] [The reason that my words are not included (in the case record) is my hope that since we have gone back over these notions a number of times, the context will be understood. Hopefully, when we read back over these the contexts will be remembered.]

I don't understand. Why are you leaving out your words? What is the methodological reason?

[I am writing the case study. My words will be there in how I write or select.]

But you have one-half the dialogue. It is strange. Is not dialogue central? You accept a dialogical relationship and then you cut yourself off from this. Is there a false objectivity? Here it is on paper?

[Since the beginning I have stressed that the final form or context is a central concern. You do not know within which context I will be using these understandings. This is why it is important that we discuss the understandings of issues raised as they stand, isolated.]

Where are the issues?

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[10]It will be recalled that by the time of the release interview each topic had been initially discussed in an interview; discussed from the hand-written log the next day; often taken up in continuing conversation; and now seen in writing. See the description of the many reflections on pp. 65-66.

[Well, we can see here as we read.]

No you can't, because the issues are not here.

[That is why we have gone back and spoken about these as often as three separate times. I cannot write a case study and provide the verbatim transcipts for the people who are to read it. Obviously there must be interpretation and selection—contextualisation. The dialogue becomes changed.]

Well, if that is why you choose. But I don't agree.

[There is a second reason. We are in a dialogue now. As you consider release, if you feel my words are not there and they are necessary to provide a context, then they should be there. By this time I would hope that you and I would know the context of these statements. But you cannot know the final context. And to see your statements alone....]

I understand. The first context may have no bearing on your final context.

[Perhaps. Which is why you will also have access to the first draft.]

So what exactly is the purpose of this release interview?

If the dialogue becomes changed fundamentally, and if the final context may have no bearing [reference] to the first context, then what, indeed, is the purpose of the release interview? Is this mere co-option? Are we to assume that discussions of threats to anonymity are pointless if the dialogue changes— rendering our control a Romantic notion? No. The fact that to the readership the non-ostensive references are broader (than to the Department, PACCR or the University) does not deny that to some of the privileged readers their horizons will evoke the person of the statements contained in the portrayal. Privileged readers share a great deal of the horizon of the participants, many having worked together much of their adult lives. In the (albeit not exclusively nor even predominately) ostensive horizon of the privileged reader which is shared with participants, the principles of confidentiality and anonymity have direct relevance—as they do for the shared, limited release to all other participants in the study.

The overall references of the privileged reader are, nevertheless, not ostensively linked to those of the participants. This is the referential power of the text. As participants we may

seek to control such power, yet the world of the text—its sense as made meaningful (by even the known, privileged reader)—has far more possibilities than we could imagine. The matter is the same. We must consider the text as transcending the ostensive references of conversation, as beyond what we see ourselves standing for in dialogues. An illustration of a way beyond this seeming paradox is suggested from a further consideration of this same interview session.

Trying to understand the purpose of the release—if dialogue is to change in different contexts—the participant asked:

> Are you saying "Do I mind being identified?" Or, are you saying "Do I want this to remain anonymous?"
>
> [Evaluator] [The study accepts the principle of anonymity. While you may feel that you can stand behind this (statement), there are many statements in the study that can be attributed to you if you were identified.]

Herein is a key to the purpose of anonymity, in spite of the referential power of the text. And, paradoxically, because of the referential power of the text. Whether we wish to have specific statements remain anonymous or not may be immaterial, in one sense, to the matter of the text. We could not begin to fathom the referential possibilities with readers. On the other hand, just this world of possibilities requires that (with privileged readers) we maintain anonymity. In unknown contexts we can anticipate the possibility that once identified, we may be thought, erroneously, to have made other statements.

On more than one occasion participant's played the game of "Hollywood Wives" and lost, although they did not know it. Some ventured to ask "That was, 'X,' who said that wasn't it?" The reply had to be "That is confidential." The urge was to play out the game and let them know that they were guessing wrong—without giving the identity. Yet this would be hazardous—"Well then it must be 'Y'!" The referential power of the text is daunting. We can at least not exacerbate the potential consequences to participants. With respect to privileged addressees, to consider a world where we stand up behind our written discourse could include standing up behind someone else's as well. This is the danger, I believe, in not caring about anonymity and confidentiality—especially within a world of the text as

considered by participants to be a continuing dialogical conversation. Ricoeur writes:

> The peculiarity of the literary work, indeed of the work as such, is nevertheless to transcend its own psychological conditions of production and thereby to open itself to an unlimited series of readings, themselves situated in socio-cultural contexts which are different. In short, the work **decontextualises** itself, from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, and is able to **recontextualise** itself differently in the act of reading. It follows that the mediation of the text cannot be treated as an extension of the dialogical situation. For in dialogue, the *vis-à-vis* of discourse is given in advance by the setting itself; with writing, the original addressee is transcended. The work creates an audience, which potentially includes anyone who can read. (1981, p. 91)

The participant who posited my lack of presence as an explanation for the silence of the first draft stated that I did not beckon a response: "That is what your presence in dialogue means." This sense is the same as Ricoeur's above: "the *vis-à-vis* of discourse is given in advance by the setting itself." When the transcripts made no "sense apart from the conversation," perhaps they had decontextualised themselves from the original conversation—that was certainly my (forced?) intention. I am encouraged with such statements from participants that "[I]n the talking it was more clear than the writing"—especially since this understanding came later in the release interview from that same participant who found the "strange" transcripts so disagreeable. Ricoeur wrote that his gesture was "a fundamental upheaval which subordinates the theory of knowledge to ontology" (1981, p. 69). This ontological radicalness is suggested by Ricoeur as the reason that he refers to "the world of the work" (p. 143) where Gadamer suggests "the 'matter of the text'." To the extent that participatory case study evaluation addressed the world of the work, this may have been tinkering in [Ricoeur's] other dimension as one participant stated.

Perhaps the perspective which made it difficult to understand the focus on dissonance (as "where meaning lies") also suggests a difficulty to accept or to want to accept what Ricoeur posits as an abolition to previous reference to a given reality—his fundamental

upheaval. Ricoeur felt that this "dimension" was a "possibility of freeing of a second order reference, which reaches the world...at the level that Husserl designated by the expression *Lebenswelt* [Life-world] and Heidegger by the expression 'being-in-the-world'" (p. 141). In another phrasing, one participant suggested this dimension after reading the case record transcripts:

> And now I know what you mean. When you see it in writing it is different.
>
> [Evaluator] [You mean in terms of anonymity and confidentiality?]
>
> I see how all these things may be—whether anonymous or not.

Both reading/writing and speaking/listening are structures of being within which discourse takes place. These are fundamentally different discourses, hence our need for a distinction between (written) discourse and (verbal) dialogue. Perhaps the participant was more correct than we first understood when stating that the issues were not there, in the transcripts. Perhaps my own language had unintended referential power when I said "Well, we can see here as we read." And perhaps the participants who came to see "how it is different in writing"—"how all these things may be, anonymous or not"—spoke to a more genuine sense of informed consent. This participant then understood just what I meant by anonymity. There is another dimension, a broader context—a different being-in-the-world to consider.

The concerns (discussed previously) which were expressed by Werner about participants possibly not understanding the future forums of research and about evaluators not authentically providing informed consent, were given at a conference concerning "Understanding Curriculum as Lived" (1986). If the phenomenological hermeneutics of Ricoeur is to genuinely apply to curriculum-as-lived, then we must interrogate further the question of whether the world of possibilities of the text is just tinkering in a metaphysical realm or whether the understanding to which some participants came may suggest alternatives for participatory case study evaluation—alternative and alternating ways of coming to understand.

B. Applicative Moments in Evaluation: How Shall We Understand the Roles of Participants and Evaluators?

[Evaluator] [You asked if the locus of control, shifting to the participants, was all there was to justice. There also must be empowering.]

Yes. This is the sense of empowering. I think about what you said, as you gain more information you get into a power relationship.

[Yes. But now (that the first draft is out) I feel powerless.]

We began the discussion of a hermeneutic turn of this inquiry on participatory case study evaluation with the question, What happens to dialogue when it passes from speaking to writing? This question became analagous with the tension between participation and the world of the work. We now may question further the dialectic between these two phenomena. Can we come to understandings of a strengthening of the validity of participatory case study evaluation by virtue of the ethics of the study and of an empowerment for the participants related to the productive distanciation of the text?

The notion of defeasibility introduced from Hart (1948) suggests that the validity of the invention of the participatory case study evaluation is not attainable by an appeal to a standard or set of conditions. Nor, given the world of the work, can it be an appeal to the genuineness of the ostensive conditions of its imagination.[11] Alternative understandings of the questions of validity and empowerment may turn to further understandings of interpretation as praxical and coming to shared understandings as empowerment—that is, the hermeneutical understandings of *Verstehen* and *Verständigung*.

Verständigung and Verstehen

The validity of the case study report was initially premised on a belief that the participants acted as final arbiters of the report. Their continuous inclusion in the invention and imagination of the portrayal was thought to add authenticity and genuineness to that interpretation. Yet the world of the work now suggests this to be presumptuous. The

[11]See the discussion of the "The Praxis of Participation and the Praxis of the Reader."

justifications by the reader (of her or his beliefs in the meaning explicated) could have very little to do with the professed or implied beliefs of participants as written down. What participant motivations might have been is not an attainable textual reference for the reader—once we doubt empathetic understanding. Even if the reader ponders the sense of such convictions, there are numerous taken-for-granted ways to reduce their strength: cognitive dissonance, the Hawthorne effect and coercion are a few extraneous variables. There is a also a hermeneutic suspicion with this explanatory validation. Establishing the locus of belief "behind the text" turns understanding to that which a reader imputes to the intentionality of those "standing up" for their statements. The question of textual validity must seek an alternative understanding if beliefs do not reside behind the text—that is, if beliefs about justification involve the prejudices which we bring to our reading of the text. The critical consciousness of textual validity is effected by the reader's own historicity. He or she is in an unavoidable, hermeneutic situation.[12]

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[12]The hermeneutic situation is taken up most explicitly by Gadamer as the consciousness of the "principle of effective-history" (1975, pp. 267-274). He further discusses the necessity of considering the hermeneutic situation of any interpretation in "language as the medium of hermeneutical experience," (pp. 345-366). Elsewhere, in the discussion of "Hermeneutics as a Practical Philosophy," Gadamer writes:

> The elaboration of the hermeneutic situation, which is the key to methodological interpretation, has a unique element to it. The first guiding insight is to admit of the endlessness of this task. To imagine that one might ever attain full illumination as to his motives or his interests is to imagine something impossible. In spite of this, it remains a legitimate task to clarify what lies at the basis of our interests as far as possible. Only then are we in a position to understand the statements with which we are concerned, precisely insofar as we recognize our own questions in them. (1981, p. 108)

Ricoeur makes a similar point when discussing the task of hermeneutics, given the hermeneutic situation: "In knowledge, we posit objects in front of us; but our feeling of the situation precedes this *vis-à-vis* by placing us in a world" (1981, p. 56). This condition of knowing is the "massive and global fact whereby consciousness, even before its awakening as such, belongs to and depends on that which affects it" (p. 74).

In a note on Gadamer's discussion, Bernstein quotes Gadamer where the latter wrote of the hermeneutic situation as that sense of questioning which is "intended to lead to a new discovery of justice in one's own soul." "This education [i.e., "actual education to participation in the state"]....precisely in extending its questioning behind the supposedly valid traditional moral ideas, is in itself the new experience of justice" (p. 252, n. 62).

For fuller discussions of this insuperable hermeneutic situation (i.e., "the historicality of understanding") see especially Gadamer's "Foundations of a Theory of Hermeneutic Experience," in Truth and Method (1975); Habermas' "The

Addressing first the moment of participation, the empowerment of participants was attempted in an instrumental way with the notion of justice-as-control. Each was given an opportunity to change the case record; to respond to personal statements as used in the first draft; and to alter the justice case record transcripts. Most had an opportunity to read this dissertation and respond with respect to the right to privacy. In itself, participant written feedback on reports is not unusual. Doing so for reason of anonymity and confidentiality is more unique. Coming to understand the reasons for such choices was the added dimension of this dissertation on participatory case study evaluation. This coming to understand can provide a locus for the discussion of empowerment.

Thomas McCarthy posits that hermeneutics, as does communication in general, "turns on the meaning of *Verständigung* and cognate terms" (1978, p. 428). The German words for understanding— *Verständigung* and *Verstehen*—may be adduced as distinctive. The first conception may be thought of as a mutual coming to understanding (as in dialogue). The second term may be considered the understanding of the act of textual interpretation. In Truth and Method, Gadamer avows that "it is the task of hermeneutics to clarify this miracle of understanding, which is not the mysterious communion of souls, but a sharing of common meaning" (p. 260). We may presurmise that his task of clarification is a different understanding than the understanding which is a sharing of common meaning. David Linge provides the German language which reveals these distinctions in his collection of translations of Gadamer's essays, Philosophical Hermenetics: "I am trying to call attention to a common experience....a common understanding [*Verständigung*] always precedes these situations". (1976, p. 7). Habermas is succinct in the denotations where he reviews Truth and Method: "Linguistic understanding [*Sprachverstehen*] is based not upon a purely mutual understanding [*Verständigung*] but also upon a hermeneutic understanding [*Verstehen*] that is articulated when there are disturbances in communication" (1977, p. 339).[13]

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[12](cont'd) Self-Reflection of the Cultural Sciences," in Knowledge and Human Interest (1971); and Ricoeur's "Studies in the History of Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981).

[13]The mediation of dissonances in participatory case study evaluation holds out here.

Habermas elaborated upon this distinction:

> Ordinary languages are incomplete and provide no guarantee for the absence of ambiguity. Consequently, the intersubjectivity of ordinary language communication is always "broken." It exists because consensus [*Einverstandnis*] is in principle possible; and it does not exist because it is in principle necessary to achieve effective communication [*Verständigung*]. Hermeneutic understanding [*Verstehen*] is applied to the points of rupture; it compensates for the brokenness of intersubjectivity. (p. 341)

Habermas' definitions adumbrate McCarthy's proffering that Gadamer uses *Verstehen* to denote an "applicative moment." This understanding also presents the sense of Ricoeur's theory of referential power: "we understand a text to the extent that we make sense of it" (Thompson, 1984, p. 180). Intelligibility as *Verstehen* "involves finding points [moments] of reference in our own situation" [text added].

The understandings distinguished above were evidenced in the participatory case study. A participant stated:

> Once we start to deal with issues in our own context, applying and benefiting, the more we would then demonstrate to our associates in the schools that they could gain that kind of understanding and apply it in their own contexts. For example, the kinds of things you are doing in your study are, in a sense, representative of this philosophy.
>
> [Evaluator] [I think of "con-versation" in the etymological sense of "with-(a turning)." The reason that I chose the word "participatory" to describe this case study approach is that we can come to different understandings ourselves. It is not me coming to you for all the answers.]

The above exchange provides a sense of the distinction addressed. The participant described to me "What you are trying to do in our conversation is to get me to make my taken-for-granted meanings problematic— such as something called 'graduate studies'." The participant understood our task as taking these understandings, then "applying ... that ["philosophical representation"] kind of understanding." We may further add text, as the

participant continued with the question, "How do these observations [*Verstehen*] reveal a certain understanding [*Verständigung*] of the phenomenon"?

I had suggested that I was concerned with "con-versation" in the etymological sense of the word— with-a-turning. My description of participation as bespeaking an approach to the question of "how we come to different understandings" involves a turning which I had yet, hermeneutically, to understand. The senses of understanding offered in these transcriptions of dialogue can point the way to a further, deeper understanding of how "our associates in the schools" [the readers of this study] may "gain that kind of [hermeneutic] understanding and apply it in their own context."

The question of the dialectic between participation and the world of the work was raised where this participant stated that "The more we see people like you and I come together, the more likely we will see the enrichment and mutual understanding of certain phenomena." We were "bothering" so that we could bring about more "effective communication" [to use Habermas' phrase]. But is there another understanding as bothering which, perhaps, does not seek to reach unbroken communication? This is not to deny the existence nor the worth of this kind or that kind of understanding. There is a dialectic.

My approach was overtly not to come together. I wanted to focus on dissonances and threats. One participant acknowledged participation as a commitment for him since it would have been just as easy to say, "Stephen, I don't need your grief—take your problems elsewhere." Similarly, I was given to be "a bit heavy":

> [Evaluator] [The only way that I know how to guarantee control in this concern—over your understandings—is to give you blanket control of release. Therefore, in the beginning, I must make everything confidential.]
>
> I think that your report will gain credibility if you proceed in the manner that you are. People will see that the participants have actually had a hand in accepting, rejecting, advising what is there. You are proceeding in the right way.
>
> I am just saying that the way you come across to me, as an interviewee, is a bit heavy. And I don't know if this is needed at this point. It may be needed later on.

I don't know.

[Yes. Well, that is a choice that I have made. I spoke of the blank cheque and my having to say "Don't trust me."]

[Laughing.] O.K. I won't trust you!

The expression "blank cheque" described the experience where participants didn't "care" about the release of the case study record. Most would have preferred to sign over their understandings. As indicated above, I immediately and continuously tore-up the blank cheques. Release was an on-going questioning.[14]

There is an explicit assumption in these exchanges that the "report will gain credibility" by the procedures of participation. If the readers can see that the participants had a hand in "what is there" in front of them: "You are proceeding in the right way." Perhaps. But what does this mean, to gain credibility by "actually having a hand in accepting, rejecting and advising"? Is there authentic empowerment of participants given the matter of the text, or is this subtle co-option? Can credibility actually be put down on paper, or is this sense of justification dependent solely on the preunderstandings (beliefs in justification) brought to the interpretive task by the reader? One approach to these concerns of validation is to bring to the fore the evaluator's rôle.

Critical Understanding of Non-Intervention

Justice-as-control was believed to limit the "intervention" of the evaluator, allowing participants to share the rôle of final arbiters. I accepted this posture in response to a problem I perceived with the CARE group's approach: "We wanted to report the experience from the perspective of the participants involved" (Simons, 1979, p. 199). I disagreed with the following CARE assumptions: "To try and meet these aspirations we adopted the rôle of the

[14]When the participatory case study evaluation approach was presented at the Alberta Regional Conference of the Canadian Evaluation Society, a member of the audience identified himself as a "professional evaluator" at the question period of the session. He vehemently questioned the ethical problematic. If all participants sign a consent form then that ends the problem. They have consented to any use that the evaluator develops. He could not understand. There just was no problem that he could see.

sympathetic, independent observer who refrains from passing judgement" (Simons, ibid.). The CARE evaluators were given to have simply "edited slightly at the request of interviewees to remove some of the colloquialisms of conversation" (p. 53). (This, also, was the extent of the involvement of participants in contextualisation.) Simons and Humble asserted:

> Those readers looking for an analysis by the authors of the project's merits or demerits, the school's successes and failures, will not find it here. We did not see this as our task. Our purpose as evaluators was to document the experience of innovation from the point of view of those who took part, supplying as much evidence as possible to enable the reader to come to his own decisions about what happened. (1978, p. 53)

My disagreement with this appeal to neutrality was a shared assumption of the CARE Director. Stenhouse insisted that interpretation and analysis are the researcher's *res judicata*: a matter already decided, a case already settled [pun intended]. The evaluators proffered, instead, that their only involvement, other than simply documenting, was to edit out colloquialisms.

A similar stance was suggested in the PACCR evaluation when a participant stated that I could straighten things up a bit when I did the case:

> [Participants] You can see [in these transcripts that] as I am interviewed, I tend to ramble around a bit. I assume when you do your case study you will straighten this up a bit. You are an English [teaching methodology] person.
>
> [Evaluator][How much could I change, then, in the name of literary licence? One could change a lot. Perhaps we need to take the time, now. When we are talking we have more context. We don't have to make the references as clear.]

The CARE account and this participant's do not countenance the fundamental rôle of the evaluator to the establishment of the defeasibility of the case.[15] I can offer my own study as suffering such historicism as well.[16] In the transcription process I referred to a loosely defined notion of bracketing my preconceptions.[17] A participant questioned my approach:

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[15]Refer to the previous discussion of "Hart's 'Defeasibility'."
[16]See the previous discussion of "Hirsch's Concept of Validity" for a description of historicism (p. 119).
[17]See the Case Study "Methodological Background," Appendix Nine, p. 227.#

[Participant] And you thematised?

[Evaluator] [That was quite arbitrary at this stage. It was more a matter of having loose descriptors or key words so that I could later load part-files from my word processor. Speaking of methodology, however, it was quite a struggle for me to produce these transcripts. I finally had to stop trying and to first "finish." That is, I had to bring all of my notes and files up-to-date and more-or-less close off the "case record" stage of my study, before I could feel confident about pulling out significant dialogue. I guess that these terms represent my beginning coalescence. I reviewed everything and then I went back to transcribing—with emerging themes coming to mind.]

Yes, it is important to clean up all of the little facts.

[Yes. "That's the field work out of the way, now I am on to the 'release stage'." It was amazing ....]

How you were suddenly ready for it?

The *naïveté* is alarming. My belief had been that since I resisted explicit reflection on the topics that could be analysed, I had resisted any previous coalescence. I was complacent in my belief that my methodology was sufficient and that the real concerns would arise when I came, later, to the interpretation. I had situated interpretation (being interpretive) within the later discourse. I had not situated discourse (my writing) in my present interpretation (my hermeneutical situation). Of course, I was interpreting all along—as attested in the phrases: "arbitrary descriptors"; "pulling out significant dialogue"; "beginning coalescence"; and "cleaning up all the little facts." Loading part-files indeed. It was simply amazing how these selections came to mind—how I was suddenly ready for them!

The instrumental orientation that I had taken to the principle of justice-as-control had diminished my presence in the study. I could not give away my own interpretive rôle—the blanket of confidentiality only served to obscure the selection that must take place. The *res judicata* of the evaluator is to select, to interpret, to analyse, to have an authentic hand in both the imagination of the case and the invention of the study—inexorably and completely.

at all stages. Yet positivistic, effective-historicity is a formidable opponent. I had initially succumbed in the first draft as well.

The technical approach which I took to the collection of essential tensions (the dissonances) of the case study record resulted in my later perception of brokering these in the first draft writing—just as the CARE group had incorporated this rôle. I was brokering anomalous statements like so much cordwood—stacked side-by-side throughout the first draft. I had adopted a non-interventionist rôle of simply documenting essential tensions, with the belief that "where there is tension, there is commitment and meaning." I believed this then, and this belief maintains. It is my rôle which is questionable, not the brokenness of intersubjectivity. I discussed this problematic with a participant as we met to discuss the first draft.

> [Evaluator] [I must interpret. But by introducing a notion of "non-intervention," I undercut the whole methodology of case study. There is a great incongruity between my initial rhetoric and values and my behaviour.]
>
> [Participant] Right from the word "go" we must interpret as we come into contact. ["The blade cuts everything, but not itself. The eyes see everything, but not themselves." Now I must sit down and be more with this first draft.]
>
> The eyes hear, too. Well, what I see happening is the dissertation taking shape. If you can find moments—I think that there are teachings in your dissertation that need exploration.

There is a danger in participation and observation. The danger lies in the belief that the relationship between these rôles can be switched on and off.

I returned to the first draft and took a more authentic hand in the interpretation—an interpretation already present. I described my re-turning in a letter sent to all participants:

> Having accepted the premise that the evaluator cannot be unobtrusive, in the first draft I seemed to have fallen back on habits of objectivity. My interpretation was not developed. I chose, then I left the dissonances to resound. In the later writing [i.e., the second and final draft], I have attempted to provide for further understanding. I

appreciate a participant's suggestion of an approach by questioning in this regard. (Appendix Five)

The further understanding that I attempted may be considered *Verstehen*: "The real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 13).

Chapter V

AN ALTERNATIVE GESTURE FOR PROGRAMME EVALUATION

If we are to consider the inventing of the participatory case study evaluation as illustrative of coming to understandings [*Verständigung*] and if we are to consider the imagining of the case as a domain of hermeneutic understanding [*Verstehen*] (given the world of the text), then how may we consider the meta-understanding which this present dissertation represents? Is this further hermeneutic understanding, that we reach towards, making evaluation more of what it is? Perhaps this is the justification for tinkering in other evaluation dimensions.

This task of a third, dialectical understanding has been referred to by Berger and Luckmann as "trying to push a bus in which one is riding." These authors felt that the modes of questioning for such understanding did not belong to their "empirical discipline of sociology." "They properly belong to the methodology of the social sciences, an enterprise that belongs to philosophy" (1966, p. 25). We may quote from their own discipline, however, where Mannheim describes the attitude similar to that above as a "bureaucratisation of knowledge":

> ...it is out of the question that a certain analysis should be stopped short once and for all at the most crucial point merely because the recognized domain of a different scientific department allegedly begins there (a mode of procedure typical of the bureaucratised organization of science)....Epistemology would like to be taken for a critical science, where as in fact it represents an underpinning and a justifying sort of knowledge. (1953, p. 227)

I quote Mannheim not so that I may make a flight to the disciplines, away from curriculum and instructional preoccupations, but to break down the mystification of coming to understand curriculum as lived and to assert the need to interrogate our prejudices. One such prejudice places curricular theorising against pedagogical action. I will not attempt to ameliorate this prejudice. But I would hope to find meaning through a dialectic understanding of what some believe to be a dichotomy between theory and practice. In this way, we can understand curricular criticism to be a praxical activity, just as we may rehabilitate evaluation

as an empowerment of participants.

I will draw upon what has gone before as justification for the beliefs presented. The prejudice to be interrogated is the postulate that establishes the necessity of an epistemological complement (viz. the world of the work) (Ricoeur). That is, we may rehabilitate our prejudice against epistemology. The question is not whether we ascribe to a theory of knowledge or not. Rather, in all of education and especially curricular evaluation, epistemology is presenced. Furthermore, such judgements ultimately derive from normative world views.

Beyond the distinction between *Vertständigung* and *Verstehen* is what Gadamer calls an effective-historical consciousness [an effective-*Vertständigung*, if we may mix languages]. Ricoeur describes Gadamer's further understanding as the German *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*, "word for word, the **consciousness of the history of effects**" (1981, p. 61). This is Gadamer's further hermeneutic understanding. Habermas also posits an understanding distinguished from the previous two: "action oriented to reaching agreement [*Vertständigungsorientiert*]" (1979, p. 1). Ricoeur cites the difference in the distinction between these further understandings of Habermas and Gadamer as one of "gesture" (1981, p. 87). What we may suggest in this notion of gesture is a directional criterion that firmly roots understanding in theories of knowledge. The distinctive 'turnings' of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, Habermas' ideology critique and Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics may be applied to our understanding of the rôles of participants, evaluators and readers of participatory case study evaluation.

A. Directional Criteria: Participation to What Aim?

Gadamer turns to an existential radicalisation of *Vertständigung* (1975, p. 89) which Habermas considers to be "the principal flaw in Gadamer's account" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 86). Ricoeur recounts in "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology" that Habermas believes Gadamer to have "ontologised hermeneutics; by that [Habermas] means its insistence on understanding or accord, as if the consensus which preceded us was something constitutive,

something given in being" (p. 339).

> More fundamentally still, does not [Gadamer] anchor the hermeneutic of understanding in an ontology of finitude? Habermas can have nothing but mistrust for what seems to him to be ontological hypostatisation of a rare experience, namely the experience of being preceded in our most felicitous dialogues by an understanding which supports them. (p. 86)

However, Habermas does find "Gadamer's real achievement in the demonstration that hermeneutic understanding is linked with transcendental necessity to the articulation of an action-orienting self-understanding" (1976, p. 351). Yet, it is the direction of such an orientation which separates the two. Habermas disagrees that common understanding is "an ontological constitution, as a milieu within which we move" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 86). He feels that *Vertständigung* "makes possible a form of consent," but this must be future oriented: "a deliberate process of attaining consensus" (Luban, 1979, p. 83). The "possibility of putting an end disturbed understanding" (Habermas, 1977b, p. 337), requires a regulative ideal. In "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," Habermas emphasises that we must look to "rational reconstructions" of the "structures of interaction and forms of moral consciousness" (Habermas, 1979, p. 168). To Habermas, the notions of "participation and consensus" are ideals which suggest "an idealised dialogical situation [which] leads to rational **consensus omnium**" (Ricoeur, p. 93).

Ricoeur concludes his discussion of the two gestures describing "what appeared to be the most formidable difference between the hermeneutical consciousness and the critical consciousness." "The first, we said, is turned towards a *consensus* which precedes us and, in this sense, which exists; the second anticipates a future freedom in the form of a regulative idea which is not reality but an ideal, the ideal of unconstrained communication" (p. 99).

The import of these two apparently conflicting gestures is felt in participatory case study evaluation. We have read where some participants considered the world of the work academic. There was a concern with what, practically, the release interviews were all about. A suggestion was made that the textual concerns were merely tinkering in other dimensions. This

made evaluation less of what it was. A participant stated that "at the epistemological level the notion of evaluation is problematic." In its extreme, the attitude may become a rejection of theoretical endeavours. As one participant suggested:

> Researchers involved in action research do not publish the account of their research. Because, it is purely and simply political action that they are doing. There is no thought of broadcasting or publishing. It is the doing that counts in the situation.

The underlying epistemological argument advanced is to consider reading and writing —or any other form of textualisation—as merely second order considerations or "symbolic constitutions of the social-historical world," what Thompson asserts to be problematic in "Action, Ideology and the Text" (1984, p. 173).[1] As a participant stated, "Without the involvement, where is the dialogue"?

> [Participant] I see dialogue as being action. In the way that your actions will be changed by your reflections. You find out what others think, but also you articulate your own thoughts. There is also the philosophical point of speech acts. The talking is the doing. It is a whole category—a certain category of languaging, which by your saying is the action.

We had been discussing in this conversation quoted above how we might consider awareness as change. The participant seems to have been referring to the illocutionary and perlocutionary

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[1]A fuller extension of the more recent "Habermas-Gadamer debate" (now actually taken up more by other writers) is both beyond the scope of this writing and beyond my present competence. The tension between understandings of action and text is a critical focus. Are these distinct phenomena, or may action be considered text, as Ricoeur advocates? Ricoeur writes in "The Narrative Function" that this dialectic leads us to recognise history as fiction and fiction as history: "there is only a history of the potentialities of the present" and "the world of fiction leads us to the heart of the real world of action" (1983, pp. 295-296). On the other hand, does the acceptance of the epistemological impact of translocution somehow represent the omission of the question of ideology, as Thompson asserts? The future import to participatory case study evaluation is important and an open question, as this tension is directly related to the dialectic between participation and reporting. See the following for discussions of these more recent prolegomena of the debate: Bernstein, 1983; Gadamer, especially "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," 1976; Habermas, 1977b; Jay, 1982; McCarthy, 1978, 1982; Mendelson, 1979; O'Neil, 1976; Ricoeur, 1973, 1986, 1984, 1985, & (especially) 1986; Thompson and Held, 1982; and Thompson, 1984.

forces in speech acts.[2] We may understand the participant to be introducing a tension between speech acts—with "no thought of publishing" ('It is the doing that counts')—against the matter of the text. The assumption seems to be that writing/reading is not doing. The participant was not advocating such a dichotomy, only presenting a certain understanding of action research (one which was nascent in the CARE group [Lawn and Barton, 1981a&b] and which some would have extant in the work of alumni [Gibson, 1985 and Kemmis, 1985]). The participant suggested only that "At some point you have to get beyond the talk." One manner of articulating how to go beyond the talk of dialogue is the provocative theory of discourse that Ricoeur asserts. Thompson describes this gesture as a "direct and imaginative way" (1984, p. 173). Such a description converges on the concept of a directional criterion.

The assertion that all educational activities involve an inexorable theory of knowledge is substantiated by Habermas where he discusses a reconstruction of historical materialism. Habermas asserts that the normative foundations of linguistic communication have a validity basis that is "universal and unavoidable" (1979, p. 177). He maintains that "in engaging in discourse... [*ipso facto*] we have always (already) made, at least implicitly, certain presuppositions, under which alone consensus is possible" [text added]. Re-emphasising the priority of linguisticality in any interpretative endeavor, he posits that our "living being...in the structures of ordinary language communication....[binds us] to the validity claims immanent in speech" (p. 179). Gadamer, as did Habermas, gave priority to the development of our linguisticality as the "mode of awareness of oneself, the inner consciousness of one's own living, in which alone life is experienced" (1975, p. 224). This priority for the development of language was to Habermas subject to "the normative implications which every theory of development has... a directional criterion that makes it possible" to adduce judgements (p. 175).

In his address to the Third International Educational Conference in Heidelberg, 1925, Martin Buber spoke on "The Development of the Creative Powers in the Child." In this address, he introduced a more fundamental instinct beyond the "autonomous instinct of

[2]See note no. 23 of Chapter Three, p. 106.

origination"—that is, beyond the originative instinct to see "a form arise from material." The instinct beyond the originative—that which must be "a **presupposition of education**"— is "the instinct for communion" (1947, p. 114). This is the directional criterion from which the "'creative powers' are to be 'developed'."

Each in her or his turn posits a most fundamental principle. In "The Types of World-View and their Development in the Metaphysical Systems," Dilthey wrote: "To understand life as it is lived is the will of contemporary man" (1976, p. 135). This is the "principle of organisation which is the general principle of life" (p. 141)—the "inwardly-determined pattern of life, which promotes the restless progress of change, I call development" (p. 245).

In his doctoral thesis "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," Mannheim wrote of the *modus exsistendi*: "It is impossible to form a concept without at the same time determining the *modus exsistendi* of the context" (1953, p. 22). Mannheim took espistemology out of the realm of a "special kind of knowledge" and called it methodology. This rendered the theory of knowledge to be the how of methodology. "Methodology seeks but to make explicit in logical terms what is *de facto* going on in living research" (1952, p. 37). How we conduct our research, indeed, how we make sense in our every-day lives, is guided by the inexorable "how" of our beliefs in knowledge that makes judgement possible.

Marcuse, Habermas recounts in "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" (1970), based his social analysis on the phenomenon of "a world 'project'...[borrowing the term from] the language of Sartre's phenomenology" (p. 85).

Frederick Lawrence, the translator of Gadamer's Reason in the Age of Science, describes that "The prejudice, tradition, and authority rehabilitated by Gadamer are all ways of specifying the expressly social and political dimensions of those remote criteria and contexts for moral reflection and judgement" (1981, p. xxvi).

Finally, Ricoeur provides us with Habermas' own directional criterion: "The problem is no longer to reinterpret traditions [as with philosophical hermeneutic] by struggling against alienating distanciation, but to project our future autonomy as the very meaning which we

give to every critical enterprise" (1973, p. 159).

A discussion has been presented which describes Ricoeur's own gesture as departing from a paradigmatic consideration of the hermeneutic task as one of a dialogical situation, when applied to text. The distinction was in part the understanding that Hoy (1982) considered to have placed Ricoeur's hermeneutic gesture in conflict with the spirit of the ontological hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger—this is the objectivity ascribed to Ricoeur's understanding of the the world of the work. This distinction may be further evidenced (to include Habermas) as critical to the development of the projects of these authors, as it relates to the 'linguistic turn' in the social sciences.

The discussion of the dialectic between participation and reporting—between spoken dialogue and written discourse—has suggested that the other evaluation dimensions raised in the participatory case study evaluation are not essentially arbitrary, academic nor theoretical. Rather, the distanciation and judgement which become pronounced in evaluation are implicit in our every-day dialogue as well. The positive distanciation referred to by Ricoeur is part of our inescapable situatedness through language—our hermeneutic situation. The epistemological preview of a directional criterion in evaluation may be considered a paradigm case for all acts of appropriation.

B. The Epistemological Problem of a Critical Moment in Evaluation

Appropriation requires distanciation. As Ricoeur asserts: "Distanciation in all its forms and figures, constitutes *par excellence* the critical moment in understanding" (1981, p. 113). Distanciation is the condition of understanding (p. 144). The concern with a prejudice against such critical understanding is exemplified in the work of the CARE group. The CARE group developed their approach to democratic case study evaluation from certain beliefs about democracy and research, many of which were questioned by critics. The problematic of the CARE workers involved their taken-for-granted notions of such ethical principles and their explicit intention to "rid" themselves of "theorised" understanding (Lawn and Barton, 1980-81; Stenhouse, 1979b). The self-interpretations of the CARE researchers

may have lacked a beginning effective-historical consciousness—as Ricoeur writes: "consciousness of being carried by a tradition which precedes" (1973, p. 156).

Simons wrote:

> In the early days of SAFARI a solution was proposed to the problem of reliability which beset all case studies....Defining reliability first of all in terms of the relation between data and interpretation (not in terms of the adequacy of data as descriptive of reality) the SAFARI claim was that it should be possible for other researchers to reach the same interpretations from the same data. The issue was then by-passed somewhat by the statement that the relationship between the data and the interpretation of the researcher is not critical in SAFARI research because the aim is to present material which is open to multiple interpretations and no claim is made for the researcher's interpretations against those of anyone else. (1977, p. 36)

We may be encouraged by the allusion to multiple interpretations, yet the explicit statement that "the interpretation of the researcher is not critical" is problematic. Without such criticalness, in an ethical sense this position is either ethical relativity at best or cultural relativity at worst.[3]

Whatever the gesture that we take towards interpretation, we must have one. This is a "massive and global fact" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 74).[4] What is by-passed by the SAFARI claim is nothing less than the radicalness of criticism: "the ultimate meaning of the basic philosophical gesture" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 156). The SAFARI aim to discount the interpreter's involvement, in the relation between the data and interpretation, denies the "relation of participation"—without which "there would not exist any relation to the historical as such" (Ricoeur, p. 156). The relation is not only critical; it is the primordial relation which Ricoeur avows to be the dialectical and ontological presupposition of every human science.

I can just as easily set my own study up as the straw-person in this regard. When I was anguishing over having fallen back on habits of objectivity with the first draft, and

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[3]See the discussion on Kohlberg, in the section on "Hirsch's Concept of Validity" (p. 119) and the discussion of the CARE work in Chapter Two.

[4]For discussions of this inexorable hermeneutic situation see note no. 12, Chapter Three, p. 154.

feeling a great loss of control [as previously introduced], I had an interview with a participant. I shared how I felt about having assumed —in the final analysis—a non-interventionist rôle. I was struggling in the conversation to redeem a sense of the dialectic with which I had started out— that is, between the invention and the imagination, the "data and the interpretation" (Simons). The participant stated:

> Somewhere in there is what? Ethics? Justice? I think that the biggest statement you made today is "Where am I in this interpretation"?

Perhaps we may now have a further sense of this conversation. Could I, paradoxically, have experienced a genuine loss from the text, yet not have been authentically present in the interpretation as I should have been? The paradox is one of different understandings. I was involved in the *Vertständigung* of the study, as a participant. I transcribed, then collected instances of coming to understandings, which inexorably involved interpretation. I interpreted [*Verstehen*] in front of the text what sense there may have been in the first draft that had reference to my experience as an evaluator-reader perceiving to have little confirmation.

If this first draft had been a CARE case study; had been compared to the other submissions of the PACCR Secondary Education Review; or had been read next to some of the other departmental PACCR submissons, there would have been no glaring peculiarity. The first draft was intelligible and readable. Nevertheless, my experience of this text, referenced to what I had hoped to accomplish, provided meaning such that I re-turned to re-write. This was interpretive. But where was I then, as now, in this actual written interpretation before the reader? I was not, I am not. The reader has but a text before her or him—only the sense of a non-ostensively referenced interpretation (i.e., not ostensively referenced to the participants' nor my own lived experience of the case). The written discourse speaks for me only in a figurative and misleading sense. It is the reader who must bring the spirituality of the text to life. The more fundamental question then becomes, What is the directional criterion of the sense of the work? This *telos* is not arbitrary nor relative to the reader—only the references struck become inumerable. The sense of the text is limited. Herein, we have Ricoeur's evocation that we must leave off questions of inter-subjectivity to understand the world of

the work. To treat this text as text, and not as autobiographical conversation, provides the epistemological component with which we may become critical of the curricular experience portrayed. In this particular case the focus needs to be with the sense of the dialectic between conversational participation and written textualisation.

It is not to the avowals of the participants, of which I am one, but to the radical critique of the text to which the reader must look for validity. The ethical principles of participatory case study evaluation are essential to the conduct of the study, the lives of the participants and the defeasibility of the informed consent of the case. Yet, it is to curricular, textual criticism that we must turn for judgements of the validity of the report. While we may specifically address the questioning of the directional criteria explicated—those which underlie the beliefs in justifications and justifications of belief portrayed—to do so inexorably brings to the fore the reader's own effective, historical consciousness. As readers, we are thrown into this task of interpreting the case by our own prejudgements.[5]

In the Prolegomenon for any Future Metaphysics, Kant ajudicates that "one principle, namely, the faculty of judging in general, constitut[es] the essence of experience as regards understanding; so that we can be certain that there are no more such principles" (1950, p. 55). To Ricoeur, this matter of a critical moment in hermeneutics is the crux of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer. In his essay on "Editorial Criticism in Curricular Analysis," Werner provides a sense of such "criticism":

> *Krisis*, the Greek root from which the word criticism is derived, means "judgement." This judgement is in the sense of "radical"—"that which is connected with the root" (Latin *radix*). In other words, radical criticism is a judging of the roots or foundations of something. By implication a critic is one who makes a root judgement,

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[5]The previous note regarding the on-going Habermas-Gadamer debate suggests an even greater application of this understanding (see p. 164). That is, if we may consider that historical understanding, itself, requires a consciousness of lived events, appropriated as textual action, then all interpretation (and not just that of written text) requires a critical moment within the dialectic of distanciation and appropriation (comprehension within the movement between explanation and understanding). See Ricoeur, 1973 & 1976 (especially his last chapter on "Explanation and Understanding").

> and a criticism becomes at the same time a judging (in the sense of a process, a method of systematic analysis) and a judgement (in the sense of an end product, a public description) providing a broadened view of some thing or event. (1980, p. 143)

Where Ricoeur interrogates the critical complement between ideology critique and philosophical hermeneutics, this sense of criticalness is present.

Taking up this concern with judgement—with the epistemological problematic of evaluation—we may see that the question of a directional criterion is central to further hermeneutic understanding. Habermas insists that Gadamer's hermeneutic reflection is idealist and has a "residue of Kantianism" (1977, p. 361). Gadamer's retort is that Habermas has idealised a utopian communicative competence. Ricoeur judges this Habermasian regulative idea of an interest in emancipation a "Kantian idea" (1973, p. 159). [Bernstein suggests that Habermas has "qualified his project to disassociate himself from this strong transcendental strain—and with good reason" (1983, p. 185).] Gadamer alludes to Habermas' directional criterion as "pure Romanticism" (1976, p. 136). Habermas posits that Gadamer is "motivated by the conservativism of the first [Burkean] generation" (1977, p. 357). Habermas is "dependent" on transcendental philosophy (Gadamer, ibid.), and Gadamer "has not yet turned against the rationalism of the Eighteenth Century" (Habermas, ibid.).

Ricoeur, for his part, does not try to deny a critical moment. To the contrary, the task of hermeneutics is just this: "how is it possible to introduce a critical moment into a consciousness of belonging which is expressly defined by the rejection of distanciation" (1981, p. 61)? His own gesture to interpretation is firmly rooted in a directional criterion: "the project of a world, the pro-position of a mode of being in the world that the text opens in front of itself by means of its non-ostensive references" (1976, p. 94). Criticism is rooted in front of the text—in the structure of reading and written discourse.

Finally and succinctly, Richard Rorty considers each of these *modus exsistendi* "merely a project"—but a project which has become "the European intellectual's form of life" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 198)—merely discourse situated in a particular structure of being.

The original, directional criterion of the participatory case study evaluation was rooted in the belief that mutualistic procedures and principles would provide a dialectic between the participation in the study and the generalisability from the case. This at first led to an instrumentalisation of this ethic as justice-as-control—an attempt to structure justice as methodological safeguards (to structure being in a particular set of procedures). Furthermore, there was an epistemological understanding that the ethic somehow could be written into the text such that the report became inviolable. The discussions of the participants as final arbiters, in reference to the autonomy of the text, has left this problematic. Similarly, the notion of a non-interventionist rôle for the case study evaluator masks the inevitability of interpretation given our hermeneutic situation. An understanding of participatory case study evaluation as applicative of phenomenological hermeneutics raises the possibility of a rehabilitative gesture towards criticism. There may be a practical approach to evaluation which need not spurn theorised research (as the CARE group is given to advocate, [Lawn and Barton, 1980-81]). The approach which participatory case study evaluation may hold out is one where participation and reporting are considered to be dialectical; where a directional criterion can be posited which seeks just participation (i.e., authentically informed and praxical) and where praxical reading is evoked—where interpretation is suggested to be in front of the text and where the report's *telos* promotes a countenance by the reader of his or her effective, historical consciousness. These aspirations may be encouraged by the gesture of participatory case study evaluation.

C. Gestures for Evaluation: Validity, Confidentiality, Anonymity, and Justice

The instrumentalisation of an ethic of justice-as-control began as an understanding that this ethic could somehow be written into the text such that the final report became inviolable. The discussions of participant arbitration of the validity of the case study report have made this assumption problematic. We have considered the notion of the praxis of the reader as the more efficacious locus for moments of such validation. With respect to the questions of validity, the participation of the case has been escaped by the world of the

report.

"Disturbing" events in the study led to the inquiry which resulted in such beliefs. The suggestion was made that the focus on essential tensions was the *telos* of the research which compelled me to question "What happens to spoken dialogue when it moves to written discourse"? This question then prompted an interrogation of the genuineness of the ethics of participation. Were the principles of confidentiality and anonymity merely co-option, as one participant suggested? Does the matter of the text—the distanciation effected by "putting it down on paper"—make the ethical principles sense-less? The answers are both yes and no.

We saw that to understand the dialectic between participation and the world of the text required different understandings. Coming to understand in the conversations of the study made the ethic purposeful. Participants were empowered by the principles to speak in confidence and anonymity. The ethic had purpose as well with respect to the non-ostensive referential power of the text. At least we could prevent exacerbating risks through procedures which attempted to reduce the possibility of identification. These safe-guarded the possibility of statements becoming erroneously attributed to identified participants. Confirmation of the text provided two counters to this potentially false attribution. Ambiguities in the original statements (which could be anticipated to identify individuals) were rewritten, and references were made anonymous (given the ostensive referential power of the text with privileged readers) or were deleted. Yet, we could not control the ultimate sense made of our understandings. The non-ostensive referential power of the report transcended questions of control—ultimately even with respect to those which participants anticipated towards privileged readers and what such addressees might understand.

Contrary to my expectations the empowerment of participants may not have directly contributed to the validity of the case. If the lesson of distanciation is that the ethic cannot be written into the text, then the lesson of appropriation is that the lived experience of the reader cannot be situated behind the text. The meaning of written discourse must be situated in the act of reading, before the text, as the sense of the text fuses with the references of the reader. Empathetic understanding of the illocutionary force of the conversations in the study is lost to

the reader. The reader must execute the interpretation of validity.

The validity of the case must then be effected by the historicity of the reader. We saw that this need not be considered a negative, alienating distanciation. To be conscious of effective, historical situatedness is to bring ourselves as readers more praxically to the interpretation of the case—to open a more authentic world of possibilities before the text. The proper realm of generalisabilty of an evaluation is to be found in the act of appropriation by the reader. The reader may sense a degree of strength, honesty, commitment or justness of the events of the study as given in the report, yet these qualities are not the reasonableness of the case presented rationally to the reader. Rationality is that which the reader brings to the text—it is not the empathetic understanding of the praxis of the case study's participation.

The reasonableness of the case study report lies with the sense brought to life by the appropriation through critical moments by the reader. The acceptance of the freedom from a notion of empathetic understanding places the evaluative moment within the experience of the reader—a reader who critically understands the *telos* of the text. A participant suggested that my study brought to question "whether teachers really understand how such data are to be used beyond the actual research project." I would turn this question and ask, Is it ever possible that the researcher may really understand how written inquiry is received —beyond the partial understandings gained by having explicit dialogical or written response? This is a question of implementation, evaluation and gestures towards research.[6]

What do we effect with an instrumental understanding that we may control the uses or receptions of evaluation reporting? Do we then try to define our questions to meet the criteria of an idealised, consensual validation of evaluation [e.g., as understood through theories of communicative competence]? Do we situate understanding in the field, the schools or the other worlds of education? Or do we turn our inquiry to a fuller understanding of our lived situatedness as we interpret curriculum and instruction? When we consider evaluation as a problem to be overcome by objectivity, neutrality and methodology, are we establishing a belief in the negative dialectic between participation and observation or data? How does an

[6]As previously suggested, further inquiry may posit this same question for action research if we can consider action as text.

understanding of reflection as alienating distanciation perhaps keep us from a hermeneutic consciousness—from seeing what is questionable in our prejudice against that which is deemed extraneous? Perhaps evaluative reporting may be experienced as the involvement of critical moments by the reader which is not presumed to be nor expected to be merely an application of *a priori* (in-forming) methodological understandings—(i.e., criteria for valid evaluations). The most significant effect of the case study report is that it requires a reader; one who is an educator, one who has a pedagogical commitment to care about evaluation and to bring to life the sense of the report. What this sense will mean, as opened to the reader, will be ostensively tied to the world referenced by her or his own pedagogical commitment and this sense need not be referenced to canons of verification (hopefully will not be—which is my prejudice).

But at some point must we not go beyond reading and writing, just as we have gone beyond talk? Martin Jay found a praxis in the early Frankfurt School, where others found none:

> The life of the mind was becoming the last refuge of revolutionary praxis [during the Nazi oppression]..."Thought itself" [Horkheimer wrote] "is already a sign of resistance, of the effort to allow ourselves no longer to be deceived." (1973, p. 158)

But what of false consciousness? False consciousness lies before the text. The praxis of readers is a critical awareness of the effective, historical consciousness which throws them into interpretation. (There is no praxis when a false consciousness uncritically effects our applicative explanations and appropriated understandings—when we assume a neutral methodological understanding or right reason, which is to choose in a decidedly non-neutral manner.)

Justice is with the reader when the validity of the report is considered. Justice is with a commitment to lay down the instrumental understandings of evaluation. It is a commitment to allow the sense of the portrayal to develop its own *telos* and to interrogate, simultaneously, the prejudices extant in one's own hermeneutic situation as a reader. This is a commitment to understand critically the directional criterion of the text and to be critical of one's own acts of interpretation. "The critical moment can be integrated with the relation of belonging only if

distanciation is consubstantial with belonging" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 117). Synchronistically, these two moments of reconstruction and execution lead to comprehension before the text.

Justice is also with the commitment of the participants. It is their commitment to trust the ethical power of the inventing of the study—to care to become involved in a more radical understanding of how they participate and evaluate their everyday lives. A participant stated "It seems to me that the notion of justice—as it involves you and me and the other—has something there which you can unravel." Ironically, justice may unravel as a non-involvement, given the presented, limited sense of the matter of the text. That is, the work may transcend the ostensive references of participation as it spins out the sense it carries. Yet, a future and more profound understanding of the ontological similarity of action and text (fact and fiction) may rehabilitate the dialectic of participation and reporting. For now the dialectic has an ambiguity which can allow a dichotomous interpretation between dialogue and discourse. But I believe, at least at an ethical level, that participatory case study evaluation reporting has the authentic consent of participants as it is released to its world. Equally as important, participatory case study evaluation allows a more genuine, ethical inclusion of participants with considerations about ostensive referential risks. The participants were involved in extensive and continuous informed consent about the implications of released understandings with reference to privileged readers.

And justice is with the commitment of the evaluator. This is, above all, a commitment to be critical of his or her inexorable, productive distanciation. The evaluator must be explicit about the interpretation at all stages of involvement. The justice of the evaluator's rôle lies in the gesture taken with participants to this task of interpretation. Neutrality is an illusion, as is non-judgmental understanding. Criticalness is only problematic if we make evaluation less of what it is—less than the essential tension between participation and judgement; understanding and explanation.

> [A participant] The conversation must be friendly. This commitment to something beyond ourselves is quite often forgotten in discussions about dialogue. There is a commitment to that which is good. Perhaps there is justice rooted in friendliness. I

don't know. I think so.

The principle of justice in participatory case study evaluation may reside in the quality of reticence. This commitment towards mindfulness of the essential tensions of our hermeneutic situation is often forgotten in the strident gestures of research. There is a commitment to that which is vital to our understanding—yet, an awareness of how consciousness speaks us even as we are consciously thinking and speaking. Perhaps there is justice rooted in this tolerance of our shared, humanly finite coming to understand—our humility in the face of the universal, objective matter of the world of our works. I don't know. I believe that it would be good if we were committed so, especially when we participate as educators and make judgements as evaluators.

The friendliness of participatory case study evaluation inheres in the basic principle that participants have the right to decide both access and release. While the evaluator may lose the use of statements, the gesture is that it would be better to suffer such injury than to give injury. When we ask people to become involved in evaluation, I believe this principle of justice to be the most ethical. That this demeanour may have limited effect on the validation of the study is a separate concern—a concern which, on the other hand, also applies to the lack of bearing on the invalidation of the report. This is to say that the gesture of participatory case study evaluation takes its orientation from the belief that the justifications of the public's right to know over the individual's right to privacy can not be established on epistemological grounds. There are no epistemological justifications for ethical beliefs. The normative domain is pre-emptive—hence, the emancipatory interest must mitigate the critical. We are left with ethical beliefs in justifications for our actions. In this regard, in my own work I will continue to try to bring my prejudices forward.

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Appendix One: An Agenda of Concerns to the Self-Study Committee, September 18, 1984

Agenda of Concerns To inform the Consideration of the Proposal that Stephen Bath Concuct a 'Participatory Case Study' of the Department of Secondary Education Graduate Programme for the PACCR Self-Study Committee.

Interview-Contract Stage

CONSIDERATIONS: The 'principles and procedures' that inform the access and release of information of this study are negotiable. The control of both the conduct and the outcome of the study is shared with the participants: there is mutualistic 'imagination of the case and invention of the study.'

BACKGROUND: This 'method' is essential to protect confidentiality and to provide rationality.

JUSTIFICATION: The 'internal validity' of the case rests on the negotiation of principles and procedures of confidentiality.

IMPLICATIONS: This confidential interviewing may compromise the interviews of the Self-Study Committee members. How do we deal with joint interviewees? Furthermore, how shall we deal with interviewees who reject this 'method' on doctrinaire grounds?

At the Case Study Draft Stages

CONSIDERATIONS: The portrayal of the graduate programme will come from the dialectic between the 'imagination' of what the programme may be and the 'invention' of how the study will be conducted. That is, the portrayal will provide a unique 'instance' of the graduate programme of our Department, not a case of the class of graduate programmes at the University.

BACKGROUND: The definitions of a case study are 'the study of an instance in action' and 'the study of a bounded system' (as mooted by the second Cambridge Conference, December, 1975, titled 'Methods of Case Study in Educational Research and Evaluation'). A case is not tautological, it is intended to inform decision making by providing an instance to be experienced vicariously.

JUSTIFICATION: Case study is a different form of research which cannot utilize *a priori* methodological determinations.

IMPLICATIONS: The Self-Study Committee can have [illegible] limited pre-ordained directives over the study (excluding the direct involvement of members as participants). This implication becomes paramount given consideration #3.

At the Release of the Case Study

CONSIDERATIONS: The case study is a bounded portrayal. The interpretation is wrought from negotiations that make the text all but inviolable.

BACKGROUND: The negotiation of the release of information is contextual. Participants consent to release of specific information as presented in specific contexts. Unilateral reorganization or reinterpretation of the 'data' both violates negotiation and undermines veracity.

JUSTIFICATION: To be genuinely dialectical the case study proceeds by assimilating contradictions, disconfirmations and triangulations within new accommodated perspectives. To tamper with the textual construction of the case study (in addition to impinging on negotiated ethics) reduces its reasonableness.

IMPLICATIONS: The Self-Study Committee may be left with a 'take it or leave it' option, when considering the inclusion of the case study in the over-all review. The 'data' is bound by confidentiality. Indepedent access is unethical and renegotiating at a late date seems infeasible.

The Role of the Self-study Committee

CONSIDERATIONS: The Self-Study Committee (SSC) members will be obliged to safe-guard the confidential information received from the case study worker.

BACKGROUND: The SSC members may also be members of the case study worker's doctoral programme supervisory committee. As part of the 'contract' with participants, the case study worker will acknowledge that he may have to discuss concerns with his committee.[7]

JUSTIFICATION: The doctoral programme exerts its own limitations. While the text concerning participants in the later dissertation is also to be negotiated, the information received by committee members may involve them in a conflict of interest. Furthermore, information used by Committee members in their interviews may inadvertently violate confidentiality.

IMPLICATIONS: Support of this proposal will immerse the joint-Committee members in the ethics of the participatory case study. Obligations may be required.

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[7]This was not the eventual process. Only the Chair was taken into confidence— and this was limited. See the discussion of Chapter Three.

Appendix Two: Departmental Memorandum Regarding Participation, December 6, 1984

I am engaged in a 'participatory case study' of the Graduate Studies Programme of our Department. The finished report is to be submitted to the PACCR Self-Study Committee (SSC). The proposal for this case study was submitted to and discussed by your elected PACCR committee (Drs. T. Carson, K. Jacknicke and T. Kieren) at two meetings in September, 1984. The SSC accepted the proposal. November 6, 1984, the resident graduate students of the Department also accepted this case study as their collective contribution.

The PACCR Self-Study Committee (as well as my Supervisory Committee) recommended that I approach the Departmental Council Graduate Studies Committee to help identify staff participants. November 28, 1984, was the first available meeting to which I could present. At this meeting the Committee suggested: (1) all teaching staff be approached for volunteers, (2) a random sample be chosen, and/or (3) individual members be chosen at my discretion (*vis-à-vis* the methodological criteria of the study).

Participants in the study are either past or present graduate students, inside or outside faculty administrators, or external departmental professors. Approximately 70 hours of case study conversation have revealed many issues. These are presently bound by principles of anonymity and confidentiality. The Graduate Studies Committee, however, discussed general considerations: involvement or non-involvement in the teaching of graduate research and curricular courses; familiarity with colloquium and thesis supervision; status as a professor (to cover the range); and varieties of subject areas and of research orientations. It is neither feasible nor necessary (methodologically) to include all or even most of the staff in this study. The case study will be *a* portrayal of our Graduate Studies Programme, from various perspectives.

Participation in the study would entail several meetings to discuss understandings of the Programme and later meetings to discuss the written release of such understandings. Each participant has control over the release of his or her perceptions. The agreed upon contributions will form the case study report to be submitted to the SSC. The SSC will consider the inclusion of this material (clearing any changes with participants, through a re-cycling of edited material to the participants for confirmation). Finally, the report would go to all Departmental Council members at the retreat, when the final Self-Study Report is to be decided.

If you believe that you could add to the portrayal of the Departmental Graduate Studies Programme; if you wish to take part in the study; or if you wish to discuss the case study further, please place a memo in my letter box. I will contact you for a suitable meeting time.

Sincerely,

Stephen Bath.

Appendix Three: Consent Form

Re.: Involvement in a Case Study of the Department of Secondary Education Graduate Studies Programme

I acknowledge that Stephen Bath, who is a Doctoral Candidate in the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Alberta and with the Department of Secondary Education, has discussed with me, during our interviews, with frankness and in understandable language, the following aspects of his research: (1) the purposes and procedures; (2) the rights of participants (egs., the right to withdraw at any time without penalty, the right to an explicit degree of confidentiality and the right to inquire about his research with his Doctoral Programme Supervisor, Dr. T. Aoki); and (3) the threats to the agreed upon principle of anonymity.

I also acknowledge that I have the right to question the ethical principles and procedures of my participation, and that I have the right to withhold release publicly of any contributions I have made to the case record (i.e., the substance of our confidential interviews).

I consent to participation in this research.

Signature

Date

Appendix Four: First Draft Release Letter, April 3, 1985

Editing of the Participatory Case Study Report of the Graduate Studies Programme of the Department of Secondary Education to be Submitted to the PACCR Self-Study Committee

DEADLINE: Please release this first draft, by APRIL 9, 1985, with your contributions *vis-à-vis* your **own** understandings. That is, please exercise your control over those statements that you recognise as your own (from the "released transcripts"). You may delete or modify such passages.

To review the case study procedures and principles, we have discussed at length the purposes and procedures; the rights of participants and the threats to the agreed upon principles of anonymity and confidentiality. Each participant has had the right to question the ethical principles and procedures of his or her participation, and has had the right to withhold release publicly of any contributions made to the case record (i.e., the substance of our confidential interviews).

During our last interviews, all participants have released to the "first draft stage" a transcript of the understandings confirmed within each dialogue. Throughout our interviews, the understandings have emerged and been discussed recurrently. Each successive interview has seen the distancing of the initial dialogical context, bringing into place a shared understanding of the general context within which the statements may stand. That is, from the initial conversations, the themes have been refined to the point where the participants' statements may now stand on their own. The initial context has been confirmed in dialogue to the point where we now have an understanding of a broader context within which the understandings may be discussed—the broader discussion of the Departmental Graduate Programme.

As I wrote in the introductory statement that each participant received, in my study I interpret a "participatory case study" to be a process that allows confirmation or reciprocal determination of the case by all participants (the 'researcher' and the 'researched'). The release of such understandings has now been confirmed at the early stages of the case study (initial statements released into the broader conversation of the interviews and the release of the transcriptions of understandings). Sufficient context to make such decisions was progressively provided as other participants released confirmations and as the study was 'invented' and the case 'imagined.'

What remains is the first draft stage of the case study. We are now at the stage of the study where the understandings released have acquired a final (in draft) contextualisation. Following the release of this draft, the finished report is to be submitted to the PACCR Self-Study Committee (SSC) by April 15, 1985. I will remind participants that the proposal for this case study was submitted to and discussed by this elected PACCR committee (Drs. T. Carson, K. Jacknicke and T. Kieren) at two meetings in September, 1984. The SSC accepted the proposal. November 6, 1984, the resident graduate students of the Department also accepted this case study as their collective contribution.

In the memorandum circulated to the Departmental staff, I stated:

> Participation in the study would entail several meetings to discuss understandings of the Programme and later meetings to discuss the written release of such understandings. Each participant has control over the release of his or her perceptions. The agreed upon contributions will form the case study report to be submitted to the SSC. The SSC will consider the inclusion of this material (clearing any changes with participants, through a re-cycling of edited material to the participants for confirmation).

The principles and procedures assumed in this statement have been discussed at great length throughout our study. Participants have acknowledged this, formally, in the consent forms. In conversations, almost everyone has made reference to my almost "too heavy" insistence on rehearsing the risks and contextual considerations. I have been frank about my purposes: about my intent to seek out dissonances (in an effort to discern positive tensions) and about the fact that while I have attempted to give the utmost control to participants over their own perceptions or understandings, the final interpretation must be my own.

The control over interpretation does not mean that the released transcriptions can be dealt with out of context. To the contrary, before a final draft may be released, each participant now has the opportunity to identify his or her own perceptions as included in the first draft, and to modify these as he or she desires. This control, however, does not extend to the written treatment of other participant's understandings, nor to the overall interpretation. These auspices must remain within the control of the other participants and of myself.

With these provisions in mind, I extend to you the opportunity to reconfirm or to exert control over the contextualisation of **your** understandings. I would ask you to respond by correcting any misunderstanding or by deleting threats to anonymity contained in the first draft discussion of those statements that you consider to be those which have been confirmed (from the transcripts). If you feel the need to discuss these, please contact me so that we may meet at a time between the fourth and the ninth of April.

The ninth of April must be the deadline for the return of all responses to the first draft. I will need the remaining days to ready the final draft for the SSC. Unless the Committee decides to alter the case study text (in which event we will have to reconfirm any alterations to the edited version), this should be the last input required by you until I begin to write my dissertation.

When the dissertation stage of the research begins, I would ask that we meet one more time to confirm the notions of justice that we discussed during the "release interviews" concerning the transcripts. I will have transcribed these last tapes, and would seek confirmation of the principles discussed. At some point, finally, I will invite you to preview the final thesis, should you so desire. At that time, I would welcome any contributions or reservations that you may suggest.

Sincerely,

Stephen Bath.

Appendix Five: Second Draft Letter, April 22, 1985

Dear Participants,

The Chair of the Self-Study Committee (SSC) has accepted the final copy of the case study for inclusion in the Departmental Retreat 'Package.' This means that we will not have to reconfirm any contextual changes.

I would like to thank you for your considerations of the first draft. I received helpful and insightful responses. You may notice that the tone of the final draft has been altered.

I was under great pressure to meet the SSC deadlines. Also, there were 92 pages of typed participant transcripts, alone. The great number of ideas and the little amount of time meant that the first draft was not sufficiently edited.

Having accepted the premise that the evaluator cannot be unobtrusive, in the first draft I seemed to have fallen back on habits of 'objectivity.' My interpretation was not developed. I chose, but then I left the dissonances to resound. In the later writing I have attempted to provide for further understanding. I appreciate a participant's suggestion of an approach by questioning, in this regard. I am also thankful for the suggestions that more "balance" was needed. The discussions of "essential tensions" have received more numerous qualifications. For example, there is an attempt to compare within larger University and societal contexts.

While Dr. Aoki and I had decided that his identification could enhance understanding, he was "too present" in the first draft (for which I am completely responsible). This has been ameliorated.

You will also notice that I have added an "Executive Summary," "Methodological Introduction" and "Methodological Background" (Appendix One).

I would like to thank you for making this study possible. I hope that you have gained from your participation. And, I hope that the case study and the dissertation remain consistent with the principles and procedures which we have confirmed.

Yours Sincerely,

Stephen Bath.

P.S. I am sorry that the first draft was presented so close to Easter. I hope that this did not provide too much inconvenience.

Appendix Six: Justice Case Record Release Letter, December, 1985

Dear Participants,

I had indicated that I must ask you for one last involvement. I have transcribed those points in our conversations where we spoke of the ethical and methodological aspects of the case study. That is, the transcriptions that I am sending to you are from our discussions of confidentiality, anonymity and justice—as they relate generally to the study and specifically to the release of understandings. May I please ask you to consider these statements for release. I would interpret these in my thesis dissertation and other public writings.

I was torn between wanting to meet with you again (where possible) and not wanting to impose on your time any more than I have. Also, if we met again this would be a sixth time (or more) and such extended contact begins to make the case study approach 'impractical.'

This ambivalence speaks to a central dilemma in my research. The pursual of a 'participatory' or 'mutualistic' approach seems inimical, in certain ways, with the demands and limitations of an institutional milieu. The need for expediency seems a bureaucratic, rather than an ethical, rationale. And the acquiescence to exigence may contradict, somewhat, the commitment to **mutual** sense-making. Yet, such necessity seems compelling at this time.

It is with reservations, therefore, that I must ask you to consider the transcriptions without the benefit of our meeting. Would you please seriously consider the principles of anonymity and confidentiality that we have rehearsed. I hope to share some of my interpretation about our notions of justice beyond my thesis dissertation. This constitutes a broader audience that I urge you to consider.

I thank you in advance for response at your earliest convenience (within two weeks?). If you have any concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me by phone or in person.

Sincerely,
Stephen Bath.

P.S. May I remind you that you may have access to my dissertation, at which time you might want to respond to my interpretations. That is, I will allow an opportunity when copies may be acquired. I am willing to consider how any modifications or additions could be included.

Appendix Seven: Dissertation Letter to Participants, September 21, 1987

Dear Participants, Re.: The Anonymity of Quotations in my Dissertation Draft Concerning Participatory Case Study Evaluation.

It has been many months since I corresponded with you. The last time was when you cleared the transcribed selections from our discussions of the issues of justice—ostensively the moments of our conversations after the evaluation about your reasons to release or not release understandings. Having released the written transcriptions from the confidentiality of our interviews, you may now want to consider, further, the anonymity of such understandings as these appear in my dissertation draft.

I have placed four copies of this draft on two-day reserve in the Education Library. Please ask for "Justice in Evaluation," under my name and with the call number UNC 0082. The copies are at the reserve desk. The task that I ask you to consider is **whether your anonymity has been safe-guarded** in this re-contextualisation of the transcriptions which you have released.

At this time I can alter the draft or delete text to provide anonymity where you judge that there are threats. I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss any specific questions of anonymity or to share any general interest that you might have in the study. Or you may wish to write to me. Either way, if I do not hear form you before October 2, 1987, I will contact you once again, at a later date. Also, I will assume that you do not have any concerns about threats to your anonymity. This would mean that the present inclusion of portions of the text which you previously released may proceed into the final, dissertation draft.

I trust that my efforts to maintain the principle of anonymity have been sufficient, but I ask that you consider assisting in this endeavour. You need not read the entire 250 pages. The appendices contain the case study report (and documentation) which you have already cleared. The first 179 pages are those of the dissertation, *per se*.

I am sorry if you are inconvenienced in any way by the timing of this procedure. I am under pressure of time-lines which relate to the commitments of my Supervisory and Examining Committee as well as the deadlines imposed by the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research regulations.

Should you take up the offer to read the study, I hope that you find it interesting. I enjoyed our coming to understand the Graduate Programme of the Department of Secondary Education during the case study evaluation, and I am grateful for my learning experience with the thesis dissertation concerning our participation in the evaluation.

Yours Sincerely, Stephen Bath.

Appendix Eight: Participatory Case Study Evaluation Report

A. Title Page

A Participatory Case Study of the Graduate Studies

and Research Programme of the Department of Secondary Education

University of Alberta

Submitted to

The Departmental Self-Study Committee

for the

The Review of the Department of Secondary Education

being conducted by

The President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews.

Stephen Bath

Doctoral Candidate

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

Department of Secondary Education

University of Alberta

April 15, 1985

B. Executive Summary

Background

The following case study report is *a* portrayal of the Graduate Studies and Research Programme of the Department of Secondary Education in the University of Alberta. The portrayal is a submission to the President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews (PACCR). The conduct of this evaluation was formally supported by the elected PACCR representatives of the Department of Secondary Education Council—the Self-Study Committee (SSC). Furthermore, the resident graduate students elected to have this study constitute their collective submission.

Issues

This is a "participatory" case study. Some of the issues of this form of research are to be taken up in the "Methodological Introduction." An in-depth exploration of this approach to evaluation will be the subsequent doctoral dissertation of the case study worker. This present report does not provide the suitable forum for such a debate. The assertion is made, however, that rigorous validation of the principles and procedures of this form of evaluation are possible and will be provided in the subsequent thesis dissertation.

The report could be construed, overall, as a discussion of fundamental issues. There is a focus upon dissonances. Incongruity—the seemingly harsh-toned disharmony between intentionality, language and behaviour—provides an awareness that may point the way to fuller understanding. This seeking may not always seem to provide a sufficient dwelling with the present strengths of the Programme.

The Self-Study Committee of the Department and the Thesis Committee of the case study worker made a unique commitment when they allowed a graduate student to provide a major and frank Departmental contribution to the PACCR Review. Coming to this decision raised questions about the appropriateness for the student and the benefit to the Department of such an undertaking. Should a graduate student be given access to probe deeply into Departmental social relationships? Should possible understandings or differences be aired in public? Has this student, or any other, the status to take on such responsibilities? Is it wise for a Department potentially to allow self-exposure in the context of a PACCR review? Do others take such risks—do other departments place such faith in graduate student work?

The professors involved made the decision that the Department's characteristic deportment towards its Graduate Programme demanded such conduct. The student was allowed "access" to explore the Programme, almost as an acid-test. If such a commitment had not been made, this would have said much about the Programme. Similarly, if perceptions of graduate student status in the Department were such that other colleagues would not cooperate with the study, this, too, would reveal much about the commitment of the staff. While other departments may wish to put their "best players forward" (viz. written reports for the review), the Department (as represented by these two committees) decided, instead, to seize upon an opportunity for growth—growth for the student and growth to the Department in its search for a deeper understanding of the commitment to graduate work.

This decision may be at odds with the traditional deportment of departments *vis-à-vis* PACCR. Such a commitment could be seen as a threat to the best interests of the Department (from an expedient perspective). The intentionality expressed, on the other hand, reveals a willingness to take risks in the search for meaningfulness. And the case study takes up this theme. There is an intentional sounding of the "essential tensions" in the Department. These dissonances are explored in an attempt to understand the commitments of the Department. Where there is tension, there must be commitment.

The reader of this study must bear this commitment to self-criticism in mind. Otherwise, there could be a tendency to consider the feelings of tension as negativity. While some may respond to tension with quick judgments—attempting to push away disharmony by ready labelling—the theme of this study is that essential tensions provide moments for deeper understanding.

This portrayal of the Graduate Studies and Research Programme is an interpretation utilising understandings confirmed with 19 participants. The interpretation addresses two dimensions of the Departmental Programme: Curriculum and Instruction. Chapter One of the study explores the dimension of "Curricular Scholarship." Under this heading are discussions of "Departmentalisation"; the "Flight from the Field"; the "Flight into the Disciplines."; the "Emergence of a New Leadership Group"; and "An orientation to Orientations." Chapter Two examines the "Pedagogical Commitment" of the Department. This discussion has a sub-heading: "Praxiology."

Chapter One of the study has two, more in-depth treatments of the Department's curricular scholarship found in Appendix Two: "The Non-Thesis Route" and in Appendix Three: "Essential Tensions." [Appendix One is a "Methodological Background," referred to in the "Methodological Introduction" to follow.] The second chapter on pedagogy has an example developed in Appendix Four: "Criteria for Staff Assignment to the Graduate Programme." The three remaining appendices are methodological references.[1]

Recommendations

Given the purposes of PACCR Reviews, outlined in "Some Comments on Campus Reviews" and in Folio descriptions, the major purpose of this case study is "to inform decision making." The assumption is made that decision makers require first-hand knowledge of the Programme in order to make informed choices. This is the *modus operandi* of "participatory case study," and it is the assumption that underlies the qualification of "*a*" portrayal. The understandings are those of the evaluator and the participants—another group of participants and another evaluator would portray a different "case."

Impicit in the statements of the participants are "visions" or needs to "re-vision" the Graduate Programme. Beyond such implict recommendations, it is not the function of a

[1]These appendices have been re-arranged in the body of this dissertation. Footnotes will provide new references.

portrayal to draw conclusions. The case study worker has attempted to immerse himself (through dialogue) deliberately, reflectively and methodically within the cognitive and affective experiences of the participants. The researcher, as an evaluator and a participant in the Department, has tried to make himself self-aware and self-critical in this process. The necessity of such criticalness has been "up-front" in all proposals, correspondence and conversations within this study. The participants have sanctioned the portrayal via their critical observations and final arbitrations of the interpretations of their own understandings. They have been given an explicit degree of control concerning access to and release of understandings.

Consequences

As a consequence of the intent to portray participant experiences, it is hoped that the decision makers who read this case study will be able to vicariously experience something of the Programme. The measure of the effectiveness of the report will be the reader's ability to sense the Programme in such a manner. Such sense-making should allow generalisation to future contexts within which informed choices are to be made. Such sense-making also requires a sustained awareness, while reading this report, of the tension between the "imagination of the case" and the "invention of the study." The methodological discussion of the participatory case study approach is not ancillary. It is a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of the portrayal that follows.

C. Methodological Introduction

In the publication, "Some Comments on Campus Reviews," the President's Advisory Committee on Campus Reviews described a broad purpose: "In the broad sense the purpose of reviews must surely be to seek ways of serving the public interest as effectively as possible." What do we understand to be "the public interest"? If we consider "the public" to be the plurality of ethnic, racial and socio-economic groups, then the concern becomes the **interests** of varied and various groups. Given the pluralistic actualities of the Canadian political spectrum, such interests are often competing, sometimes inimical and usually not well defined. Furthermore, while we may accept the existence of racial and cultural plurality, what definitions do we bring to ethnicity and what **structural** plurality exists—*vis-à-vis* equal and fair distribution of social advantage?

How, then, is a review or an evaluation to make judgements of "effectiveness" of service (or any other normative appraisal), when the interests to be served may be ambivalent? More specifically, how can the evaluation be just in respect to the possibly competing interests of the programme participants, the reviewers and the decision makers to whom the review is destined? An exegisis may reveal that these three groups, through their evaluative actions, define the "public good" or the "public interests" to be served. Evaluation is a political act that affects the lives of those involved. A "participatory" case study attempts to make this fact a prominent concern in the determination of just principles and procedures

[please see Appendix One: "Methodological Background"].[9]

In this study there were 19 participants: 9 Departmental professors (3 additional professors had to decline involvement because of personal commitments/circumstances); 4 external professors/administrators (one additional professor could not be included because of the lateness of availability); and 6 resident graduate students. A number of Master's level graduate students withdrew after the "informed consent" interviews in light of the frank discussions of threats to anonymity and confidentiality and of possible effects from such threats; some first year graduate students did not feel secure against possible repercussions. It should be added that this was not action based on understandings of the Department, per se. The concerns voiced in the decisions not to become involved were **general** appraisals of the relative powerlessness of graduate students (especially first year) at the University. The students felt that there was enough to contend with just piloting themselves through the tribulations of their programmes, without adding the possibility of being identified while "speaking their minds."

There were 90 conversations in the study comprising 115 hours of dialogue. Each participant was seen an average of 5 times. From the taped conversations, five hand-written log-books were transcribed, resulting in 92 typed, transcript pages of participant understandings.

The reader of this study may pay particular attention to how and when the interpretation by the case study worker (the implicit and explicit description of the study) derives from the presented understandings of the participants (the perceptions of the case). The interpretation of the evaluator and the understandings of the participants are two moments of a dialogue. The "invention of the study" and the "imagination of the case" reveal a reciprocal relationship. To the extent that there is an authentic and genuine relationship between the contextualisation by the writer and the confirmed intentions, language and endeavours of the participants, there will be internal validation [Please refer to Appendix One for a discussion of such "confirmation"].[10] The normative qualifications of "genuine" and "authentic" to the notion of "validation" are deliberate. The assertion of this approach to evaluation is that if one can pass through "epistemological doubt" there may no longer be a "belief in justification" according to "a **conventionally**-justified set of explanatory categories and a set of standardised procedures." In place of these canons from "consensual validation," the case study, *per se*, must provide internal "justification for belief."

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[9]See Appendix Nine, p. 227.
[10]See Appendix Nine.

D. Chapter One: Curricular Scholarship

Departmentalisation

An observation has been made by one of the participants in this case study that academics and administrators outside of the Faculty of Education do not really distinguish between its six Departments. This observation may require the assumption that quite different understandings of the Graduate Programme prevail outside of the Faculty and Department.

Within the Department, one participant expressed a similar assumption as follows:

> Conceptually our Departmental organisation is essentially administrative. The structure of the Faculty is such that people are deterred from coming together. I see only an administrative rationale, not a substantive rationale.
>
> As we come to know who we are as departments, I find the structure more and more meaningless. Yet, this very meaninglessness may allow us to seek the meaning of who we are as a Faculty.

This case study is an attempt to "seek meaning." Beginning with "meaninglessness" implies that this is not an investigation of the "class" of phenomena called "graduate programmes," to which the Secondary Education "case" is to be compared. In light of the Faculty of Education, "Guidelines for the Structure and Function of the Department of Secondary Education," a major purpose of the Department is "to provide an identity for those who constitute it and an expression of common purpose." This case study report is the result of long hours of conversation about such common purposes. Hopefully, it will provide at least one "identity."

The depth of this portrayal, however, may go beyond that customary for a PACCR Review. There is risk, as a participant external to the Department suggested:

> The Unit Review Committee may not understand what it is that you are doing. You would be pushing them to a much deeper analysis....Their criteria do not in any way address a qualitative shift that is distinguishable in the manner that this case study attempts.

Reservations about the possibility of understanding a "qualitative shift" were also extended to the Departmental members. As one Secondary Education professor stated:

> We aren't ready to grow. We don't have a vision. We still have mostly subject area people. We need to re-vision our Department until we get a notion of where we are going. Right now, it is like riding a horse backwards....PACCR isn't going to talk about where we are going. It will probably talk about where we have been.

This case study portrayal speaks to 'where we have been.' However, the hope shared by many of the participants is that it may also allow some reflection on the 'vision' of the Department's Graduate Studies and Research Programme.

To understand the Programme of the Department we can begin outside of Secondary Education. The institutional pressures on the Department may first be explored. Some participants perceive such pressures as competing and perhaps inimical. Others perceive the tensions as an "essential dialectic."

The Flight from the Field

"Boundaries" created by departmentalisation in the Faculty of Education have resulted in developmental restraints and expectations. Departmentalisation has effected the relationship between the Faculty of Education and the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, as well as the relationships of these two Faculties to the Department. Added to these is the effect of the "field" of curriculum and instruction—the school systems, the Governmental agencies, as well the academic/scholarly community. Some feel that the different currents outside the Department may inhibit a proper orientation. Conflicting demands may "create an absence of relating what we study to educational practice."

This concern is especially directed at the departmentalisation in the Faculty of Education and is raised by a participant who is an administrator outside of the Department [an "external participant"]:

> The departmental model has shortcomings for a Faculty of Education—for any professional school. It is easy to separate into specialisations, but integration of activities or of thinking is extremely difficult to achieve.

Another participant expressed a similar concern:

> What do we gain by adding to the word "education"; teacher, secondary or elementary? The 'it' that we are trying to understand is education—the basic question. When we understand the qualifying adjectives do we understand education?

Other "specialisations" or "separations" may be added. The adjectives "graduate" and "undergraduate" are also placed before the "basic question of education." Are these qualitatively different? Can one be thought of in isolation from the other? Can a graduate programme in education remain authentic without an essential relationship with an undergraduate programme?

The departmentalisation of the Faculty may mitigate such questions. As an external participant suggested:

> We have adopted the model of the Faculties of Arts and Sciences. This is the notion of departments and of clearly defined boundaries around these units. A department gets its orientation from the field of study. Education adopted this model, and the departments gradually became sacred areas.

This "adopted" departmental model rests upon certain notions of "theory and practice." From this perspective, some departments within the Faculty of Education become more concerned with the 'basic disciplines' ['theory'] and others become the domain of 'practical application' ['practice']. A participant stated:

> When considering our 'reason for being' as a Faculty, what are the so-called "Basic Departments"? What does "basic" mean? Basic disciplines? Is this the understanding that makes undergraduate education secondary—secondary to the "basic" disciplines of psychology, sociology, philosophy, history, administration, etc.?

Within such an orientation, the 'basic' departments of the Faculty of Education (Administration, Foundations and Psychology) may become more the domains of graduate work—the 'curriculum and instruction' departments of the Faculty (Vocational, Elementary and Secondary) may become more the domains of undergraduate education.

Attempts by some of the members of Secondary Education to 'push the boundaries' of this departmentalisation (perhaps "foundationalism") have been described by the Chair of the Department as a "search for the radical."[11]

> There are a few on Campus sympathetic to our search for the radical—given to a restoring of the fullness of possibilities of understanding in ED C&I. For example, we are trying to get beyond the "method" mental set, the "instrumentalist" rationality to which we have been reduced or to which we have reduced ourselves.
>
> ["Radicalness," in this context, may need qualification. As the Chair suggested:] If the meaning of radicalness is understood as interest in "the root," then I would suggest that the members of other departments ought to be engaged in this form of research as well. However, it would be a misconception of us, if people construed "radical" to mean "leftist."

There may be institutionalised determinations that reduce or lead Department members to reduce the purview of the Department. The Chair articulates these pressures as the two moments of "the flight from the field" and "the flight into the disciplines." These flights may become 'from the undergraduate into the graduate.'

> The Undergraduate Programme is the reason for the coming into being of our Faculty. The Department of Education and Higher Education supported the founding of the Faculty with the notion of supporting teacher education and preparation of teachers. There is a historical primacy of the Undergraduate Programme over the Graduate Programme.
>
> Today, the Graduate Programme and the Undergraduate Programme can be understood within a dialectic. However, there are signs of emphasis on the Graduate Programme—which I interpret as a move towards the flight from the Undergraduate Programme.

The primary concern of the Faculty of Education must be education. "The basic departments are removed somewhat from education and are more concerned with sociology, psychology, etc." This primacy does not mean that Secondary Education is to be only an undergraduate department. Nor does this mean that graduate work in other departments must give way to undergraduate. The suggestion is that graduate studies and research throughout the Faculty must be essentially concerned with the issues arising from undergraduate, teacher preparation and situations experienced in the field of curriculum and instruction. The suggestion is the restoration of the "fullness of research possibilities in ED C&I."

The 'missions' of the Faculty of Education and the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research may be inimical in this regard. The tensions that exist at the University may be similar to those highlighted in a report by Harry Judge: "American Graduate Schools of Education" (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1982, mimeo). In this commissioned report, the British educator made an observation that the "best graduate schools" strive to place a "*cordon sanitaire*" between themselves and undergraduate programmes:

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[11][Footnote form the original report] While all other participants have remained anonymous, the Chair and the case study worker agreed that it may be essential to understanding that he be identified with certain statements. The case study worker hopes that the number and place of such inclusions are sufficiently limited. The Chair expressed some discomfort with the thought that he may be "too present" in the study. This would be counter to his preferred demeanour in the Department.

> Whatever the strengths of their protestations, just as they [the "best" graduate schools of education] influence other schools, so they are directly affected by **general opinion and public prejudice** about the place of the teacher in society and the effectiveness of undergraduate programmes of teacher preparation. True, they have worked to separate themselves from both areas of infection (p. 45). [Emphasis added.]

Among the professors in the Department of Secondary Education, some appear to support such separation. Such a dispositon may encourage the "flight." The "*cordon sanitaire*" seems manifest in attitudes towards the teaching of undergraduate versus graduate courses. As one Departmental participant commented:

> ED CI 352 [an undergraduate introductory course] can be a very interesting and enlightening experience. But a few people don't think that it is worth their time and effort. They prefer to work with the "select few" [graduate students].

This participant felt that an "elitist standard" was operating. This attitude "towards the Undergraduate Programme reveals the attitudes about the Graduate, as well."

Whether or not the **"general opinion and public prejudice"** against teacher preparation and teaching in general are groundless is a separate issue. The situation remains, however, that some educators act as if these were the case.[12]

The belief that a dialectic exists between the Graduate and Undergraduate Programmes implies that the Faculty and the Department cannot avoid dealing with the "place of the teacher in society and the effectiveness of the undergraduate programme of teacher education" [Judge, ibid.]. A Departmental participant stated:

> Graduate Studies in teacher education should say something to the Undergraduate Programme. The Graduate Studies and Research Programme's focus should include the improvement of the Undergraduate Programme. The purpose of the Graduate Programme should be to address teacher preparation.

The attitudes that foster the *cordon sanitaire*; the flights from the field; and the separation of theory from practice may be further explored in consideration of the statement of an external participant: "I would say that a lot of graduate courses are a more sophisticated example of what you see at the undergraduate level." This assertion speaks to a number of essential issues between the Graduate and Undergraduate Programmes. These issues are considered within a discussion of the thesis-route versus the non-thesis (or colloquium) route to a graduate degree in the Department. The theme that underpins this discussion is the "theory/practice" dichotomy.

[For this discussion, please refer to Appendix Two.][13]

The Flight into the Disciplines

The Greek word for "judgement" is *krisis*. This word is also the root of "critical." This sense

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[12][Footnote from the original report] The recent "Minister's Report" on "The Education of Teachers in Alberta" is a case in point. Submissions to this "Model for the Future" were provided by educators on a province-wide scale. The report had a basic premise that "few could disagree that the quality of education...has been under attack." Few were asked if they agreed, however, whether this attack has substantiation in anything other than "general opinion and public prejudice."

[13]See Appendix Ten, p. 231.

of (critical) judgement is the "power of distinguishing." The desire to "search for the radical" [from the Latin *radix* —"root"] is a commitment to a re-orientation that re-turns from the disciplinary notions of 'research.' [14]

> The eagerness to be 'disciplined' has caused curriculum people to go afield—without realising what one does or does not do by going afield. Yet, only a number of people in our Department see this as important. [A participant]

The acceptance of the 'distinction' between 'theory and practice' [please refer to Appendix Two][15] may be a result of going "afield" to the disciplines. In the Department, such uncritical judgements may result in the denigration of undergraduate teacher preparation (the "practical") in favour of graduate studies and research (the "theoretical").

A Departmental professor stated:

> The attitude of some of the staff toward the Undergraduate Programme is that it is an almost demeaning task. We have some senior members on our staff who don't think that they should have to teach courses such as ED CI minors: "I mean, how low can you go?" "I was hired to do other stuff." Teaching an ED CI to minors or ED CI 352 is about as "low" as you can get on the totem pole.

The indication made was that this preferred "other stuff" included educational research and graduate student supervision at the exclusion of undergraduate teacher preparation.

While other staff members may see their teaching in the Undergraduate Programme as very important, the demands of this programme continue to increase while the number of staff decreases. The "flight" to a rationale that elevates the Graduate Programme may seem increasingly attractive. Recent discussions within the University and the Faculty of Education have alluded to such a shifting priority. As one administrative participant relayed:

> The reason for considering the reduction of the Undergraduate in favour of the Graduate Programme is expediency. There are historical reasons to consider such a shift: the maturity of the professors, the declining enrolment in the Undergraduate Programme, the lack of mobility and the teacher demands for life long commitment.

The 'shift' discussed is to require two years of 'liberal arts or sciences' before entering the B. Ed. programme. Ironically, for Secondary Education, the heavy commitment comes during "Phases 2 and 3": these occur typically during the third and fourth years of the undergraduate student's education. And while enrolment may be declining, the commitment of Secondary Education has increased with the institution of the "phases."

The pressures exerted by the "flight rationale" are exacerbated by the demands of the Undergraduate Programme. A Secondary Education professor stated:

> Given the increasing workload of our staff, I'm surprised that we haven't had a number of resignations. The increased pressure of the integrated courses, our inappropriate response to the Faculty's pressure regarding the demands of the Undergraduate Programme, and the loss of one-quarter of the staff have resulted in the staff not having the time to even think about the Graduate Programme.

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[14]This understanding was gained from Werner, 1980, p. 143. See the discussion: "The Epistemological Problem of a Critical Moment in Evaluation," in Chapter Five of the dissertation.

[15]See Appendix Ten.

The feeling of this professor towards the Undergraduate Programme was that of a "shifting burden" with "long-term effects on the members."

Another Departmental participant stated that the pressures exerted by the increase in undergraduate programming, coupled with the decrease in staff, were taken on consciously: "We did this to ourselves." The Department was instrumental in developing the newest changes. "But we have never evaluated the effects." Perhaps the effects can be suggested by a comparison.

Another Education department has, within three or four members, a comparable staff to Secondary Education. Last year the Faculty of Education graduated approximately 1200 undergraduate students. The "Curriculum and Instruction" Departments of Secondary and Elementary Education took the lion's share of this teaching responsibility. Secondary Education lists some 85 undergraduate courses in the University calendar. This other "basic" department lists 5. This Spring and Summer, four sections (during the four sessions) will be offered by this department—this equals one course with one section for each term. At the graduate level, considering both part-time and full-time students, this department has 293 students, while Secondary has 103—approximately one-third. These comparisons add weight to a staff participant's suggestion: "There isn't the necessary time to be with graduate students." The Chair of Secondary Education stated:

> I have tried to keep a dialectic between Grad Studies and Undergrad Studies—trying to have all staff involved in both the Graduate Programme and the Undergraduate Programme. I think that they become stronger professors for having been involved in both, at the same time creating the possibility of improvement in both programmes.

Without such involvement, the concern was expressed that staff may "atrophy."

The possible benefits of involvement in both programmes was expressed by a Departmental participant:

> The thing that works both ways is that it is nice to work with graduate students because they instruct you, as well. But, there are some professors who have been with graduate students so long that undergraduates would instruct them more. It would give them a whole different perspective.

This attitude seems very positive, given the increasing demands outlined above. Two participants external to the Department also pointed to the necessity of a "link" between the two programmes:

> If your Department is composed of 'curriculum people', there ought to be a close link between what they are doing and the field. Secondary Education has been seen as tied more to teacher education. This assumes a tie between undergraduate and graduate teaching. This is necessary if you wish to maintain the "praxical" relationship.
>
> The Secondary, Vocational and Elementary Departments are highly concerned with teacher preparation and particular areas of teaching specialisation. "Basics" don't feel a part of teacher preparation. The responsibility for leadership that concerns the relationship between the "field," the Graduate, and the Undergraduate Programmes has been placed on Secondary and the other Curriculum and Instruction Departments.

Within Secondary Education, however, different opinions prevail. To some, the "close link" is not necessary. One staff participant suggested:

> There are two ways of being in touch—pre-service and in-service. But not all of the people in my graduate courses are teachers. Maybe one-half of them are from Educational Psychology, Nursing, Administration, and other fields. To be in touch with these students means to be in touch with certain other vocations. They may be not so concerned with little kids, but with people who are sick, etc. The orientation that I take is a broader view that takes in counselling, parenting, administration, and so on. So I feel that I'm really in touch with the practice of everyday life in the professions through those kinds of activities.

The suggestion here is that professors may stay "in touch" without necessarily having to be involved in "pre-service" activities.

In a different context, concerning a different rationale, yet also suggesting disagreement with the 'broader orientation' rationale above, the Chair stated:

> Some staff may see the assignment to teaching undergraduate courses as a demotion. In some cases, there is an agreement that the professor's graduate students will take up the undergraduate slack.

This acknowledgement points to the pressures within the Institution that intervene between values, rhetoric and behaviour in the Department. Yet, such tensions can be seen as openings or challenges that may direct the "search for the radical." These issues may reveal a number of "essential tensions," and a fuller discussion is provided in Appendix Three: "Essential Tensions." [16]

The Emergence of a New Leadership Group

> Now there is a new paradigm in ascendency. There is a re-shifting of paradigmatic priority. The previous people feel that they have lost approval—there is a threat of shifting approval.

This word "paradigm," one participant suggested, is becoming a word like "criticalness"—it is a "red flag." One professor suggested an inimical perception of such orientational differences.

> Qualitative and quantitative research are really different ways of seeing the world. Bringing them together is impossible. They are oil and water, they don't mix. Qualitative and quantitative research are radically different. Yet, people don't see this [notion of bringing them together] as a problem.
>
> The quantitative approach lacks a socio-economic or historical-political reconsideration. People don't see that they don't see. They don't see the multiplicity of the world—the complexity of the situation. They don't see themselves involved in the problem. They soon start to live the lie and begin to see the world only from the perspective.

The normative import of this understanding is revealed in the choice of such words as 'lacking', 'not seeing' and 'living the lie.' Another staff member suggested:

> Yes, there are some paradigms that are not suitable and do dichotomise. They don't have much to do with being. These orientations are out of kilter. And when we re-search and question, we begin to try and tie these into values. There is

[16] See Appendix Eleven, p. 235

vulnerability. In this way we risk people saying: "Are you telling me that I've wasted 25 years?" It is a very threatening and resentful experience.

The suggestion that one's orientation may not "have much to do with being" may, understandably, 'stir the soil' [as suggested in Appendix Three].[17]

The shift in orientations to research is associated with the "shifting leadership." This leadership change has been suggested by one participant as Institutional:

> Under normal conditions—in the life of a university —when someone leaves, who has vibrant, mainstream leadership, he or she would be replaced....In normal conditions we would have brought in someone and maintained the level of the "old guard" group....I definitely perceive the shift. I would initially give it a generational explanation; simply an evolutionary thing. The "old guard" has taken a hell of a loss in a very short time. Simply because of hiring restrictions that are in place, you get either a vacuum or a generational gap.

Added to these external "conditions" is a suggested *de facto* research policy in the Faculty which may perpetuate the belief in inimical orientations. The emerging leadership group may be those who question this "policy."

Individualistic Research

An external participant, who is a member of one of the recently formed committees of the Dean of Education, stated:

> At the meeting of the Education Faculty Advisory Committee on Research, the comment was made that this [individualistic research] may be the way things are, but it is not how they should be. There is certainly a range of opinions from: "You can't tell or force people to do research in a certain way," to the statement that: "Leadership in this area is necessary." No doubt the whole range of beliefs is represented in the Faculty.

This same participant suggested that the *de facto* policy of the Faculty of Education, "has been left to highly individualised endeavour....If there is an implicit policy in the Faculty it is that research is individualistic."

A professor-participant from a department other than Secondary Education corroborated this perception about that home department:

> In our Department, we do not have an orientation in the sense of a whole that is larger then the sum of the parts—the professors' individual orientations.
>
> Even if we don't call it a "rift," we have in most departments, essentially: "Do your own thing." If it seems to contradict someone else: "Well there are these tensions."
>
> Each professor has 'x' amount of experience. "And there are no over-arching criteria for curriculum and pedagogy." So you end up with a sort of 'professional courtesy.' "You scratch my back and I'll scratch your back."

The commitment to the search for a "larger" perspective—"the sense of a whole"—deemed absent in this other department, is an explicit orientation of the Chair of Secondary

[17]See Appendix Eleven.

Education.

> The meaning of coming to know or to understand curriculum and instruction as a domain unto itself may mean that the traditional notions of research get in the way....If we see the interest in wholeness of this research orientation, then we have a chance to make sense of what is meant by pursuing, for example, a "quantitative mode of research." If this interest in wholeness is missing, researchers may not realise the fixedness of research problems.

This orientation to Graduate Studies and Research can become the commitment by students "to explore again previous understandings." The commitment is to "re-searching."

A professor that is an external participant has stated that this orientation towards wholeness entails "a personal commitment as a human being."

> As an outsider, I see Secondary Education, since Ted Aoki arrived, as the leading edge of any Department in the University. Secondary Education is the only Department that is trying to orient to a phenomenological basis for research.
>
> From a historical point of view, no other department could claim to promote the premise of involving the student in terms of his or her subjective concerns. Others may encourage students to research their "own problems," but this approach stems from some aspect of a professional creed or genesis and not from a concern with the subjective—in a personal sense. The students may have chosen the problem, but the problems do not entail a personal commitment as a human being. This commitment is to bring their motivations to bear on what they do.

Other orientations to research may represent a "professional creed," that has less to do "with being" in a subjective or personal manner. The use of the word "creed" suggests taken-for-grantedness— that "exploring again" or "re-searching" is not done by the graduate students nor evidenced in the professors' orientation to these students.

In Secondary Education, one staff participant suggested, "people would resent the labelling of the Department as phenomenological." The feeling would be that, "no one person should be able to articulate the Programme vision for us." Another staff member suggested the need for different (yet equal) orientations:

> When you achieve membership in the organisation, you bring with you a total set of credentials that are not questioned. So, you are not going to have diversity or camps that are based on the research philosophy, because you bring with you a level of **competence** or you wouldn't be here. You have **proven** in your own work and expertise that you are well recognised in your subject area....people will be equally competent and equally recognised in their fields. They are all different, but they are all recognised in that they are proven in methods of research. So I wouldn't at all question...or say, "Your research methods are baloney." "This is the only way to do it—this is the way that I was taught." That would not be acceptable.

Set beside the belief in unquestioned competence in research method, is the suggestion by another staff member that the Departmental curricular courses lead to questioning of "essential things— not only of my research but of my life."

> This question[ing] goes far beyond the 'concept' of curriculum. No wonder there is friction among the staff. It is threatening, when you get at vulnerabilities. Graduate students begin asking questions which may change me as an advisor, as a professor, in

my different rôles in the Department.

Is the assumed expertise of the staff—the unquestioned credentials—being called into question? And, could this also be a source of the perceived "tension"? The Chair stated:

> How is a "flight from the field" necessary to flesh out our own opening....to get at the meaning of what it means to be scholarly in a particular discipline? Is what this calls for directly relevant to what we do in the curriculum and instruction field? What does it mean to be scholarly in **our** domain in a **curricular** department? This question needs to be raised.

This questioning of research methods is not seen as unacceptable. To the contrary, exploring again what it means to be scholarly is "a healthy re-definition of research." What becomes a central question, given the wholistic/individualistic tension, is whether the assumption of "proven methods of research" reveals complacency. On the other hand, does a belief in the necessity of a search for a deeper ground for **all** research *ipso facto* raise the question of the validity of certain claims to "proven work"?

An Orientation to Orientations

An external participant asked, "to what extent does the group [in Secondary Education] share a critical orientation?" A second external participant asked: "Is the Department radical, or is Ted?" And a third asked: "To what extent have we [in the Faculty] provided adequate curriculum—curriculum that directly relates and contributes to the activities that go on between the teacher and the learner?" The suggestion was made by the first of these participants that:

> Dr. Aoki is somewhat unique in this regard. He has said that: "This is the orientation toward which we should be moving—to which I give leadership." I know that he has not excluded others, however.

Another of the participants above suggested that Secondary Education is seen as having a "prominent rôle" in the efforts to make knowledge problematic. The intention is "to shift what might be the controlling element or perspective in education." The theme that seems to underlie all of these questions and concerns is paradoxical. Can one be committed to the search for alternatives without denigrating the established traditions?

One of the statements above suggests that the Chair does not exclude other perspectives. This same participant recommended that:

> The use of "alternatives" to describe the different research orientations perhaps reinforces one approach. The use of "different" approaches would be better.

In this regard, the Chair has stated:

> Some may wish to use a word other than "alternative," so that there is no suggestion of one strong tradition. But, if we look at the theses from our Department, there is no doubt a tradition of empirical/analytic research. The question is: Is there room for other forms of research?
>
> Identifying "the traditional" does not set up an "either/or" relationship. What we need to explore is the dialectic between tradition and its ground. I feel there should be an effort to question the qualitative/quantitative distinction—which may get in the way of surfacing the real issues.

The broader perspective offered is admittedly 'biased.'

> My bias is to search out alternatives but not merely as alternatives. The search should be for the deeper ground on which we stand, deeper perhaps than the ground of traditional research. It is depth I seek.

Some of the Secondary staff may not consider this questioning of "proven methods" to be tolerant. As one professor paraphrased the feelings:

> [U]nless you are doing phenomenological research, the feeling is that you are not doing 'real' research. Unless you get into the 'life-world' business your research is suspect. Your research is considered only part of the "instrumental world" and at a lower level of approval, acceptance and quality.

This sentiment was reinforced by another who stated: "There is a feeling that one type of research is better than another." "You are looked down on if your students do a certain kind of research."

The suggestion of bias is a sensitive and difficult issue. A perception was offered that the confounding of the rôles of administrator and scholar belies "fair treatment." There may be a cross over between "political control and value." An external administrator-participant has suggested:

> In education it is not usual that the Chair gives leadership in the orientation to research. Chairpersons are not required to be leaders in defining research.
>
> I suppose that the job requires that the Chair promotes, facilitates and ensures that research takes place, but the definition and exemplification has never been a necessary emphasis in the rôle.

In the Faculty of Education, "Guidelines Concerning the Structure and Function of the Department of Secondary Education," the Chair is directed to assume "the provision of leadership to staff members" and to assume "the provision of guidance and direction for both students and staff in Secondary Education."

Some of the concern with the "guidance and direction" has been the suggestion that "provisions" or "procedures are a mystery." The staff member who suggested a mystery also stated that: "It is not clear to me what we in the Department look for in those who are to get involved in graduate studies."

> What is the underlying basic principle? What are we trying to see accomplished? We do not have to agree, but we should have a common understanding of how we see our Graduate Programme.
>
> Educational Administration has it written out very clearly. They have defined the rôles of the graduate programme: knowledge areas; some skills, attitudes and strategies; knowledge of the past; a sense of the future and a philosophy.

This participant also suggested that a lack of understanding may contribute to what was believed to be non-specific criteria for the selection and promotion of staff into the Graduate Programme. For a fuller discussion of the concern with "Criteria" for promotion and development in the Graduate Programme, see Appendix Four: "Criteria for Staff Assignment to the Graduate Programme."[11]

The dissonances revealed in the discussion of curricular scholarship are not unique to the Graduate Programme of Secondary Education. The participant who spoke of the

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[11]See Appendix Twelve, p. 239.

discussion of the Faculty Research Committee suggested that the policy of individualistic research was, perhaps, implicit to the Faculty. If this is the case, then the "orientation to orientations" could be seen as challenging tacitly accepted policy. The suggestion that some orientations may be "fixed" could be perceived as a negative judgement. And suggesting that "expertise" may "get in the way" may imply limitedness—or perhaps complacency. But the "search for the radical" is a two-edged sword. Some of the presumed negativity may be blunted by the willingness to turn this critical edge toward the 'wholistic' orientation. The question may become: "Is the assertion of 'wholeness' also complacent?" Could ontological assumptions about the profundity of an orientation to orientations also mask uncriticalness—allowing the belief that: "This is the only way"?

The assignment and promotion of staff within the Graduate Programme; the perception of an emerging leadership group with a wholistic curricular orientation; and the dialogue within the Department concerning the need for a re-vision, all suggest normative dimensions that may be explored. Conditions which are perceived to exist in Secondary Education are manifestations of such value positions. Curricular structures, social relations and research approaches may indicate more fully the perspectival nature of the Departmental "tensions." And the second domain of the Department—the pedagogical or "Instructional" side to C&I—may reveal conditions that can allow further exploration of orientational questions. This final domain also more directly addresses the situations of the students in the Graduate Studies and Research Programme.

E. Chapter Two: Pedagogical Commitment

Reflection on dissonances between pedagogical values, language and behaviour in the Department may reveal orientations. Such incongruities may point the way to fuller understanding. In the Department of Secondary Education, pedagogical language is perhaps the most pronounced moment in this tripartite relationship.

An external participant remarked that in the University at-large, where the "same vocabulary, never mind intentions and significations is not present," then the situation exists, "where students must read each professor to choose where they may get this accommodation." A student participant suggested that this type of 'reading' of professors may be necessary in Secondary Education:

> My supervisor really wants to let me do what I want to do. Yet, he seems really unhappy if I don't arrive at the place that he wants me to.

The ambivalence suggested of the professor is also highlighted in a description by a Departmental professor:

> In terms of the qualitative/quantitative split, I sit on the fence. Sure I have my own biases, yet the choices of research are ultimately up to the graduate student. I will try to twist the student around to my way. I prefer the "soft-sell." I try to twist the student around to my way.

A student expressed this same irony in an account of a core course:

> There was a genuine attempt to let the students direct the class. Yet, there was a strong undercurrent of manipulation. They shake up the class through the readings, the dialogue and the assignments. There is a structure of control but an illusion of

freedom.

The "soft-sell" approach has been called "creative manipulation" by an external professor. [Perhaps it bears repeating, that this may be a constructive criticism. We may conceive of the alternatives of the hard-sell and the subliminal approaches that could take place.] As in advertising: "They establish a need, then they convince you that they have what you need." The concern here is whether the "social relations belie any type of emancipatory education."

The suggestion that students "read" the orientations of the professors is further indicated by the statements of a Departmental professor:

> I just can't bring myself to believe in the Ninteenth Century realism of the quantitative approach. My preference is the qualitative, yet I have done a number of "useful" quantitative studies. No one has ever asked me to supervise a quantitative study. And, I have never talked anyone out of doing such research.

The suggestion made by this professor was that graduate students may have, "already chosen to accommodate." This would come as, "no surprise."

In some situations, however, this accommodation may not be found. A student participant suggested:

> Sometimes you can end up with the two "camps" on your Thesis Committee. There are oppositions and inconsistencies. For example, when you go to one professor you are pushed towards a survey approach. Another tells you to concentrate on the "life-world." The contradictions can lead to compromises by combining. You end up having to try both. You can have a professor tell you that your focus must be on a very, very specific question. The question must come from the field. Then another committee member tells you to use a questionnaire, and that your study is "too narrow, too specific—you need to be more sophisticated."

The situation was described as "double-messaging." And the "contradictions are not just abstract or academic." Such inconsistencies, "affect the lives of the students." A second student-participant stated:

> The professors are trying to push students toward their own orientations, regardless of what the students may feel. In this way they do not concern themselves with the students' special talents and abilities, if they don't agree with the orientation....They are not interested in those things that they are not interested in. They are not looking at your topic, only your approach. They want to push you a certain way. "You can deal with your own question, but."

This "but," one professor remarked, becomes the situation where: "Students end up walking on eggs":

> There are contradictions between the professor's research person and his or her political person. There is not that much critical thinking about everyday beliefs and language. For example, having to get committee members. Sometimes they disagree on the final direction of the study. It may be that they have conflicting definitions of what it means to do a certain type of research. The student gets caught between the inconsistencies of the professors.
>
> Some people are on committees for specific reasons. They talk one way, but at the defence they fall back on other questions. You wonder why. Some of the canons are pulled in from the outside, and you think, "Hey! Is this the real person coming

through?"

Praxiology

The concept of praxiology, promoted in the Department, can be introduced in an effort to ground the discussion of anomalies (such as those above) in the pedagogical relationships between students and professors. In, "Curriculum Implementation as Instrumental Action and as Situational Praxis," published in the Praxis Monograph Series #9 (University of Alberta: Department of Secondary Education, 1984), the Chair described **praxis** as: "Critical reflection and action as full of thought, and thought full of action." **Praxis** "leads to understanding of what is beyond, allowing disclosure of tacitly held assumptions and intentions." (1984, p. 15).

An external participant suggested that if Departmental tensions militate against a unified orientation, "then the second string would be the graduate students." Graduate students "may be more open" since: "They do not have the tenure, the certification nor the old models of education to protect." This participant suggested that the following questions may be asked of the graduate students in the Department:

> What can you ask the graduate students about what they have learned in their courses that represents an orientation of the Department? And how can you recognise in their teaching in the Department that say phenomenology or whatever is present? How can their praxis reveal the Departmental orientation?

The suggestion was made that: "The strength of Secondary Education is its lead in this direction." The leadership was seen to be "Ted Aoki's vision [which] is this need for praxis; as a broader basis for knowledge than is technique."

To understand pedagogical praxis may be to ask: "How is the professor in that class teaching the class, such that it focusses on teaching?" The suggestion was made that this "may be hard for people across campus to understand." Familiarity with "the orientation to orientations" is necessary, as one staff member stated, so that people "can see curriculum as Being." As the Chair wrote in the same Monograph Series above:

> For many of us, to understand praxis requires an estrangement from the dichotomised view of "theory and practice" and an embracing of that view which sees them as twin moments of the same reality. Rather than to see theory as leading into practice, we need now more than ever to see it as a reflective moment in praxis. (1984, p.13)

One example where the Departmental graduate students may be demonstrating praxis, is in their venturing forth from the Department in their graduate studies.

External administrators in the study expressed surprise that approximately 28% of the student courses in the Secondary Education Graduate Programme are taken outside of the Department. The suggestion made was that other departments do not demonstrate as much of an external orientation. [This figure is based on an analysis of the 1984/85 transcripts for students presently in residence.] Furthermore, of these 127 course enrolments (compared to 453 internal C&I courses), less than 20% were in subject area departments, *per se*. That is, 33% were taken in Educational Psychology and another 33% were in Educational Foundations. Of the remaining 34%: approximately 20% of the courses were in areas such as music, art or computer science; 10 % were in such areas as Sociology and Philosophy and the remainder

were in one or two departments within Education or other Faculties. The external participants considered the Department's behaviour, in 'going out', as unusual in the Faculty. This was seen as "a representation in the Department's behaviour that reflects the recommendations to the students."

The Chair has stated that: "To have an encounter with that which we are not is almost a precondition to understanding the ground on which we stand." A "dialectical tension" is necessary for re-orientation. "A part of real growth is the shedding of the old ...a tearing away from one's old home." The venturing forth by students into other Departments is an exemplification of this "context of alternatives."

The paradox with this venturing forth, as one staff member described, is that the loss of security in the 'home' department is necessary if the students is to "find that sense of at-home-ness." Analogous to the acquisition of a new language, "You are able to feel in your bones your mother tongue once you have a second language." The staff member felt that it is a commitment by some to the student's "individual experience—lived-experience" that allows the "risk to seek dissimilarity."

The commitment within the Department to the student's lived-experience suggests a pedagogical orientation. The curriculum courses, a student participant suggested, "depend on the students." The commitment may require an estrangement that is necessary to attain "action full of thought, thought full of action." The curricular courses are described by a professor as, "fundamentally dialogic." A recent graduate suggested that: "The talking is the doing." The "broadening" of the individual student's horizon results: "Dialogue is change." This focus on dialogue raises the question whether awareness can be considered change. As the former student asked: "Are the conversations of our course work the arena for praxis?" Is "con-versation" sufficient as emancipatory pedagogy?

The following experience of two international student-participants may indicate a dissonance with dialogical assumptions:

> When the professors require effort, we should expect the same. When the papers are returned with written comments, deep questions and reflection, that is the way that we like it the best.
>
> However, some professors just "analyse" in talk. He or she is interested in "analysing" the student's work, not in the person. To us, as foreign students, writing is the most intimate conversation that we have with most of our professors— written dialogue. In the really good courses we write and discuss our writing in groups. In the curriculum courses this happens a lot. We need the comment in detail. Not just the grammatical.
>
> [A second international student remarked:] The readings and the writing are our greatest vehicle for learning, since we find it difficult to get that much from the classroom conversation. Sometimes, for example, the professors just give out the readings, then we never discuss them. Often, there is one major assignment that is a written paper at the end of the course, and this is not given back or there is no written comment. The courses where we must write about the readings, and the professors discuss and comment on our papers, are the ones where we can find a position. They

are also the ones that trouble us the most.

For most of the case study participants, the taken-for-granted notion of dialogue has been speaking and listening. The consideration of dialogue as reading and writing (or even silence, as one participant suggested) may reveal a direction for increasing praxical focus.[19] Some participants have suggested that this "genuine dialogue" is carried on in those courses where personal written curricular experiences by the students become the point of departure for dialogue. Often this writing takes the form of student logs or anecdotes. The irony remains, however, that in some courses believed to be "dialogic," the possibly incomplete notion of dialogue may have prevented fuller understanding. Taken-for-granted notions about dialogue may actually belie genuine dialogue.

"Praxical dialogue" has been called into question by external participants, as well. One professor asked: "If Dr. Aoki had the opportunity to hire five new staff, would he find five that seriously, rather than rhetorically, used this praxis vocabulary?" Another external participant suggested: "What the Department has must be treasured." Yet, there is a risk, "you will end up talking to yourselves." A third participant outside of the Department made a similar observation. Here, again, there is an indication that the Department's 'radicalness' may bring a sharper focus for criticism:

> It is a problem of getting too imbued with a particular language. There is a danger of not communicating outside of your own community. This emphasis on language, of course, may point to a complacency in some forms of more established research (about their own language).

The concern that dialogue may become "rhetoric" or "red flags" is not unique to the Department. It is a general concern.

Dialogue within Secondary Education is, however, a source of dissonance. And as well, dissonance is a source of dialogue—a call for dialogue. One Departmental staff member suggested that: "When language breaks down there is no dialectic, there is no dialogue." This professor felt: "That is the stage that we are in now." Language was, perhaps, "part of the rift."

> You can say that: "I'm trying to find a balance between theory and practice." But if you mention praxis, that closes the door. I can say that: "We need more discussion." But if I mention dialectics, the door comes down. A lack of dialogue may have to do with the language that is used which speaks of critical theory.

The irony here is that the "language of phenomenology" was also given to bring down the "doors." This language speaks of lived-experience. Yet, the question raised about its use was: "Are we forgetting people?"

The questioning of 'dialogue as change' perhaps reveals a deeper concern for the orientation to praxis. An external participant pushed this notion to the 'critical edge' with the statement:

> Critical theory is an essential element in praxis. Those Curriculum Praxis Monograph Series papers which have been influenced by Dr. Aoki have a sense of praxis. The majority do not. Praxis and emancipation can become very neutral terms.

A response to this sentiment was given in a discussion of the issue whether 'praxical language'

[19]Here we find a first sense of the hermeneutic turn of the dissertation.

in the Department may be shallow or rhetorical. A Departmental participant stated:

> Professors shifting into a new area, may be tentative. But being tentative is a sign of ongoing search. At this stage in one's career, what would be adequate? When our research attitude is inspirational and opening up, we must be mindful of our own shallowness or depth and as well, of action which is mere bandwagonning.

The importance of such mindfulness was indicated by a student-participant. When the language of the professors does not match behaviour and values, the implication may be read that one must "learn the code." An external professor paraphrased this same lack of "fluency" on the part of the professor as: "Do as I say, not as I do." A student corroborated this sentiment:

> Even though some of the professors I have had say that research themes must come out of the field and from the people with whom you work, in specific situations you learn very quickly that these are just words. You end up having to figure out what it is that they want. There are others, it is not just me, that think this. I want to clarify, however, that this is not a general criticism of the Department.

Again, the qualification must be made that the "venturing forth" by some in the Department may open them to more rigid standards of consistency. As educators, we may have all experienced the anomaly of learning about alternative teaching styles primarily by attending lectures. We may all have written multiple choice examinations that had questions about the necessity of expository writing. Or we may have been taught the necessity of student-centred learning in an anonymous undergraduate class of 350 students. The student who suggested the anomaly above was most adamant that there should be included in this discussion the qualification that in the Department of Secondary Education such anomalies are less prominent than other departments of the University at-large. Again, the criticism must be seen as relative.

A staff member also suggested the relativeness of this pedagogical criticism of the Department. This took the form of a critique of the pedagogy of other departments. When describing the situation where lecturing may be considered the desired form of 'pedagogy', the following description was given:

> In a class where there are 250 students there is no dialogue. The students must live with my language as the lecturer and they had better find out what my meanings are—how I use words. It is one-way, unidirectional use of the language.

Another staff member remarked, lecturing is "not even minimal—it is abysmal." Especially in Education: "Personal contact is essential." Compared to the "unidirectional use of language," when dialogue becomes central, more issues or dissonances come into focus. There is a necessary commitment and openness to self-criticism.

When language moves, "out of the realm of the unexamined, the unlived, and becomes real in the sense of being not just intellectual or accepted knowledge," this is when knowledge becomes the "guiding force in our lives." The external participant who made this suggestion felt that, "the 'language as rhetoric' concern" should not be construed as a negative judgement—that the Departmental "beginnings are bad." Rather, the suggestion was that, "we [all] need help to grow in the use and understanding of language." Without such a struggle: "How else are we to benefit or become sophisticated?"

As suggested earlier, another area that may reveal pedagogical praxis in the Department is the teaching by the graduate students. In Secondary Education, the principal graduate student assistantships are for undergraduate teaching and practicum supervision. While the assignment to teaching may not seem different from many other departments, one staff member suggested:

> What is different in our Department is that undergraduate teaching is emphasised and given an orientation. The dialectic should be there. The orientation of our Department is praxiological.

This orientation was reiterated by another:

> Courses like ED CI 551 and the Gang Won Do Project[20] can push graduate students into a praxical situation. Similarly, the GSSL [Graduate Student Second Language Project] language students are involved in a praxical situation. A larger area for possible growth is in the area of practica.

While the "dialectic should be there," to what extent can this praxical situation arise? Are graduate students perhaps being 'pushed' into dissonant rather than praxical situations? Can the institutional conditions of the Department allow this freedom?

One student participant suggested that if the graduate student projects and courses are, "to be praxical, the real question becomes whether or not we have the continuation of students and the strength in our...programme to support this." As an example of the praxical orientation, the experiences gained in the pre-requisite ED CI 549&550 ("Curriculum, Development" and "Current Curriculum Development") [two of the four core courses], have been suggested as allowing the student to be "placed in a dialogical situation with a certain staff member," when they later team-teach ED CI 352 in the Undergraduate Programme. "The student and the staff have a chance to enter into dialogue." However, during the last round of this Phase II teaching, there were only three tenure-track professors involved in three of the ten sections of ED CI 352. Of the remaining seven sections, one graduate student was paired with a sessional Ph.D, two were paired with practicum associates, and four team-taught with other graduate students. The availability of tenured staff for such "dialogue" seems to militate against the hoped for praxis. Without such dialogue, the praxis that can be expected may be lessened. As an external participant suggested: "In most cases the student has not had the requisite background...one course [ED CI 549/550] is not enough to change an orientation."

Adding further dissonance to the praxical potentiality was the following statement by a staff member with much experience of the undergraduate course assigned to most graduate students:

> I never knew that this was the rationale for the assignment: I always thought that graduate students were assigned to ED CI 352 because they were closer to the students' ages, and they were fresh from the classrooms.
>
> How is the rationale for ED CI 352 being made, behind closed doors? When I say to my grad students: "Isn't it great that you can share your recent experience with the undergraduate students (what is really going on in the classroom), am I mistaken?

[20] A coopertative TESL project with a Korean Province.

Am I misinforming them? What is the Department's position on this?

A student participant described how 300 "necessary hours" were spent on the teaching assignment—when less than 100 were allocated. When asked how this continued, the statement was made:

> When you are a first year graduate student you don't push anybody. You find out what you are to do, and you do the best that you can....Yet, we are students too. Everything builds up. Some grad students teach one course one term, and then they are asked to prepare a different course the next term. I don't think that this is fair, when one is taking a full course load oneself.

Student participants have suggested that the interests served by the teaching assignments are perhaps more institutional. The understanding expressed earlier was that graduate students must "take up the slack" of those senior staff who do not teach some or any of the undergraduate courses. Furthermore, students may be assuming the demands of the "shifting burden" of increasing Departmental undergraduate responsibilities; the added pressure of the reduced staff numbers; and the understaffing needs resulting from unequal staff complements in the different subject areas. The following understanding and concern of an administrator-participant raises a further implication of the interests served or not served by the graduate student teaching situation:

> We are at the point where the duties and teaching of basic courses places the students from other lands in a disfavoured position. When the area of graduate programming increases, and I suspect that it will, how can we provide for these students yet maintain support for the institution?

"Praxis," this participant suggested in another context, "may be what we want to accomplish but not be representative of what we are doing."

The question of the interests served by the teaching assignments to ED CI 352/3 provides challenges to the praxical orientation. We should bear in mind, however, that in most departments the pedagogy of such assignments may not even have been considered, never-mind criticised. Furthermore, the orientation to orientations (as repeated throughout this case study report) may lead to a deeper criticism of pedagogical commitments. We must be mindful of this 'relative' qualification. For example, praxiology aside, in many universities graduate students receive very few assistantships (if any at all). This is especially true for Master's students. Even within the departments of the Faculty of Education at this University, Secondary Education students may be "better off." The needs of the Institution may provide otherwise unavailable opportunities.

Balanced with this "opportunity," however, are the conditions of the residency requirement. The stipulation that students attend full-time and that they not work more than twelve hours per week may render the "need" that is filled by the corresponding "opportunities" within the Faculty. That is, some universities do not require their graduate students to leave their employment. Rather, courses are offered at times that accommodate the typical time-frame of the educator.

The standard argument against such "part-time" degrees is the lack of an intensity and sharing that takes place with residency. Statements by some of the students in this study have challenged the extent of this assumed community and the standard defence of residency.

> I've often thought of the architecture, and what the architecture says about how the institution feels about the physical being of those who must live in the environment. This says a lot about our being, in how we are put, and the colour of the walls, and how we are viewed. Graduate students are put in converted storage rooms. The classrooms are sterile and they have the most disfunctional furniture imaginable. The types of desks used were thrown out in schools years ago. As teachers you would hope that we would walk around and look at how the surroundings speak to our being in this place. But teachers are just people. If I could, I would paint the walls.
>
> There is the inconsistency between rhetoric, values and behaviour. How can we dwell in this place when we have no place to dwell? Or what do the places we are given say about how we are seen?

This student responded to this section of the first draft of this report by insisting:

> Please **emphasise** that although many comments are criticisms of the Department, it is a truly valued experience, a privilege, to be able to be a member of this Department in which the individual is recognised and allowed a "degree of freedom." This is not found in other departments or in the institution at large.

While many of the participants in this study have pointed to the dissonances within the Department, many have also qualified such concerns as not primarily negative. They have been called "healthy tensions." Complacencies and vulnerabilties have been surfaced. We might also keep in mind that: "In a Department like ours 'institution', 'deinstitution' and 'constitution' are always at play."

The Department is at an important moment in its history. There is a new Chair. The staffing budget is under constant threat—as is the graduate assistantship budget. There are "essential tensions" surfacing [some suggest that this study may be a "self-fulfilling prophesy" in this regard]. The flight from the field and into the disciplines may be quickening with the shifting priority to graduate studies and research. Dr. Aoki has suggested that when "pushing to the edge": "Each occasion must be seen as an opportunity to bring people together—a chance that things might be re-constructed."

The Chair reflected on the stuggle during these times of retrenchment with a fundamental question:

> The question for me became: How can I keep this place really alive when the number of staff is shrinking? What can I do to encourage the self-transformation of the staff? That has been my central problem; to have them move on—to have them open new ways for themselves.

The Chair's approach has been to "seek opportunities and to grow with them"—rather than "to set goals and go after them." The present conditions in the Department may provide such opportunities. Through the conversations with participants and the case study worker—as we met to consider the challenges and dissonances we all experience—it is hoped that this case study has portrayed some of the vitality that exists in the Department. The portrayal of these conversations will hopefully have allowed an experience of the Programme (of thoughts full of action). Perhaps this awareness may bring about some change (some action full of thought).

Appendix Nine: Appendix One of the Case Study Report

Case Study Appendix One: Methodological Background

Procedures

The participatory case study approach to evaluation is a significant change from the tradition of "Democratic Case Study Evaluation" developed by the Centre for Applied Reseach in Education (CARE) at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, England. The "participatory" approach includes the 'principle of justice'; a principle which entails a significant increase in the control extended to participants.

The methodological background to this study began with the research for a Master's dissertation on two CARE projects: "Negotiation of Ethical Principles and Procedures in Case Study Evaluation: The Humanities Curriculum Project and the Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project" (Vancouver: Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, University of British Columbia).

On May 20, 1984, the Thesis Committee of the case study worker (now a doctoral candidate) at the University of Alberta first discussed the possibility of his doing an evaluation as part of the PACCR review. In August, 1984, the Thesis Committee Chair, Dr. Ted Aoki (also Chair of the Department of Secondary Education at the University of Alberta), discussed with his supervisee the suitability of a portrayal of the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Programme.

September 10, 1984 a written proposal for such a study was submitted to the members of the Departmentally elected PACCR Self-Study Committee (SSC). After an in-camera meeting on September 13, the case study worker was invited to a subsequent session to present the proposal. At the meeting of September 18, this representative body gave **support to the study** (on behalf of the Department). At this time, the suggestion was made that the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Committee be approached *vis-à-vis* staff participation in this portrayal.

On October 15, 1984, a Doctoral Research Proposal for this study and the dissertation to follow was successfully defended at a Candidacy Examination and Proposal Defence. The Thesis Committee also suggested that the Graduate Studies and Research Committee be approached to help identify staff participants.

November 6, 1984, the resident graduate students of the Department met to consider their PACCR contribution. At this symposium, the present study was elected to be the collective **contribution of the students.**

November 28, 1984, was the first opportunity when the case study could be made an item on the agenda of the Departmental Graduate Studies and Research Committee. The Committee members "informally decided" that the identification of participants was not within their "mandate." They did, however, make three suggestions: 1) that all staff members

be offered the opportunity to participate; 2) that the participants be chosen randomly; and/or 3) that the criteria determined from the case study methodology be used to select. The first and third options were utilised.

December 6, 1984, a memorandum was sent to all Departmental staff requesting participation in the study [See Appendix Five].[21] A number of staff came forward. Others were approached in consideration of the following criteria. These criteria, *mutatis mutandis*, were also used in the selection of the graduate students, the external professors (to the Department and/or Faculty) and the administrative participants. The criteria were: gender representation; subject area (a wide selection); Graduate Programme exposure/non-exposure; colloquium (non-thesis)/thesis supervision; graduate student levels (Ph.D., M.Ed., thesis and non-thesis [and Undergraduate experience with the Diploma Programme]); and international/national student status.

Informed Consent Interviews

The initial interviews were those of "informed consent." The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada guidelines, "Ethical Guidelines for the Institutional Review Committees for Research with Human Sciences," were rehearsed with participants. Furthermore, the issues arising from the extensive literature of the CARE group concerning their SAFARI Ethic (The Ford Foundation's Success and Failure and Recent Innovation Project) were taken up continuously. Several participants indicated that these 'rehearsals' were perhaps "too heavy" and that the discussions of risks were "almost scarry"—such was the intent.

An example of the principles and procedures discussed was that participants were kept ignorant of the identity and positions of the other participants beyond the broad descriptions of "students," "Departmental staff members" or "external participants." There was one exception. The identity of all participants was known by the Chair (as the case study worker's doctoral supervisor). Given this fact, confidentiality was especially maintained even here. No identities were discussed *vis-à-vis* released understandings and the Chair, despite his varied rôles, had no access to the transcripts nor tapes. The SSHRC guidelines recommend that participants be afforded the right "to inquire about the research, and whenever practicable should have recourse to a knowledgeable resource person." With this suggestion in mind, and as a safe-guard for the researcher given the exigencies of a doctoral programme, the Chair was provided the knowledge of participant identities. Participants were informed of this fact from the outset, as acknowledged in the "consent form" [See Appendix Six: "Consent Form"].[22]

The commitment that each participant was to have the utmost control over her or his understandings of the Graduate Programme was sustained as an integral part of the "participatory case study" approach. As will be discussed below, the acceptance of such control was not always deemed necessary by participants. However, the case study worker insisted on continued discussion of the principles of anonymity, confidentiality and justice.

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[21]See Appendix Two of the dissertation, p. 195.
[22]Appendix Three in the dissertation, p. 196.

The participants' acknowledgement of this procedure was obtained.

An important "phase" that occurred during the "informed consent" discussions concerned the trust necessary from participants that the case study worker could safe-guard confidentiality and anonymity. This trust was not merely ethical, the evaluator was frank about questions of competency. The ability to maintain the confirmed 'ethic' had as much to do with interpersonal skills and mental and emotional endurance as it did with knowledge of the subtleties of such principles and procedures. For example, acknowledgment of seemingly extraneous information during a conversation could have inadvertently revealed the identity of a participant. The simple fact that the case study worker had contact with a person [as perhaps revealed by an offer to set up a meeting for some other purpose] could have indicated that the third person was a participant. "Inside information" learned during a case study conversation about Departmental functions that did not have to do with the Graduate Studies and Research Programme (perhaps even a certain expession or phrase), could have indicated the source of knowledge as a certain person. And, as a final example, in a Department of 25 staff and 50(+) graduate students, to hide comings and goings is not always possible. The frank discussions of these and many other nuances of confidentiality and anonymity led some participants (primarily students) to not get involved. The pressures of this ethical tight-rope walking also led the case study worker to several sojourns—the need to completely distance himself from the study. However, no apparent breaches of these principles resulted.

The "Case Record" Conversations

Following the "informed consent" interviews, all participants agreed to have their conversations taped. Each participant received an average of three "case record" visits. After each session, the tapes were transcribed by hand into log-books. At the next meeting, the previous dialogue was taken up again. In this manner, the understandings were repeatedly discussed. The intention was that indicated in a letter written to the participants at the later "release interview" [See Appendix Seven].[23]

> Throughout our interviews, the understandings have emerged and have been discussed recurrently. Each successive interview has seen the distancing of the initial dialogical context, bringing into place a shared understanding of the general context within which the statements may stand. That is, from the initial conversations, the themes have been refined to the point where the understandings may hopefully stand alone; the initial contexts have been confirmed in dialogue to the point where we now have an understanding of a broader context within which the understandings may be discussed.

During the conversations, certain ideas or understandings emerged which were considered important for the "larger conversation" among the 19 participants. These few instances required limited release of the ideas, which entailed rehearsing the possible threats to anonymity and confidentiality. The participants were given sufficient context (release of ideas was not sought upon initial discussion, but only after the next meeting allowed "re-confirmation"). Each participant had complete control over the decisions for this "limited release."

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[23]See Appendix Four of the dissertation, p. 197.

The case study worker sought such release only occasionally since the overall intent of the study was to control "interventions." That is, for example, the thematic treatment of understandings was held off until three months after interviews began. [This "bracketing" was not an easy task, as the entries in the worker's journal indicate.] The intent was to minimise the influence on the direction of the conversations from the evaluator's previous conversations—to allow the understandings of the Programme to emerge initially from independent dialogues with each participant.

Similarly, the participants were repeatedly told that the case study worker did not intend to "interview" for "preconceived notions" of the Graduate Programme. It was not expected that participants would have had the occassion to systematically and critically reflect upon the Programme. Instead, each separate dialogue would explore mutual sense-making (a desire facilitated by the principles of anonymity and confidentiality). After the conversations progressed, other "released" notions from the "larger conversation" were introduced.

A measure of this "co-research" intent was expressed by several participants with their perceptions that the dialogue was "exciting," "interesting" and "helpful" to their own research and Graduate Programme activities. Interestingly, some of those initially most tentative about involvement later expressed disappointment that particular sessions had run out of time or suggested anticipation of the next meeting. Participants enjoyed the conversations and found them beneficial.

The Release Interviews

The final interviews were conducted after "the case record was closed." The participants and the case study worker went over typed transcripts, word-by-word. Two purposes were: 1) to ensure that the understandings could be confirmed—which could require deletions, modifications or additions and 2) to decide whether the understandings could be considered for use in the first draft of the case study report. The participants were asked to keep in mind threats to anonymity and confidentiality. Furthermore, each participant was asked to ground his or her decisions for release in a dialogue concerning the "principle of justice." This concern can be expressed in the question: "What notions of 'justness' or 'goodness' are considered when deciding to include or exclude certain understandings?" As an example, certain 'succinct' perceptions were kept out since: "They would not facilitate dialogue—they would close doors." On the other hand, rather 'explicit' statements were kept in since these, "had been stated in public before."

The decision to include only the participants' words in the transcripts has already been alluded to in the excerpt from the "First Draft Release Letter." A further point to make, however, is that the statements in the final case study report are not accompanied by the case study worker's previous dialogue. Rather, the evaluator has provided a "new and unknown" context—a new written dialogue. Hence, while the participants and the evaluator discussed the understandings within "general contexts" during the "case record interviews," the confirmations needed to be seen as standing alone —in an attempt to reinforce the interpretive nature of the first draft.

Release of the First Draft

The final stage of the case study was the release by participants of the "first draft." Participants were given this first contextualisation and were asked to consider, again, the principles and procedures of release. Such control did not, however, extend to other participants' understandings nor to the case study worker's overall interpretation. This was the first opportunity that participants had to read the understandings of others. The first draft was confidential and the individual copies were returned and (requested to be) not copied. Modifications, deletions and additions of **their own statements** were written in. Where requested, additional meetings were offered.

From these submissions, the final draft was prepared and submitted to the Self-Study Committee. This Committee had agreed (at the September 13, 1984, meeting) that should there be alteration to or editing of the case study report, the text would be returned to the case study worker so that re-confirmation could take place with the participants.

Subsequently, the case study report was presented at the Departmental PACCR Retreat. From here it was included, as the reader now finds it, in the Departmental submission to the Unit Review Committee.[24]

Principles of the Study

The purposes of the study have been three-fold: 1) "to inform decision making" by those "across campus"; 2) to provide the Department with a portrayal of the Graduate Programme at a time when there is a change of Chair and 3) to provide the centre-piece of a doctoral study. In reference to the third purpose, the thesis of the dissertation concerns the rôle of the "principle of justice" when determining access to and release of 'information' during educational evaluation. The assumption of the evaluator's approach is that evaluation is a political activity. That is, an evaluation that concerns the 'facts of peoples lives' must necessarily address the considerations of power in social relationships. To make sense of the "public interest," the assertion is made that an evaluation must more fully consider the "interests" of the participants, the evaluator and the "decision makers" (or administrative recipients of the study). These are the three groups who define by their actions what is to be in the "public interest." As do the groups exisiting in the larger pluralistic "public," the above groups have varied degrees of power within the institution evaluated.

The release of understandings contained within the case study has been confirmed with these political and ethical concerns in mind. The decisions to allow release publicly of personal perceptions have been discussed within the participatory case study ethic, but have remained the auspice of the participants.

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[24]As a final stage of the case study research, the participants will be asked to confirm and release to the dissertation stage their notions of justice from the first draft release interviews—i.e., the principles and procedures considered. They will also have an opportunity to respond to the final Thesis Dissertation.

The facilitation of such control, by the case study worker, required self-denial. As an example, many participants repeatedly gave the evaluator a "blank cheque" *vis-à-vis* release. The typical justification was that: "I've already said this publicly." Or else: "I wouldn't tell you anything that I wouldn't share with others." The "cheque" was always immediately returned with the insistence that the participants rehearse the risks to the principles and procedures of the study. Significantly, in the final release interviews, all participants deleted, modified or elaborated at least some of the understandings. Many made considerable changes. And one participant decided that **all** conversations and understandings must be kept confidential. There was no release and the tapes were destroyed.

A further example of the necessary self-denial is the time that it takes to allow such participant control. It would be far more expedient to accept the acquiescence of control. 'Quick turn-around of data' and earlier completion of the study would result. For example, this study was five months in the making. While some stages were more demanding than others, during the month of March, 254 hours were logged. Considering a five day week [for a graduate student!?] this amounts to 12 hours each day of the four and one-half weeks in the month. It would have been far easier to have conducted a "value-free" study under the guise of the "autocratic evaluator."

[Please return to p. 206.]

Appendix Ten: Appendix Two of the Case Study Report

Case Study Appendix Two: The Non-Thesis Route

The statement has been made that: "The concern with the colloquium versus the thesis has been a fundamental question of our Department." The standard critique offered against the colloquium was paraphrased by a participant:

> The study of education can be seen as the generation of knowledge. There are many who question the non-thesis degree as a legitmate form of study—since it does not 'add to knowledge'—as a Master's in Chemistry might.
>
> They are saying that nothing that the M. Ed. student is engaged in enhances the generation of knowledge. It is assumed that a degree of investigation is only deemed worthy to receive acceptance as investigation.

The notion of research that is presented by "the model of the Arts and Sciences Faculties" is suggested as setting up a dichotomy between 'theoretical investigation' and 'professional development.' The thesis is the vehicle of the former 'research' —the colloquium is the vehicle of the latter 'application.' A Departmental professor believes that such an orientation operates among Secondary Education colleagues. The account, itself, may also reveals this orientation to "theory and practice."

> The colloquium has fallen into question. There are enough people who look back on their own thesis march to the golden Ph.D. So for anyone setting out, there is only one goal—the thesis. The Master's is subtly directed as a dry-run at the Ph.D. It is difficult for them to see the Master's as a terminal degree; as a tool for the student's work (eg. an administrator). This puts a totally different complexion on the degree from the institution. The expectations change.

A second participant in the study suggests a similar 'practical' complexion for the colloquium.

> Colloquia are much more practical and pragmatic. The activities are based in the classroom. The research is able to explore some aspect of the subject area. This aspect can then be reported and theory applied. The thesis must be theoretically based, but I have felt that the colloquia are much more practically based.

A third participant's understanding of the 'practical' basis of the colloquium was given as follows: "I believe that the academics who teach certain subject area courses promote the colloquium because they believe that the subject matter is technical."

The three perceptions of the colloquium-route would seem to support the distinction between "theory and practice." Although they suggest that a practical approach is as legitmate as the theoretical, the theoretical can never-the-less be "applied" to those practical subject area aspects brought back from the schools. Does this acceptance of the dichotomy somehow, therefore, support the understanding that certain graduate courses are merely "incremental" to the undergraduate courses? Are undergraduate courses more concerned with the practical (instructional preparation), whereas graduate courses should be more concerned with the theoretical (research on education)? Are colloquia students merely receiving more of the same practical knowledge? The belief of one of the three participants above is that the experience of subject area courses is not incremental, when taken as a graduate student:

> Many students come to my subject area needing content. The colloquium-route offers the chance to take more courses outside of the Department. This is not incremental to

> the undergraduate experience, it is taking the subject area into graduate level work —looking at the relationships differently....They need to grow stronger in the discipline—in a qualitatively different way.

A student who experienced the colloquium-route presents a different understanding.

> I chose the colloquium-route because I could take more courses—specifically in a certain subject area. I was preparing for a job, when I didn't think that I would be going on to a doctoral programme.
>
> I couldn't tell the difference between Diploma, M. Ed. and Ph. D. I would use the metaphor of a seven or ten story building. It is incremental. The stories will all have the same foundation....The colloquium can be seen as professional enhancement.

This student had a specific focus to the programme, but it was never-the-less "incremental." To others, the choices for "job enhancement" may not be as determined. One professor observed:

> Some people have come back to get "re-tooled" in an area. They want to select courses like in a shopping centre: a few courses here and there. In case job offers come up, they have a few courses in each area. This is not a graduate programme.

Do the students who choose to prepare for jobs slip through? Or do certain professors have different criteria for a 'graduate programme'? Another professor stated: "If the courses taken in the programme are like a smorgasbord, that is the problem of the Supervisor."

The ambiguity that may be apparent in these different examples from the 'colloquium debate' may suggest why the question prevails. The dilemmas faced may be a result of the language chosen for the debate. As one external participant suggested:

> A lot of times we have not carefully conceived the rationale. We end up trying to justify non-thesis degrees on bases grounded in the "Research" orientation—from the opposing camp.

The suggestion made is that: "The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research and the President have had judgments about the non-thesis degree...very much in the 'research' vein." The Faculty response has been conveyed within this same "picture" or frame of reference. The above use of the 'practical' and 'technical' rationales for the colloquium-route may be construed as examples of such attempted justification—justification within the *modus exsistendi* of the prespective that dichotomises 'theory and practice.' Without attempts to appropriate new 'bases for justification', an ubiquitous hierarchy of purposes may result. Exploration of these questions may require more attention to "beliefs of justification" than to "justifications of belief."

[Please return to p. 210.]

Case Study Appendix Three: 'Essential Tensions'

> A portrayal can provide different understanding at this time. It could tie into all kinds of political things.

As this participant also shared, there is at least the perception of a "rift" in the Department. Some feel that the strain is "orientational." Others speak of "in-groups" and "out-groups." Some blame "internal politics." Factions may be "student stereotyping." Or, such perceptions may come from "peripheral groups." The consideration of such agitation is, indeed, political. As some have suggested of this study: "Why should we air our dirty laundry?" The intention of focussing on dissonances is not to reveal weaknesses. It is the *modus operandi* of this study that tensions can be seen as healthy, and that dissonances can only be revealed where there is genuine commitment. Frustrated expectations are linked with intentionality. The challenges to the Department reveal such commitments. And the understanding of the Graduate Studies and Research Programme may be portrayed, as a result of such foci.

A participant stated this approach as follows:

> How is it that we view our own activities in our own arena of function? We must act in our own sphere of influence to demonstrate relationships to others in the field. The rôle of the teacher begins with self-criticism.
>
> Your study is an example. It is not just done in "some school out there." Understandings from administrators, professors, students, etc., will provide inclinations and dispositions to carry on in this context. It relates back.

The realm of "inclinations and dispositions" is normative. More than perhaps any other field, education is directly concerned with the "ought" and the "good." To focus on dissonances is to focus on normative inconsistencies. Yet, this need not be considered adverse criticism—a negative judgement. Again, as this same participant stated:

> It is a product of human beings—perhaps out of the realm of education, *per se*—to be not disposed consistently to matching behaviour with very carefully examined and continually renewed value positions. Are individual staff in Secondary Education aware to what extent they are engaged in activities that do speak to inherent value positions, notions of society, concepts of authority, etc.? This is a consistency to which most people do not aspire.

And finally, this person observed that: "When our practices are challenged we must come back to: 'What is it that we really believe about education?'" This is the commitment of the following discussion of the "tensions" in the Department.

Looking in from the outside, a participant stated:

> Despite the student perceptions of biases in research, I don't think that the culture or the climate of departments allow the professor's perspective to be known. There may be stereotyping going on.

The suggestion of student stereotyping has also been shared by a student participant:

> The students had a prejudice against one of the professors after only the first day. When some got to know the professor, later, it was O.K. Why are there supposed to

be two approaches only—the qualitative and quantitative—and why was this professor rejected by some right from the beginning?

> Students talk about who belongs where. Who are friends with whom. There are rumours of professors opposing each other. In some courses we may not hear open statements by professors about others, but we can guess. From where do these prejudices come to professors; from papers or references or from students? In some classes they even set up an opposition of orientations right from day one.

The student wondered at the source of such student prejudice. Yet, the questioning was also extended to "these prejudices" in the "open statements by professors."

The external participant who suggested student stereotyping also spoke of staff intimations of prejudice. But the student "stereotyping" was more definite.

> Somehow, the stereotypes are communicated in subtle ways. We don't know what colleagues say to students —whether they reinforce the stereotypes. I don't hear this in committee meetings or staff meetings. There are signs of stereotyping, but these come through in much more definite ways with the students' choices of research orientation.

The research approaches of students, therefore, become overt orientational choices. Such choices are manifest in the selection of courses, supervisors, committee members, and research problems.

If the divisiveness can be explained as "student stereotyping," then the staff may have more cohesiveness than the students perceive. Yet, as one Departmental staff member stated:

> Maybe it is easier to see an integration from outside. Inside these seem like unscalable rifts. That outside observation gives me some hope—more than I have now.

A student made the following similar observation:

> Some of the important professors are very frank about their research: "This is my camp." Some professors have said in class, for example: "There are qualitative and quantitative studies." "My bias is the qualitative."

One Departmental member suggested that:

> In addition to ED CI 549&550 [Curriculum Development and Current Curriculum Development], ED CI 596&597 [Research Methods in Education and Research Design in Education] are also power-houses. These courses are the internal structure, the skeleton that describes the shape of the Graduate Programme. Students choose to take other courses, but the core courses set the skeleton of their experience. These courses introduce questioning of curriculum and research content, and they focus the questioning of this content.

A second Departmental professor-participant was more emphatic:

> Some say that the "polemic" exists because of ED CI 549&550. It is usually the first course. The students get that direction right away.

In support of the perception that stereotyping is more evident among students, some professors have also suggested that the students spend much time outside of class "cross-fertilising." A "preferred list" of professors results. But one student expressed a sentiment shared by others in the study:

> [T]he office space is scattered on all floors and in little rooms. After the first year, when we don't take many courses together, when we have no

> lounge of our own, where is the community? In the offices? Some are converted storage rooms. Room-mates seldom appear. The room might have no windows. When we talk we are disturbing others. The initial courses in our Department become the only place that we can form a community.

The initial or core courses for most are ED CI 549&550 plus ED CI 596&597. Some staff members add support to the inference that orientational choices result from the experiences and from the professors in these courses. That is, the "stereotyping" may result from explicit and implicit 'introduction' and 'directing', as suggested in the previous "power-house" description. A representative statement was made by a Departmental professor:

> Students sense the preferred orientation. They come and say that they don't want to do "that kind of research." If one camp has more status and power than the other, it is more important. Students choose the orientations of those whom they come in contact with through courses. Students pick up very quickly which professors to work with.

The suggestion being made is that students "pick up" the orientational camps of the professors of the core courses. Is the strain that reveals itself in such terms as "polemic," "rift" and "camps" widespread in the Department? Is this tension unique to Secondary Education, or is this a fundamental issue in educational research? Is it possible to think of this dynamicism as vital and not merely as divisive?

A Departmental staff participant suggested a change from the once healthy tension:

> This terminology of camps, interestingly enough, is not used by the mainstream Departmental members. These terms seem to come more easily from those who are new-comers—peripherals. I don't mean peripheral in a derogatory sense. They are sessionals, graduate students and even tenure-track people who are working in satellite situations. But you still have the main body of tenured people. You don't hear the polemical terminology so much from them as you do from the people looking in. From outside, people tend to break it all down and analyse it to see if it is O.K.

This participant further suggested that if such a 'rift' exists, the divisiveness may be infectious:

> Even in the tenured-group—I don't like that word, maybe hard-core—well, in the inner-group you can even recognise differences of opinion, differences of political stance, differences of philosophy, and so on. As a person who has been here a long time, I have seen a shift from healthy differences—an opportunity to do a little friendly fencing—to splits, camps and divisiveness.
>
> It is not unheard of that external influences and pressures can build up to cause internal strife. The jargon, etc., can become a wedge.

Was the previous absence of "unhealthy differences" evidence of a lack of "divisiveness"? Or have friendly differences been exacerbated by a peripheral and false polemic? One staff member suggested that, "three years ago I would not have said that there was a problem." Now, however:

> We know that there are factions because we can feel the tension. It is not a healthy tension, and no one talks about it. There is an element of suspicion. No one puts his or her cards on the table.
>
> Things are not said when the Chair is there. People tend to stay very polite in front of the Chair. When he is not there, people are not so polite....Perhaps intolerance is not that big an issue. But how do you know, if it is all underneath? People are talking, but conversations go by one another.

"Intolerance" is surfacing, but before could there have been tension beneath complacency? Could the search for the radical—"to the root"—have revealed such underlying tensions? Could such a focus have brought the "conversations" of Departmental members under increased scrutiny—such that dialogue is now questioned?

Another Departmental professor suggested: "Any time that you stir the soil, personal trauma may be the result." This same participant stated:

> Instead of going on underneath, the debate about the 'rift' is coming out. I like an unruffled surface, but I welcome the creativety—the **positive tension**.

As a final example of the "perception of a rift," a professor shared that:

> We have tried to talk about the "rift." We dismissed everyone but full time academics [from the Council]. And the perception was that there is a rift. This discussion was a beginning, but it was much too polite.

'Stirring the soil' may cause **personal** trauma. It is very difficult to separate the personal from the professional or 'academic' orientations. One's research understandably says much about one's view of the world of education—even if this view entails the belief that one's perspective may be kept 'unobtrusive' by methodological 'safe-guards.' Each orientation must begin with a philosophy of mind—a philosophy of "personhood." Some of the participants have tried to make sense of the primacy of the "personal" versus the "professional" within a discussion of the "emergence of a new leadership group."

[Please return to p. 213.]

Appendix Twelve: Appendix Four of the Case Study Report

Case Study Appendix Four: Criteria for Staff Assignment to the Graduate Programme

The Chair has offered the following as criteria for assignment to graduate courses:

> The assignment to teaching graduate courses is the Chair's prerogative. As a senior administrator, the Board of Governors insists that the assignment to the courses is the Chair's responsibility. The Chair has to answer for these assignments. I have to ask: "Who are qualified as scholars and teachers to teach graduate level courses?" I consider in this the reason that people are hired to our Department. Those hired into a subject area are expected to teach all of the courses in that area.
>
> The assignment of people to ED CI 549&550 depends on my confidence in them to be able to handle a graduate course in curriculum. I study what staff have written, what scholarly interests they have shown, and what kind of work their graduate students do.

Participants in this study who have taught the core graduate courses suggest that they have made their own opportunities. They have "shown" their interest. One professor stated:

> I find it really hard to believe that some people don't get to teach graduate courses if they want. Remember, though, that in order to develop a certain course, I had to do five courses at one time. But I didn't mind, because this was the area that I wanted to develop in. The additional course I developed over and above my normal teaching load and duties. I did it because I have a strong academic interest in this area. When it was shown that student interest was there, and it continues to be so, a course was developed. I feel that I developed it out of sheer enthusiasm. It wasn't any special treatment.

A second professor stated that a research interest came first. The assignment to teach a "generic course" came about as a direct result of work begun during a sabbatical. The participant became "critical of my subject area from this broader context of curriculum and research."

> My interest came first; about teaching with my grad students and searching in the area. I never thought about teaching the course. I had no desire for the course. I was busy enough in my own world. I believe that I was given the opportunity because Ted saw potential and he supported this. Much of the work that I had done had shown off my Master's students' work provincially, nationally and internationally.

The suggestion made is that the "scholarly interest shown" opened the way to opportunity.

A second of the criteria is "subject area." This consideration has been contentious. One staff member has pointed to the "inequalities in staff assignments" to graduate work as a direct result of the unequal undergraduate commitments in subject areas. "Compare one subject area which has three integrated [undergraduate] programmes in a year with full classes to another subject area which has one integrated with ten students per year and three professors." No one is "confronted with these inequalities." Another staff asked the question: "In some subject areas how are some staff to ever get enough students to run a graduate course?" The problem was seen as "the structure" of the Department—kept within the boundaries of subject areas.

One staff member has suggested that this criterion of having to teach "all courses in the subject area" is not equally applied. In some areas with the highest enrolments, "steps have been taken to free up staff." Graduate students, sessional instructors, or practicum associates can be provided, "when there is a desire." [Perhaps the previous discussion of the first criterion may add understanding to this anomaly.]

Without "exposure" to graduate courses, however, there is a "Catch 22." Those who teach the research and graduate courses "supervise a great many theses." The perception is that: "A small group of people get on the Thesis Committees." Those that end up on committees, "seem to pass supervision among themselves." The assertion is made that: "If you surveyed the Committees, the same names would come up again and again." This assertion raises, again, the question of which comes first, the assigned graduate exposure or the 'demonstrated' scholarly interest?

The third and fourth criteria offered by the Chair (in answer to: "Who are qualified as scholars and teachers to teach graduate level courses?"), were scholarly writing and supervised graduate student work. In this realm, "hard choices" remain the "prerogative of the Chair." A question, however, that speaks to praxis in the Department, concerns the criterion of "scholarly writing." As a participant asked:

> How much is the Department committed to praxis? The structure militates against 'doing.' There is consistent favouring for theoretical writing. Universities are not traditionally a place of action.

This possible strain on the consistency of the praxical orientation was further 'brought home' by a reflection of one of the Departmental staff:

> I was out in the schools all of the time. I had good relations. But it didn't count for advancement at the University. All of these things I did out of my own naivete. But now I have lost the necessary passion to carry out the task of making my subject area speak to and be close to what happens in the schools.
>
> People consistently congratulate me on the work that I have done in the schools, but I'm embarrassed. I know that I have turned my back on it. I learned how to publish, to go to the right conferences—I won't go to any where I don't give a major paper. That says something about the Faculty, doesn't it?

The Department operates within a hierarchy that is explicitly committed to meritocracy. There may be "illusions of democracy," however. The institutional exigencies of the University mitigate these beliefs. The question has also been raised about the efficacy of praxiology in this type of institution. The "theory/practice" dichotomy is the accepted rationality. Furthermore, 'theoretical research' receives paramouncy.

An analagous situation is the phenomenon of "up-rootedness." This theme was spoken of a great many times by staff and students in this study. This up-rooting is "in the sense of the ground underneath—the foundations—falling away." What becomes of the students when they have fundamental beliefs challenged, and when they begin to "search for the radical"? As a participant suggested, students may become "square pegs trying to fit into the round holes" that are the institutional positions to which they must return. When one

Departmental professor described the great disruption in one student's professional life (resulting from such criticalness) the question became: "Should the Department be even doing this?" The suggestion made was: "To be able to see and not do is debilitating." As also suggested of the University, the structure of the school systems may "militate against 'doing.' "

A further dissonance related to this theme of "criteria" for promotion or assignment in the Graduate Programme concerns the lack of opportunity that may result due to "private courses." The "tradition" of graduate course development was described by a participant as follows:

> [T]he tradition is that if the students want this kind of course, then we should provide it. Then, if people (other than the staff member who originally designs the course) want to later become involved in the course, they can audit it a few times. Perhaps, after, they can team-teach. Then one, two, three or however many, may become involved in teaching the course. I don't know if this happens—if professors take others up on this.

This participant conjectured the reason that professors later become "so protective" about these courses. "I guess in their minds they feel that they have built up the course to the way that it is—if someone else touches it, then it would come falling down around their ears." This feeling of ownership is believed to develop for "required courses," as well as others.

From a different standpoint, the suggestion is made that graduate courses should not be "shifted around administratively":

> In our Department people have demonstrated scholarship or expertise; they have published and presented at conferences in particular areas. Now I know that some people have been grumbling: "Why shouldn't I be allowed to teach this or that graduate course as well?" In principle they are right, but only if they can demonstrate that they are at par with the present instructors. Because, I think that the students have a right to study with the most competent person.

A possible response to this viewpoint was suggested by the paraphrasing of another staff member: "I'm sure that there are some who would argue that if you are in an ED CI Department you should be able to teach ED CI 549&550." That is, a professor hired to teach "Curriculum and Instruction" courses should have, *ipso facto*, the competence to teach the curricular foundations courses. Similarly, this professor stated that some would argue: "If you have a Ph.D. you should be able to teach ED CI 596&597 [having carried on research oneself]." This professor did not agree with the arguments. They were advanced by other participants. But the debate would seem to be decided by the Chair's prerogative. And the Chair stated that he must choose those qualified and those in whom he has confidence "to handle" graduate courses. In itself, the necessity of choosing would indicates that not all are considered equally qualified.

A final dissonance concerning the criteria for staff selection is related to gender. While a number of participants have been earnest in not suggesting any gender preferential treatment, the question remains: "Why is only one female staff member involved in any of the required courses?" A student participant reiterated this concern as follows:

> One issue that I would like to bring up to PACCR as a female graduate student in the

> Department is: "Why are there not more female staff members?" Where are the numbers of female scholars that we may emulate? In a department this size, this discrepancy stands out. We need charismatic leaders from a variety of orientations—the curriculum scholars? One's advisor is a really significant rôle model in one's graduate student life. You measure yourself against this mentor. If there was a woman on staff dedicated to my research orientation it would be different for me. It is not just a question of more female scholars, it is a question of quality female scholars. Surely we can attract additional top scholars....I realise that this is a general problem in higher education, and it is not only a short-coming of this Department.

Once again, the questioning of pedagogical relations reveals a direction for re-vision. And this need for examination is, again, not unique to the Department. However, a praxical commitment to the "disclosure of tacitly held assumptions and intensions" would seem to require an examination of gender inclusiveness. What dialogue has been entertained in the Department about affirmative action? Has the notion of "gender inclusiveness" been a priority? What considerations have been brought forward regarding the "discrepancy in the Department?" The external tensions that influence the Department must also be considered.

[Please return to p. 217.]